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Thesis Abstract
This thesis analyzes data collected from four surveys conducted 
bewteen 1957 and 1984 in Palanpur, a village located in Moradabad District 
of Uttar Pradesh, India. It considers the evolution of inequality, poverty 
and economic mobility in Palanpur. The working of the credit market is 
also scrutinized.
The influences on the distribution of income and land of agricultural 
intensification (the "Green Revolution") and off-farm employment are 
examined. The use of income as an indicator of living standards is 
evaluated and compared with a more broad measure of prosperity. Various 
correlates of poverty are assessed and the incidence of poverty among 
agricultural labour and low caste households is found to be high.
A unified framework for the analysis of inequality, poverty and 
welfare, following the stochastic dominance approach, is applied to the 
data. Across a broad range of measures, the 1974/75 survey year shows less 
poverty, higher welfare and lower inequality. The four survey years may 
be divided into one pre-Green Revolution and one post-Green revolution 
pair. On this basis, there is some evidence that living standards have 
risen between the earlier and later pair of years. Within each pair, 
however, living standards in the later year tend to be lower. This is 
partly due to the effect of poor harvests.
Mobility in Palanpur appears high if we look at current incomes, 
suggesting that poverty in the village may not be long-term. However, 
among poor agricultural labour households occupational mobility is low. 
Moreover, the income mobility among these households is largely transitory 
and hence poverty for this group may be regarded as sustained.
Credit market operations in Palanpur between 1974/75 and 1983/84 are 
examined. Credit rationing is widespread and in this segmented market 
there is evidence that poor households are able to smooth consumption only 
by borrowing at a high (and rising) cost.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis is concerned with dynamic aspects of inequality, poverty 
and mobility in the north Indian village of Palanpur. Its aim is to 
document changes in the levels and distribution of living standards in the 
village and to investigate the processes whereby these changes have 
occurred.
Data on the village are available for four years covering an interval 
of roughly a quarter-century between 1957/58 and 1983/84. As a result, it 
is possible to investigate the impact on living standards in Palanpur 
exercised by some of the developments which have taken place in the wider 
Indian context. We enquire into the effect of changing agricultural 
technologies, the so-called "Green Revolution", on the distribution of 
income in the village. We ask who have been the major beneficiaries, who 
have not, and whether there have been changes over time in this respect. 
In a similar way we examine aspects of the process of inter-sectoral change 
whereby a number of villagers have been able to move from a livelihood 
which was highly dependent on agriculture to a more diversified 
occupational structure including employment in nearby towns. Another 
feature of the wider Indian economy which has affected Palanpur concerns 
the evolution of financial markets in rural areas. We examine the credit 
market in Palanpur and ask how well this market operates as a source of 
funds for those villagers with particular investment needs or those who 
wish to smooth their consumption in the face of short-term fluctuations in 
income. We also pay attention to the success of government programmes 
designed to expand the availability of credit in the village.
In this study, attention is paid to issues which arise out of an 
attempt to measure living standards, particularly where these are changing 
over time. The focus on one village provides a rare opportunity to
15
evaluate the success of common approaches to the measurement of socio­
economic change. This is because the study permits the comparison of 
results reached on conventional bases with what is known about the village 
from intensive fieldwork carried out during four separate survey periods, 
and which has provided detailed quantitative and qualitative information.
1.1. The Palanpur Study
The project to study the Palanpur economy over an extended period of 
time was originally initiated by Christopher Bliss and Nicholas Stern. 
Over the agricultural year 1974/75, assisted by two Indian researchers - 
S.S. Tyagi Jr. from the Indian Agricultural Economics Research Centre 
(AERC) in Delhi and V.K. Singh from RES College, Agra - they undertook a 
year-long study of the village economy which culminated in the publication 
of a book, Palanpur: the Economy of an Indian Village, in 1982. In this 
book, the focus was principally on agriculture, economic decision-making 
and markets, but it also explored in some detail a wide range of other 
issues relating to the village economy. The selection of the village was 
based on a number of different criteria^. Prominent among these was the 
fact that the village had twice previously been surveyed by researchers 
from the AERC in Delhi, the first survey taking place in 1957/58 and the 
second in 1962/63. Results from the first survey were reported in Ansari 
(1964) . Copies of completed schedules and questionnaires used during the 
earlier two surveys were made available to Bliss and Stern and some 
comparisons were provided in Bliss and Stern (1982).
In the late 1970s Nicholas Stern decided to prepare for a resurvey of 
the village, with the intention to explore further questions relating to 
living standards, and changes over time. He approached Jean Dreze on the 
issue in 1982 and it was decided to conduct a survey over the 1983/84 
agricultural year. This resurvey was directed by Jean Dreze and Nicholas
.^ These are described in full in Bliss and Stern (1982), and will 
not all be repeated here.
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stern, in consultation with Christopher Bliss, and conducted by Jean Dreze 
and Naresh Sharma of the Indian Statistical Institute in Delhi. Stern made 
frequent visits to the village during the course of the fieldwork, and 
Bliss also visited the village during this period. The survey covered a 
period somewhat longer than one entire agricultural year between 1983 and 
1984. The researchers in 1983/84, as in 1974/75, were assisted by S.S. 
Tyagi Jr. of the AERC and his participation greatly contributed to 
continuity^. The project was directed from the University of Warwick 
Development Economics Research Centre until 1986 when it moved to the 
London School of Economics. It was funded by the Overseas Development 
Adminstration (ODA) under ESCOR.
After the 1983/84 survey, the data for all four years were compiled 
and coded in such a manner so as to create a panel data set^. While the 
level of detail (and accuracy) is not uniform over all four survey years, 
an extensive "core" of data are available for each year and much of the 
analysis contained in the thesis is based on this core data set. Where 
possible the core data are then supplemented with additional information 
available for specific survey years*.
1.2. The Village Setting
An excellent and detailed description of Palanpur, its population, 
institutional setting and its markets, can be found in Bliss and Stern 
(1982) . Additional information, pertaining specifically to the last survey
^. Moreover, the elder brother of S.S. Tyagi Jr. had directed the 
fieldwork in Palanpur during the 1957/58 survey.
^. This lengthy process was directed by Jean Dreze at the University 
of Warwick and the London School of Economics during the mid-1980s and was 
funded by the ODA and the Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics 
and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the LSE. A number of collaborators 
assisted in this programme, including Naresh Sharma, S.S. Tyagi, Luc 
Leruth, Serge Wibaut, Anindita Mukherjee, and Peter Lanjouw.
*. In addition, between the main survey years several short revisits 
took place which provided useful supplementary information on the village.
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year, can be found in a number of recent contributions (see Dreze and Stern 
(1986, 1989), Dreze (1988), Dreze and Mukherjee (1989) and Dreze and Sharma 
(1990) and Sharma (forthcoming)). In the brief introduction to the 
village presented below we have drawn from these sources but this overview 
will not attempt to go into the same level of detail.
In addition, we will not attempt to provide here a complete account 
of the village economy and how it has evolved over time. While we do 
discuss some aspects of the village economy, we will carry out a fairly 
detailed examination, in chapter 2 of this thesis, of the major forces 
which have affected the economy of Palanpur over time and therefore do not 
repeat this discussion here.
In terms of population, population growth, average yields, per capita 
income levels and growth rates, Palanpur is not far away from all-India 
averages. This is not to assert however, that Palanpur may be regarded as 
a "typical" Indian village - a notion of a "typical" or "average" village 
is a rather doubtful concept. What we are interested in is whether 
commonly advanced arguments apply to or explain what is observed in 
Palanpur. If not, we are entitled to ask why that is. Does this raise 
interesting questions for the arguments? Does what occurs in Palanpur 
provide insights into what might be fruitfully investigated elsewhere? 
Palanpur does not have particular features which make it peculiar in 
crucial respects. For a village study to provide a useful setting in which 
to examine the working of economic theories or to assess the impact of 
particular government policies, we would not want it to stand out markedly 
in any particular way.
1.2.1 Location and Physical Features
Palanpur is situated in Moradabad District in west Uttar Pradesh. It 
is located along the railway track connecting the city of Moradabad and the 
town of Chandausi. Both these towns are quite sizeable, the population of 
Moradabad was already in excess of 200 thousand in 1974/75. Moradabad is
18
approximately 3 0 kilometers away and Chandausi is situated at a distance 
of about 13 kilometers (see Figure 1) . Palanpur lies adjacent to the 
Jargaon railway station on the Moradabad - Chandausi line and is thus quite 
well positioned vis-a-vis the outside world. This relatively favourable 
connection with the urban economy has been important in facilitating access 
to work opportunities outside the village. But it cannot be said that 
Palanpur is exceptional in this respect, at least for Moradabad district: 
while only a minority of villages are endowed with a railway station, a 
significant part of the rural population in the district finds it possible 
to take up employment in nearby towns and to commute either by public 
transport or by bicycle. While Palanpur has a railway station, the nearest 
tar-sealed road is several kilometers away and reaching the nearest town 
(Chandausi) by bicycle involves a journey of some time. The distance from 
Delhi of Palanpur is about 190 kilometers, and involves a journey by train 
of considerable duration. For most villagers in Palanpur, Delhi is a very 
remote place which does not figure highly in their daily life.
The village itself consists of a cluster of mostly mud houses which 
are closely packed together. A few of the wealthier villagers have houses 
which are made of brick, but these are relatively rare. Three broad lanes, 
wide enough for a bullock cart, run through the village. There are a 
number of small narrow alleys in the village. The village households are 
divided in such a way that specific castes tend to congregate together. 
There is no electricity in the village itself, nor effective drainage in 
the lanes running through the village.
1.2.2 Land and Agriculture
The village land covers just under 500 acres, including residential 
and railway land as well as land under the Ari river which forms the 
village boundary on the northern and eastern side. Most, but not all of 
this land is owned by Palanpur households; some is owned by landlords in 
neighbouring villages. Similarly, a few Palanpur households own land in 
other villages. Nearly all of the village land is being cultivated. There
19
is very little which is under any forest cover so that possibilities for 
further extension of agriculture are minimal. The distribution of land 
owned and cultivated is described in Chapter 2.
Agriculture forms the most significant component of the Palanpur 
economy. The dominance of this sector declined somewhat in the most recent 
survey year as links between Palanpur and the outside economy strengthened, 
but even then it remained of central importance. There are two main
seasons in the agricultural year, rabi and kharif. The harvest for most 
of the crops grown in the rabi season is in April and May, and for the 
kharif it is in September and October. For the relatively small area 
cultivated in Palanpur, the number of crops grown is rather large (in 
1983/84 around 3 0 crops were grown in almost 100 combinations). However, 
most of the gross cultivated area is devoted to four or five main crops. 
In decreasing order of area in 1983/84, these are wheat, sugarcane, millet 
(bajra), fodder (jowar) and paddy. Sugarcane is a major cash crop in the 
region and wheat is the most important food grain. Most crops are grown 
in either the rabi season or the kharif season but sugar cane is the 
exception as it requires ten months to reach maturity. The main rabi crop 
is wheat, while bajra, jowar and paddy are all grown during the kharif 
season. High yielding wheat seed varieties associated with the "Green 
Revolution" were introduced in Palanpur over the interval surveyed. The 
first such seeds were introduced around 1970, i.e. between the 1962/63 and 
the 1974/75 survey years, and further improved varieties have appeared 
subsequently.
A second major feature of the agricultural intensification which took 
place in Palanpur over the 25 years surveyed has been the spread of 
irrigation. Whereas in 1957/58, irrigation was still very underdeveloped, 
by 1983/84 more than 9 6% of land owned was irrigated. Nearly all 
irrigation is from sources drawing groundwater. There is a small village 
pond which is occasionally used as a source of irrigation water. In 
1974/75, Bliss and Stern (1982) found that the most common source of 
irrigation was the Persian wheel attached to an open well and powered by
20
draught animals. By the last survey year, the number of Persian wheels had 
declined from 26 in 1974/75 to 22, with many of them not in working order. 
The use of Persian wheels had declined because they were being replaced by 
diesel pumping sets; there were 22 such pumping sets in 1983/84 compared 
with only 9 in 1974/75. In addition, in 1983/84 one tubewell running on 
electricity was in operation and the one tractor in the village was also 
being used to lift water from borings.
The climate in Palanpur is dry for most of the year, but there are 
four monsoon months (July-October) during which rains are frequent. These 
rains are erratic from year to year, and in this respect agriculture during 
the 1983/84 survey year fared particularly poorly^. The monsoon is 
preceded by a couple of very dry and hot months where temperatures during 
the day can be well over 40° C. During the winter months in Palanpur 
temperatures can fall to nearly 0° C, and there are occasional rains as 
well.
1.2.3 Population and Caste Composition
In 1957/58 there were 100 households in the village, comprising a 
total population of 528. By 1983/84 the number of households had risen to 
143 and the population had risen to 960. According to the 1981 Census, 
nearly 75% of all villages in India had a population below 1000, and almost 
50% had a population below 500 . For the state of Uttar Pradesh 
specifically, the comparable proportions were very similar. Palanpur, while 
not extremely large, is certainly not among the smaller villages in India.
Palanpur is a multi-caste village, and this feature of the village 
will be seen to exercise an important influence in many different parts of 
the analysis. Of the village population in 1983/84, 87% were Hindus with 
the remaining 13% consisting of Muslims. Bliss and Stern (1982) divide the
^. During that year, pest attacks on a number of fields during both 
the rabi and kharif seasons constituted an additional factor resulting in 
particularly poor harvests for 1983/84.
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village population into a hierarchical ordering of nine castes and this 
division will be retained in the thesis. The term "caste" in this sense 
is used rather loosely as it includes those Hindus without caste and two 
groups of Muslims.
The top of the social hierarchy in Palanpur is occupied by households 
of the Thakur caste. In 1983/84 there were 3 0 such households with a total 
population of 217 individuals. Thakurs are traditionally of a warrior 
caste and even though most of them are currently farmers, factory workers 
in nearby towns, or government employees, there remains a discernable 
reluctance among many to become involved in manual labour. In 1983/84, the 
average landholding per Thakur household was 25 bighas (6.4 bighas are 
equal to 1 acre), and the average cultivated holding was 19 bighas (see 
Table 1). This compares with 30 and 26 bighas respectively in 1974/75. 
From Table 1 we can see that while in terms of status Thakurs are ranked 
highest in the village, they are not ranked highest in terms of land 
ownership, operation, nor in fact, per capita income.
Ranked just below Thakurs in the social hierarchy are the Muraos. In 
1983/84 there were 27 such households with a total population of 217. 
Muraos are the only caste group in Palanpur whose traditional occupation 
is cultivation, particularly the growing of vegetables. Compared to other 
castes, many Muraos appear to take pride in cultivation and they are often 
very skilled farmers. They have taken greatest advantage of recent 
technological advances in agriculture. Their land endowment is better than 
that of all other castes and has actually increased over time. The average 
landholding of Murao households in 1983/84 was 40 bighas compared with 37 
bighas in 1974/75, and in 1983/84 they averaged a cultivated holding of 41 
bighas compared with 29 in 1974/75 (table 1). The rising prosperity of 
Muraos has become a source of rivalry with the Thakurs, who are losing 
their ability to retain a privileged economic and social position.
Next in the social hierarchy of Palanpur are the Dhimars. The 
traditional occupation of this caste of 13 households in 1983/84 numbering
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74 individuals, was water carrier. Dhimars reportedly owned quite a lot 
of land long ago, but they had already lost much of this by the earlier 
survey years. By 1983/84 the average household owned 5 bighas and 
cultivated 12 bighas of land. This was down from a comparable average of 
11 and 19 bighas respectively in 1974/75. In chapter 6 of this thesis we 
will see that Dhimar households are quite heavily indebted to public 
lending institutions in Palanpur.
Below the Dhimars in the social hierarchy are households of the 
Gadaria caste. This caste comprised 12 households in 1983/84 and 83 
individuals. The traditional occupation of these households was goatherds 
although few are still involved in this occupation. In terms of 
landholding per household in 1983/84, Gadarias were ranked below only 
Thakur and Murao households with an average holding of 16 bighas, and a 
cultivated holding of 15 bighas.
The two Muslim "castes"; Dhobis - washermen, and Telis - oil pressers, 
follow below the Gadaria caste in the social hierarchy. There were only 
4 Dhobi households in 1983/84 numbering 27 individuals. Telis were more 
numerous with 16 households and 92 individuals. On average, households of 
these two castes owned around 6 bighas of land in 1983/84. Dhobis averaged 
a cultivated holding of 15 bighas while Telis cultivated 12 bighas on 
average.
Below the Telis in rank, but far richer in terms of average per capita 
income, are the Passi households^. This caste was traditionally involved 
in mat-weaving. They recently emigrated to Palanpur from east Uttar 
Pradesh, and many members of the caste are employed in the railways. 
Involvement in agriculture of this caste is generally quite low, with on 
average a land holding of 9 bighas and land operated averaging 7 bighas in 
1983/84.
Towards the lower end of the social hierarchy as laid out here, 
the actual ranking of castes becomes less clear-cut. Hence, the 
significance of the Passis being "ranked" below the two Muslim groups while 
earning greater incomes, may not be marked.
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The Passis are followed by the Jatabs (traditionally leather-workers) 
in the social ranking. This is the third largest group in the village 
after the Thakurs and Muraos. In 1983/84 there were 19 Jatab households 
numbering 118 individuals. Jatabs are similar to Muraos in many ways, 
except that they own far less land and other resources (in 1983/84 Jatabs 
owned 11 bighas of land on average, and cultivated 12 bighas). They are 
heavily involved in various labouring occupations, particularly 
agricultural labour. Although they are poor, and unable to lease in as 
much land as they may desire because they lack complementary resources, 
Jatabs are good cultivators, particularly in growing vegetables.
The ninth group in the social hierarchy comprises the remaining 
households in the village which do not fit into any of the other castes. 
Consequently this heterogenous group should not be considered as uniformly 
below the Jatabs in rank. It included, in 1983/84, three Banji (sweeper) 
households, two households of the well-educated Kayasth caste, a barber 
household and one carpenter household. The households in this group differ 
widely from each other in social standing, education, income, and so on. 
They have little or no involvement in agriculture.
1.2.4 Markets and Institutions
The market for land in Palanpur centres on rental transactions as 
opposed to sales. Sales of land occur infrequently and usually as a 
consequence of distress. The principal contractual arrangement is 
sharecropping, with 50% of the harvest going to each the landlord and 
tenant, but with the tenant incurring most production costs (such as seed, 
labour, use of bullocks and so on). In recent years, with the expansion 
of fertilizer use and mechanized irrigation, some of these additional 
variable costs are shared between landlord and tenant. Several features 
of leasing patterns are of interest. Tenancy arrangements covered in 
1983/84 approximately 3 0% of total operated area, and more importantly 
leave very few households in the village unaffected. Both tenants and 
landlords constitute large, fluctuating and heterogeneous groups. While
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landlords tend generally to be somewhat better endowed in terms of 
landholdings, the distribution of both groups along the landownership scale 
is quite similar. A majority of tenants contract with several landlords, 
with most leases lasting only one year. The landless have virtually no 
access to tenancy. See Bliss and Stern (1982), and Drèze and Sharma (1990) 
for further details on sharecropping in Palanpur.
The labour market in Palanpur operates largely in terms of casual 
agricultural labour with some non-agricultural wage labour also occurring 
within the village. As a rule, casual labour is hired on a daily basis. 
Contracts are usually agreed during the evening preceding the day of 
employment, with the employer approaching the prospective labourers and 
asking them whether they are willing to work for him the next day. There 
are three types of wage-payment system: daily wage, piece rate, and harvest 
share. Most contracts are based on the daily-wage system. The "going 
wage" for a day's work is generally the same for all labourers, and it also 
tends to be somewhat rigid over time despite fluctuations in the level of 
agricultural activity. As a result, involuntary unemployment is common 
during periods of slack labour demand. Often, those who have to go without 
a job during these periods are the less productive labourers. Few women 
are employed as wage labourers and those that are are almost invariably 
from the lower castes. Regular employment opportunities outside the 
village have increased substantially over the survey period, while 
traditional labour services and occupations are becoming less important. 
More details on the labour market can be found in Drèze and Mukherjee 
(1989) .
The credit market is the subject of chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Briefly, it can be divided into four broad segments: (1) interest-free
credit from friends and relatives; (2) low interest credit from state 
institutions (including rural banks and a local Credit Cooperative); (3) 
commercial credit from urban goldsmiths and pawn-brokers; and (4) high- 
interest credit from village moneylenders. Nominal interest rates vary 
widely between these four sources (from zero in the case of friends and
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relatives to about 60 per cent per year in the case of village 
moneylenders), but non-price factors limit arbitrage. For instance, 
borrowing from a relative can entail a loss of prestige, state institutions 
are prone to corruption and fraud, and loans from urban goldsmiths can be 
obtained only against specific collaterals. Generally, better-off 
households are able to obtain cheaper credit, while the poorest households 
find it hard to borrow from sources other than village moneylenders.
There is an active market for the services of most (non-animal) assets 
used for productive purposes in Palanpur. In earlier years, as mentioned 
above, most irrigation was conducted with the use of a Persian wheel 
powered by bullocks or buffaloes. By 1983/84, water was mainly drawn from 
tubewells by diesel pumpsets. Throughout the survey period, irrigation was 
organized and provided privately. Similarly, the introduction of new 
technologies and seed varieties was largely the result of private 
initiative. Although an extension worker has been appointed for Palanpur, 
there is little evidence of effective assistance and advice being provided.
In Palanpur there is an elected village council, called the Panchayat, 
which was designed to serve as the cornerstone of local self-government. 
The Panchayat hardly ever meets and in practice most of its duties are 
performed directly by the headman. In 1983/84, this headman was a Thakur 
farmer who was regarded by many as corrupt, and strongly disliked by many 
in the village.
Palanpur has a government primary school. However, this institution 
does not function in an even remotely satisfactory manner. The school is 
housed in a one-room building in ruins, with no materials or equipment to 
speak of. In 1983/84 the school teacher was a Thakur from Palanpur, son 
of the village headman, but he was only rarely observed to perform his 
duties. There is also a Secondary High School located in Palanpur. It is 
privately run and has a slightly better record than the Primary School. 
However, as this school requires the payment of fees, only few Palanpur 
households send their children to the school. These households are without
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exception of the higher castes. In 1983/84 72% of males and 95% of all 
females in Palanpur were illiterate. There were four college graduates and 
two individuals with secondary education. Of the four graduates three were 
Muraos and one was a Gadaria. On the whole however, the level of education 
among Thakurs was the highest in the village, with 31% of all Thakurs 
having gone to school. The Jatabs, Dhimars, Dhobis and Telis were the most 
poorly educated in the village.
1.3. Socio-Economic Change in Palanpur: Issues
In this thesis one of the issues with which we will be concerned is 
whether the "quality of life" of Palanpur villagers has improved over the 
last 25 years. This question is one which is natural to ask and one which 
is of interest not only to economists but any to concerned observer. 
However, it raises a number of important methodological issues. There is 
need for a definition of welfare and its changes over time. In addition, 
to comment on the welfare of individuals involves numerous distributional 
judgements. Under certain conditions (e.g. the endorsement of individuals' 
own preferences), welfare changes are revealed by a comprehensive measure 
of "real income" which takes into account not only earnings but also 
health, disutility of labour, the consumption of public goods, etc. (see 
Sen, 1979) . Such a measure of "real income" can differ markedly from the 
conventional income measure, and an important component of this thesis is 
concerned to highlight these differences. However, this is not to deny the 
importance of purchasing power in any assessment of changes in living 
standards in Palanpur. Because so many villagers are severely constrained 
by poverty in their endeavors and aspirations, it is easy to understand the 
great concern for money incomes among villagers. A further point relating 
to income as a measure of living standard is that as a measure of 
purchasing power it represents command over commodities and yet ultimately 
we may be more interested in "capabilities" (see for example. Sen, 1992). 
The two approaches diverge mainly because the relationship between 
commodity command and capabilities tends to differ from one individual to
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the next. However, the differences need not be very large within a small 
village, where the individuals share a similar environment and a similar 
access to public goods. For these reasons, this thesis will pay a 
considerable amount of attention to changes in the levels, distribution and 
functional determinants of money incomes in the village.
In the literature on the measurement of living standards, consumption 
expenditure has frequently been proposed as an alternative indicator of 
welfare (see for example, Anand and Hariss, 1990). It is argued that such 
a measure is well placed to shed light on welfare achievements by 
individuals. Certainly, where individuals are able to "smooth" consumption 
in the face of fluctuations in income, one might prefer to examine 
expenditures when evaluating living standards. Such a measure is used in 
many studies of living standards, particularly in India, and there is no 
doubt that much interesting analysis could have been conducted for Palanpur 
with such information. However, the data available for the village do not 
include details on consumption and expenditures and no work in this 
direction could be carried out’.
While the use of income data may not generate the same conclusions 
regarding living standards in Palanpur as would have been obtained from 
consumption data, in some situations it might actually be the preferred 
indicator. As has been pointed out by Atkinson (1989) income can be seen 
to point to opportunities to achieve certain welfare levels, while 
expenditures reveal achievements. The implication of this difference can 
be easily brought out in an example. A particular individual may be 
regarded as very badly off on the basis of expenditure data, when in fact 
his income is quite adequate and his low consumption is not the result of
’. It is possible that the choice of expenditure data as opposed to 
the collection of income data in most large scale studies of living 
standards, is motivated by the fact that it is easier to collect (although 
numerous collection and definition problems are also encountered in this 
approach). A reliable measure of income (certainly annual income) involves 
very detailed information and requires extensive cross-checking and 
verification. Complete information on many income components would not be 
readily volunteered to strangers. In the Palanpur study it was possible 
to overcome many of such difficulties.
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financial constraints but some other consideration such as fasting on 
religious grounds, or the conscious choice for an ascetic way of life. In 
such circumstances it may be argued that the expenditure data become 
misleading in terms of revealing the standard of living.
Supposing that the use of income restricted to some measure of 
purchasing power is found to be acceptable, the measurement of income and 
its change over time in an agrarian economy still presents a number of 
difficulties. First is the definition of income for farm households 
simultaneously involved in production, consumption and investment. Second 
is the need to choose price indices which will allow meaningful comparisons 
to be made between survey years. A third problem involves the choice of 
time interval over which the flow of incomes should be calculated. In some 
respects an interval of a year may seem to be very long because it masks 
the considerable variation occurring during the year. On the other hand, 
an annual measure may seem too short because it does not adequately reflect 
the long-term purchasing power position of individuals. In the Palanpur 
setting, as in most agricultural settings, these considerations take on 
additional significance because of the presence of sharp short-run 
fluctuations in farm incomes due to harvest quality. We will see that 
"noise" in an income measure, in the sense that income in a particular year 
deviates randomly from its long-run level, can have serious implications 
for the investigation of living standards, particularly in the analysis of 
poverty and economic mobility.
A first step taken in this thesis is an enquiry into the distribution 
of living standards in the different survey years. Is income inequality 
rising with the intensification of agriculture and the rise in the number 
of outside jobs? There is a substantial literature which suggests that the 
Green Revolution has been associated with increasing income inequality (for 
a recent survey on this issue see Lipton and Longhurst, 1989) . It is 
argued that large farmers may have advantages in the credit market and are 
therefore better positioned to acquire the new seed varieties, fertilizers 
and capital goods that the more intensive cultivation practices require.
29
In addition, it has been argued that large farmers may be able to reap 
economies of scale from cultivating intensively on larger plots of land and 
by utilizing their capital stock more efficiently. Third, large farmers 
may be quicker to adopt new practices because the risks posed may be less 
severe as they need not devote their entire landholdings to the new 
techniques.
A second issue discussed in the literature has been the effect on the 
distribution of income of inter-sectoral transfer out of agriculture. In 
a developing country context, this literature can be traced back at least 
to the contribution of Lewis (1954), and it has provoked much research at 
various levels of aggregation (see also Kuznets, 1955) . In Palanpur there 
has been a discernable strengthening of links between the village and the 
outside economy and the impact of this process on income inequality has 
been marked.
The nature and the extent of poverty in Palanpur is examined and we 
discuss how well a measure such as income identifies the poor in the 
village. Questions relating to different notions of poverty must be 
addressed. For example, what are the differences between absolute poverty 
and relative poverty? From the perspective of policy, it is of interest 
to consider the success of various correlates in identifying the poor in 
the village. If a clear, and easily observed correlate of poverty were 
found, then this could suggest a possible target group for government 
poverty alleviation schemes. It will be seen that, because income is a 
'noisy' measure, seeking to identify groups particularly vulnerable to 
poverty may result in systematic biases, such that the poverty of those who 
are truly poor is understated while the poverty of those who are not poor 
is overstated.
Much of the analysis of living standards has tended to treat the 
measurement of income inequality, poverty and welfare as distinct issues 
which can be examined separately. Such practices are not always 
satisfactory, because they may obscure the many linkages between these
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aspects of living standards. In particular, the choice of summary measures 
can significantly influence conclusions reached. For example, it is quite 
possible that for a particular change in the distribution of income, with 
some specific measures, poverty may be seen to fall with inequality rising, 
and the reverse may be observed when other measures are used. As another 
example, it is important to know under what circumstances rising average 
incomes, accompanied by worsening income inequality, would lead to a rise 
or a fall in welfare. These questions are difficult to examine using 
conventional approaches.
A further problem encountered in many of the conventional approaches 
to the measurement of living standards is the failure to deal 
systematically with subjective judgements. We have already mentioned that 
poverty and inequality measures often do not make these judgments 
explicitly, but even where they do, one would also be interested to know 
how robust conclusions made on the basis of a particular measure are when 
other distributional judgements are held. In the measurement of poverty 
further room for individual discretion lies in the selection of a poverty 
line below which individuals will be regarded as poor. Once again it is of 
interest to know whether conclusions as to a rise or fall of poverty 
between two periods is heavily dependent on the actual income level at 
which the poverty line is drawn.
There is an approach taken in the literature, and which we examine in 
the Palanpur context, which does attempt to address many of the 
difficulties raised in the above two paragraphs. This is the approach 
pioneered by Atkinson (1970) for the measurement of inequality and welfare, 
which has been extended in a number of directions in subsequent 
contributions by himself as well as other researchers. Essentially the 
approach applies results from the literature on stochastic dominance to 
rank distributions on the basis of poverty, inequality and welfare. If 
dominance of one distribution, whether in terms of poverty, inequality or 
welfare, is observed, then this ranking holds over a wide range of 
measures. Hence a considerably more robust ordering, incorporating a much
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wider range of distributional judgements, may be obtained than would have 
been possible using one or two individual measures. Because the process 
of examining for stochastic dominance is so similar whether we are 
considering poverty, inequality, or welfare, we retain a clear idea of how 
related these concepts are. Using this approach does not always provide 
us with a full ranking, however. While this may appear in some respects 
to be a disadvantage, it does highlight the fact that comparisons of 
poverty, inequality or welfare cannot be easily divorced from 
distributional judgements.
A question of great interest which arises in any examination of 
dynamic aspects of living standards, is the extent of economic mobility 
which occurs over time. In relation to poverty, it is important to obtain 
some idea of the degree to which poverty is a sustained or a temporary 
condition. Once again, we must scrutinize our measure of income in its 
ability to distinguish between those villagers who are "chronically" poor 
and those who are not vulnerable in this respect. In some respects the 
fact that the years surveyed in Palanpur are fairly wide apart makes some 
of the analysis of income mobility more difficult. However, considerable 
additional insights can be obtained for the situation in Palanpur by 
scrutinizing the mobility of occupations. It is seen that households with 
involvement in agricultural labour have not enjoyed much occupational 
mobility over the quarter century studied. Moreover, households of this 
group are highly represented among the poor in all four survey years. 
There is therefore a suggestion that among most households in this group, 
poverty is a long-term condition.
The operation of the credit market in a village such as Palanpur can 
influence the living standards of households in several ways. First, this 
market can act as a conduit through which households wishing to make 
productive investments may be able to temporarily expand their expenditures 
over and above their current revenues and savings. These productive 
investments can affect future incomes of households and in this way living 
standards may be raised substantially and in a permanent way. Second, the
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credit market may affect living standards by providing a buffer whereby 
households facing a temporary downturn in their fortunes (this can be due 
to a whole host of reasons including bad health, harvest quality, mistakes, 
accidents, etc.) are able to avoid having to resort to distress sales of 
assets, or even more drastically, constrained consumption. With access to 
loans such households might avoid reinforcement mechanisms which could 
threaten to make a temporary downturn become a continuous spiral.
An examination of the Palanpur credit market with respect to these two 
roles may be usefully conducted from five perspectives. First, we ask 
whether credit has been going to both types of borrowers. As we are 
concerned to detect evidence of vulnerability among certain groups we will 
be particularly interested to see whether those who are likely to need 
credit to tide over temporary shortfalls are restricted in their access to 
the market. The approach from this perspective involves some assessment 
of the purpose for which credit is required. Ascertaining this purpose can 
be difficult because of the fungibility of money. From the second 
perspective, we enquire into the cost of credit and whether this has been 
changing over time. We will be interested to see whether credit going to 
different people has different costs attached to it and we must examine why 
this would be.
The third perspective focuses on repayment performance. An aspect 
which deserves attention is that the burden of debt may itself become one 
of the mechanisms threatening to turn a temporary shortfall into longer 
term immizerization. Related to this issue of repayment is the fourth 
perspective which focuses on collatoral and inter-linkages with other 
markets. If access to credit is linked with an ability to offer collatoral 
of a value equal to or greater than the loan, then there may be cause for 
concern that those with few assets may be unable to obtain the credit they 
would like, regardless of whether it is to be used for consumption 
smoothing or investment. It has been pointed out in the literature that 
inter-linkages with other markets may develop in those circumstances where 
informational asymmetries threaten to make credit unavailable for those
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unable to offer collatoral (see Bell, 1989, for a survey). However, even 
where such interlinkages occur it need not be the case that the outcome is 
particularly desirable. For example, in order to obtain credit, an 
agricultural labourer may have to accept employment as an attached labourer 
at a wage below the daily wage rate.
A fifth perspective from which we view the credit market in Palanpur 
is with respect to the dichotomy between public, or government, provision 
of credit and private (all other sources) provision. The government of 
India has been active in trying to displace the village moneylender in 
rural credit markets. It has argued that these moneylenders charge high 
and usurious interest rates, and has proposed that government provision of 
low cost credit is the best way to eliminate these moneylenders from the 
scene. Questions which must be asked include, what have been the effect 
of these measures in terms of the two roles that the credit market in 
Palanpur can play? What proportion of the total private credit market do 
moneylenders represent? Have village moneylenders actually diminished 
their scale of operation? Have they been replaced by other private 
lenders?
1.4. Village Studies Versus Large-Scale Studies
In recent years there has been on-going debate surrounding the way 
in which to examine socio-economic change in developing countries such as 
India®. One approach, often labelled the "economist's approach", has been 
to compare results for different years from large-scale surveys of many 
thousands of households designed to represent particular regions, states 
or even an entire country. The second approach, more typically associated 
with anthropologists but certainly not exclusively so, consists of 
resurveying individual villages or groups of villages. In India the debate 
became particularly heated during the 1970s and 1980s when it was found
®. A recent publication edited by Bardhan (1989) contains a very 
lucid summary of the debate until the late 1980s, and also contains many 
useful contributions from both sides of the debate.
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that the different approaches yielded different conclusions about trends 
in living standards in rural areas. Moreover, the divergence in conclusions 
was not always in the same direction. On the one hand, village re-surveys 
tended to observe a decline in poverty over time while large-scale studies 
painted a more gloomy picture. On the other, large-scale evaluations of 
the working of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) in India 
during the 1980s yielded rather optimistic conclusions while micro-studies 
tended to be considerably more negative.*
This thesis is well placed to contribute to this debate. We have 
already mentioned above that the changes in living standards which we have 
documented for Palanpur should not be extrapolated to all villages in rural 
North India, or even western Uttar Pradesh. However, the findings obtained 
for Palanpur may be usefully suggestive, and should be tested out 
elsewhere. It should be stressed that we do not disagree with the 
advocates of large-scale surveys who stress that generalizations are only 
possible from such studies. We would argue however, that the micro-study 
of a village such as Palanpur is better placed to examine "dynamics, 
processes and relationships" (Bardhan, 1989, pg.6) than large scale
studies. Village studies can circumvent many of the problems associated 
with large-scale studies stemming from the large size and the consequent 
need to compromise regarding standardized definitions, concepts and 
categories. In addition, possible "agency" problems which develop between 
field investigators and the original designers of the surveys may be 
avoided. Moreover, micro-studies are particularly good at identifying 
situations which, while still marginal and statistically insignificant, 
point to substantial changes in the larger dynamic context. Consequently, 
small scale field studies can very productively feed into the operation of 
large scale surveys by supplying hypotheses, identifying useful indicators, 
and highlighting the ambiguity of various definitions.
See Drèze (1990) for a comparison of the conclusions reached by 
the Concurrent Evaluation of the IRDP conducted by the government of India, 
and what was observed from many village studies, including Palanpur. Note 
that the IRDP was not introduced in Palanpur until after the last survey 
year, and as a result it will not be examined in this thesis.
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Micro-studies can play another important role in testing several areas 
of economic theory. For example, it has not been possible to firmly 
establish whether the ongoing attention of many development theorists to 
the importance of inter-linkages in rural markets has been warranted, 
because most large-scale studies are unable to provide any guidance as to 
the relative importance of such contracts. We would argue that careful and 
detailed micro-studies can provide the necessary information. These 
studies typically examine many markets at the same time; more extensive 
cross-checking and verification of responses can be carried out; and they 
are more likely to elicit accurate responses on topics which are sensitive. 
As a result, micro studies can be not only useful but may be essential 
testing grounds for economic theories.
While the Palanpur survey unambiguously falls under the heading of a 
micro-study, it is clear that in many respects it differs from the type of 
survey which anthropologists might carry out. Many cultural
anthropologists might reject altogether attempts to measure socio-economic 
change in a positive manner, and certainly most anthropological studies 
would place less emphasis on the collection of quantitative as opposed to 
qualitative data^ °. While we would agree that the collection of 
quantitative data should not form the entirety of an intensive village 
study, there can be real benefits to having such data available. Most of 
these advantages lie in the fact that carefully collected and recorded 
quantitative information may improve our ability to detect inconsistencies 
in respondents' replies as well as our understanding of what these 
inconsistencies mean. The level of detail provided by quantitative micro­
data means that if properly used, such data can contribute in a real way 
to the positive analysis of rural economies.
The Palanpur project is by no means the only village study in 
India which has focused on economic questions and made intensive use of 
quantitative data. There is a long list of studies in this area and many 
published works. For just a flavour of this literature, see Bailey (1957), 
Bardhan (1984), Bardhan and Rudra (1980), Cain (1990), Epstein (1962, 
1970), , Gough (1987), Hariss (1983), Platteau and Abraham (1987),
Swaminathan (1988), Walker and Ryan (1991).
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1.5. Plan of the Thesis
The changing distribution of income and land in Palanpur is the focus 
of chapter 2. The impact of population growth, intensification of 
agriculture and the spread of outside jobs is assessed. The determinants 
of income in the four survey years are examined. Inequality of incomes is 
decomposed by components as well as by population subgroups in an attempt 
to understand their contribution to total inequality. The effect of 
household partition on the distribution of land is examined. It is found 
that inequality in Palanpur changed substantially between the survey years, 
but that the direction of change was not uniform over the survey period.
In chapter 3 we examine the meaning and identification of poverty in 
Palanpur using three indicators of standard of living. The first is a 
measure of "apparent prosperity" based on the personal assessments of the 
investigators involved in the fieldwork. The other two are income for each 
respective survey year and a measure of permanent income obtained by 
averaging incomes over the four surveys. Income measured in any one year 
may give a misleading impression of the incidence of poverty. In 
particular where current income is used to identify groups particularly 
vulnerable to poverty, systematic biases may emerge. Vulnerability is high 
among low-caste households and those which are involved in agricultural 
labour. Categories, however, are not homogeneous.
Chapter 4 examines living standards in Palanpur from a particular 
methodological perspective. The approach taken is the one of stochastic 
dominance, which permits (partial) orderings of distributions on the basis 
of inequality, poverty and welfare. These orderings are robust over a wide 
range of measures embodying various subjective distributional judgements. 
We examine the extent to which we can obtain more rankings if we are 
prepared to permit less divergent distributional judgements than are 
allowed in the stochastic dominance framework. We find some evidence to 
support the assertion that living standards have risen over the 26 year 
period, particularly when we consider the income distribution as a whole.
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When we focus more specifically on poverty or inequality, it is more 
difficult to convincingly argue that the village has seen an improvement 
between 1983/84 and earlier years.
In chapter 5 we turn to the issue of economic mobility. In particular 
we examine the mobility of agricultural labour households in Palanpur. 
This examination yields insights into the working of the economic processes 
which have affected Palanpur over time. In addition, the interpretation 
of different measures of economic status, such as income and occupation are 
explored in a dynamic context. It is found that whilst the diversification 
of employment opportunities permits routes out of agricultural labour, 
particularly across generations, agricultural labourers are not generally 
well placed to take advantage of these opportunities and mobility out of 
agricultural labour remains low. While there appears to be much variation 
in relative incomes among agricultural labourers, there is some evidence 
that this 'income mobility' is more transitory than among other households. 
The incidence of poverty among agricultural labour households is 
consistently high. Together these factors suggest that households in this 
occupation are chronically poor.
Chapter 6 examines the credit market in Palanpur. In particular, the 
chapter considers the way in which the market has changed between 1974/75 
and 1983/84. Changes in levels of indebtedness between the two years are 
analysed. The changing relative importance of the various segments of the 
market is described. The evolving role of the public sector in the 
Palanpur market is considered and contrasted with the private sector. A 
distinction is made between private sources of credit within the village 
and those outside. The debt burden of households in Palanpur is examined 
and related to income levels, land ownership and caste. A formal analysis 
of the characteristics of borrowers from different segments of the market 
is presented and we also examine the determinants of debt levels. It is 
found that while there has been considerable change in the Palanpur credit 
market it is difficult to point to evidence of the credit market having 
improved in its ability to protect and enhance the living standards, in
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particular of those most vulnerable to poverty.
In Chapter 7, we provide a concluding discussion
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Table 1
COMPARISON OP BASIC INDICATORS FOR 1957/58 AND 1962/63 BY CASTE
Caste 1957/58
No. of No. of Per Av. land
households Individuals Capita Holding
Income^ (bighas)
1962/63
Av. land No. of No. of Av. Per Av. land Av. land
Cultivated households individuals Capita Holding Cultivated
(bighas) Income (bighas) (bighas)
Thakur 17 104 178 53 38 19 125 180 45 48
Murao 21 117 221 48 38 25 133 208 41 39
Dhimar 10 56 91 10 9 9 53 93 11 9
Gadaria 9 42 177 21 23 9 45 202 22 23
Dhobi 2 6 236 30 35 1 2 731 40 40
Teli 8 47 108 11 15 9 57 107 10 17
Pas si 11 56 180 10 10 16 70 183 8 6
Jatab 16 71 120 15 15 13 71 105 19 22
Other 6 29 112 5 7 5 29 93 10 9
VILLAGE 100 528 161 27 23 106 585 162 26 26
® All income figures are expressed in 1960/61 rupees (see chapter 2).
o
Caste 1974/75
No. of No. of Per Av. land
households Individuals Capita Holding
Income^ (bighas)
Table 1 (cont.)
COMPARISON OF BASIC INDICATORS FOR 1974/75 AND 1983/84 BY CASTE
1983/84
Av. land No. of No. of Av. Per Av. land Av. land
Cultivated households Individuals Capita Holding Cultivated
(bighas) Income (bighas) (bighas)
Thakur 25 174 334 30 26 30 217 212 25 19
Murao 27 178 336 37 29 27 217 240 40 41
Dhimar 8 59 210 11 19 13 74 194 5 12
Gadaria 10 68 237 18 18 12 83 211 16 15
Dhobi 3 22 178 19 18 4 27 175 5 15
Teli 12 71 203 7 18 16 92 149 6 12
Pas si 8 61 287 13 13 15 85 240 9 7
Jatab 14 97 189 14 21 19 118 83 11 12
Other 4 27 212 5 1 7 47 179 2 3
VILLAGE 111 757 273 23 22 143 960 194 18 19
® All income figures are expressed in 1960/62 rupees (see chapter 2).
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Chapter 2 
Agricultural Changes and Inequality
2 .1, Introduction
The economy of Palanpur changed radically between the first survey 
in 1957/58 and the last one in 1983/84. There were three major forces at 
work. First, the population grew from a little over 500 to nearly 1000. 
Second, agriculture intensified greatly with increased irrigation, the use 
of chemical fertilisers, and the adoption of new varieties of seed, 
particularly of wheat - the process often known as the "Green Revolution". 
Third, job opportunities outside the village, mainly in local towns within 
commuting distance, expanded very substantially, changing from 9 regular 
outside jobs in 1957 to 54 in 1983 and contributing around one-third of 
village income in the mid-1980s compared with less than one-tenth in the 
1950s. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the distribution of 
income and of land has altered under the influence of these demographic, 
technological and economic changes and to indicate how these processes and 
outcomes have been related to the operation of village markets and 
institutions.
We shall be examining the operation of two kinds of theory. The first 
concerns the more broad brush descriptions of the way in which development 
processes take place. Two key aspects of standard development stories - 
technical change, and sectoral transfer as the relative importance of 
agriculture declines - are involved here. The second concerns the way in 
which certain markets work, particularly those for land, labour and 
agricultural inputs. The analysis is based on data from the four household 
surveys of the village between 1957/58 and 1983/84. Although we are in a 
position to follow the fortunes of families over time the work described 
here involves mainly a comparison of the distributions of income at the 
four data points and is not based primarily on its panel aspects. These
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will, however, be invoked from time to time and will play an important role 
in some of the arguments (see Chapter 5 for a examination of economic 
mobility which further exploits panel aspects of the data).
Measurement of income and its growth raises a number of 
difficulties. First, we have the problem of what to include in the 
definition of income; second, we have to consider the relevant period for 
income measurement when there are severe fluctuations; and third, we need 
a price index for comparison across years. Further we have to consider the 
question of the income unit - individual, family, household, and so on. 
Finally, potential measurement inaccuracies associated with panel data must 
be recognised (see Ashenfelter, Deaton and Solon (1986) for a useful 
review) . We do not go into these important issues in detail but will 
comment. Our notion of income is intended to measure the returns to land, 
labour and other household assets, but we have not, largely for data 
reasons, been in a position to capture this perfectly. For example, as 
money lending income was not collected in the two earlier surveys and even 
in later surveys proved difficult to verify, it is not included in our 
measure^. As a rule we have used only simple measures which do not go 
beyond the data availability for early years. We have subtracted current 
input costs, including payments for labour hired but not family labour, but 
were not able to include land appreciation, or capital depreciation. 
Nevertheless we do think that the income measures remain useful and do not 
involve omissions which undermine our argument^.
We note that 1957/58 seems to have been an average year for 
agriculture, 1962/63 bad, 1974/75 rather good with yields perhaps 15% or 
so higher than average at that time and 1983/84 a bad year with yields
^. See chapter 3 for a discussion of how this omission leads to a 
divergence between the ranking of households in income terms compared with 
their ranking in 'apparent prosperity' terms.
^. Our income measure will remain under close scrutiny in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. Therefore we will defer discussion of some issues 
which arise from the calculation and use of this measure to those later 
chapters.
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30-35% or so down on the average at that time. With roughly 80% of income 
coming from agriculture for the years of the first three surveys (although 
only 56% in the last one) this consideration is obviously of great 
importance for assessing the level of incomes.
The price index which we have used is based on the consumer price 
index for agricultural labourers in Uttar Pradesh (see note to Table 1). 
As expenditure data were not collected in the Palanpur surveys, it proved 
impossible to construct our own price index for the village.
An aggregate picture of change in the village is presented in Table 
1. The growth in the village population over the 26-year period has 
averaged 3% per annum, a rate slightly higher but not far from that for 
India as a whole. Daily wages for hired agricultural labour appear to have 
risen over the quarter of a century at a rate similar to real income per 
capita. Real wages for regular outside jobs have risen rather faster than 
real income per capita. Average wheat yields have approximately tripled.
Bearing agricultural fluctuations in mind, the "normal" income per 
capita (i.e. averaging fairly crudely over fluctuations) for both the years 
1974/75 and 1983/84 would appear to be around Rs 240-250 (at 1960/61 
prices). Comparing with 19 57/58 we see a growth in income per capita of 
around 50% over 26 years, or around 1.9% p.a. - again not far away from 
all-India figures. In 1974/75 the income per capita was close to the 
average for India.
We shall see that, broadly speaking, the Green Revolution brought with 
it, at least initially, a reduction in inequality of incomes. (The new 
agricultural technologies were first introduced between the 19 62/63 and 
1974/75 surveys.) This is not to say that we have found a dramatic 
counter-example to the common assertion that the Green Revolution has been 
strongly biased in favour of rich farmers through their cheaper or 
privileged credit, lower risk aversion, greater access to information and 
scarce capital equipment and so on. In fact in Palanpur the Green
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Revolution appears to have been scale neutral. Two factors appear to have 
been involved. First irrigation reduces variability in yield. This 
equalising effect seems to have been particularly strong in a good year for 
agriculture (1974/75) where errant practices may be less heavily penalised. 
Second, the distribution of land cultivated in 1974/75 was more equal than 
in other years. This was for a combination of reasons. In the earlier two 
surveys the biggest ownership holdings were generally by Thakur households 
and four of their major landowning households split between 1962/63 and 
1974/75 dividing the land between them. Some members of this caste were 
prone to drinking and gambling and as a result over the years they lost 
land. By 1974/75 the Muraos owned more land than the Thakurs and were 
well-represented amongst the largest landowning households. The biggest 
landowners in that year were not however, leasing in land and, for this
year only, tenancy acted to make the distribution of cultivated holdings
more equal than land ownership.
As the Muraos' farming prospered, and some of the larger landholders 
woke up to the opportunities, while others with very small plots gave up 
agriculture, this equalising effect of tenancy on the distribution of 
agricultural holdings faded in the later years (1983/84) and the more 
effective farmers took on more land. In 1983/84 ten of the fifteen largest 
cultivators were Muraos and only two were Thakurs. The increasing 
dispersion in land cultivated was compounded by the more productive taking 
more land and by the more adverse conditions which led to greater
dispersion in yield per acre in 1983/84. Throughout the period, tenancy
remained almost exclusively share-cropping (See Sharma and Drèze (1990) for 
a detailed discussion of tenancy in Palanpur).
The most striking impacts on inequality in the period 1974/75 to 
1983/84 were not, however, from agriculture but from outside jobs. Where 
some lower castes had been employed in outside jobs in earlier years, in 
1983/84 the higher castes were more prominently represented and the outside 
jobs became a source of inequality as significant as agricultural incomes 
even though outside jobs represented only one-third of total income.
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Movements in the inequality of land ownership seem to be much smaller 
than those in income inequality. On average less than 1% of the village 
land turns over in any one year whereas one-quarter to one-third of the 
land would be under tenancy. This fraction appears to have increased over 
the last 9 years of the study period along with the growth of outside jobs 
and the greater success of certain groups in agriculture. Inequality in 
land ownership has grown a little in those 9 years but this has been almost 
entirely due to the early division of certain households in the sense that 
a number of sons now live separately from their fathers before the land is 
divided and thus become landless households. This is an interesting social 
development and possibly associated in part with the growth of outside 
jobs. Other movements in land ownership have been connected with distress 
sales brought about by dissipation, particularly drinking and gambling, and 
not by agricultural failure. Those who have bought the land tend to be 
those who have been successful in agriculture. As we have noted they are 
also taking more land under tenancy.
The remainder of this chapter is essentially devoted to providing the 
analytical evidence underlying the general picture we have described here. 
In the next section we examine the inequality of income and of land, in the 
former case decomposing it into contributions from its main elements, 
agricultural income and outside job income. Section 3 contains an analysis 
of the change in agriculture and Section 4 of outside jobs. Section 5 
briefly discusses issues in measuring inequality in the presence of income 
growth and sectoral transfer. Some concluding comments are offered in 
Section 6.
2.2. Inequality of Income and Land
Inequality in the distribution of income, as measured in the four 
surveys between 1957 and 1984, did not follow a monotonie path. In Table 
2 we see that between 1957/58 and 1962/63 inequality, as represented by a 
range of summary measures, increased. The Gini coefficient for 
individually distributed per capita income (see below for a discussion on
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the choice of this unit) rose from 0.336 to 0.390, generally taken to be 
a substantial increase. Looking at the Lorenz curves in Figure 1, we see 
that the curve representing 1962/63 lies outside that of all other years, 
implying that a whole range of inequality measures would present the 
1962/63 distribution as being the most unequally distributed (see Atkinson, 
1970)^ . Between 1962/63 and 1974/75, inequality as represented by the 
Gini coefficient fell dramatically from 0.390 to 0.253, and between 1974/75 
and 1983/84 it rose again to 0.307. Most of the summary measures of 
inequality present the 1983/84 distribution as more equal than the 1957/58 
distribution. However, in 1983/84 the Atkinson index with an inequality 
aversion parameter 5 is greater than the corresponding index for 1957/58. 
This means that as the index becomes very sensitive to inequality among the 
poor, income in 1983/84 is seen as less equally distributed than 1957/58. 
This is also reflected in the Lorenz curves in Figure 1, where the 1983/84 
curve lies below the 1957/58 curve at the lower end of the income scale, 
implying that the poor in 1983/84 received a lower share of total income 
than the poor in 1957/58. However, beyond the bottom 30%, income in 
1983/84 appears to be more equally distributed than 1957/58, and beyond the 
bottom 80%, it crosses the 1974/75 Lorenz curve.
Notice that we have presented figures on the distribution of income 
in terms of "individually distributed income per capita". This is 
calculated by dividing household income by the number of individuals and 
then attributing to each individual in the household this per capita 
income. Inequality in household income itself is not a particularly useful 
concept when households vary in size (see Cowell, 1984a)Experiments
^. The analysis of inequality on the basis of Lorenz curves (or more 
precisely, stochastic dominance) instead of summary indices is in many 
respects preferable to the examination of summary statistics. In chapter 
4 of this thesis, these advantages are explored in some detail and in that 
chapter the discussion avoids summary statistics altogether.
^. Cowell (1984b) presents an additional argument for using 
individual incomes which is particularly pertinent to the Palanpur study. 
He argues that in the presence of family splits household income or 
household per capita income are not reliable units of observation, and 
individual per capita incomes (or equivalent incomes which allow for 
potential economies of scale) are preferred. See below for further 
discussion of the impact of family splits on the Palanpur economy.
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with dividing household income by "equivalent members" to correct for the 
lower "requirements" of children made little difference to the analysis 
presented here. In Table 3 we demonstrate the effect on measured
inequality of using three different sets of equivalence scales. Whether 
we examine individual incomes or use the household as the unit of analysis 
we see that the effect of using different equivalence scales is small 
regardless of which set of equivalence scales we use or which inequality 
measure is used. Second, and more importantly, the direction of measured 
inequality is not monotonie over all inequality measures and set of 
equivalence scales. For example, if we consider the Atkinson measure for 
individual incomes with e=2 inequality rises from 0.319 (using individual 
per capita incomes) to 0.328 if we use the equivalence scales provided by 
Paul (1989) and falls from 0.319 to 0.316 if we use the scales proposed by 
Jaramillo and Pinstrup-Anderson (1986). Given that we have little guidance 
as to which equivalence scales are preferable and that their use does not 
seem to alter measured inequality by much, we have chosen to keep things 
simple by not adjusting for 'equivalent units'^. We have not made any 
additional attempts to examine the extent of within-household inequality, 
although this clearly merits further research.
The relationship between average incomes and the degree of inequality
for the four survey years is explored in Figure 2. Following Shorrocks
(1983) we present generalized Lorenz curves for the four distributions. 
Generalized Lorenz curves are constructed by simply scaling the Lorenz 
curves for different distributions by their mean. Shorrocks shows that if 
a generalized curve for a particular distribution lies everywhere above 
that of another, then one can say that welfare in the former distribution,
as represented by a wide class of social welfare functions, is
unambiguously higher. It can be seen that although average income in 
1983/84 is greater than in 1957/58 and 1962/63, the generalized Lorenz
^. Atkinson (1983) notes that the ethical status of equivalence 
scales which are based on observed consumer behaviour may be of some 
controversy. Not everyone will agree that consumption patterns estimated 
conditionally on family composition can be used to draw conclusions about 
welfare levels with different compositions.
49
curve does not lie everywhere above that for 1957/58, and hence we cannot 
rank 1983/84 higher than 1957/58 in terms of welfare. On the other hand, 
the curve for 1974/75 clearly lies above that for all three other years.®
It is our objective in this chapter to arrive at some understanding 
of the causes of changes in inequality in Palanpur over the four survey 
years. Our analysis will focus on the different components of income, 
principally those derived from cultivation and from jobs outside 
agriculture. There is also agricultural labour income which is treated 
separately and may be negative for households which hire in labour. The 
main source of income outside agriculture is regular jobs outside the 
village but some small non-agricultural income is earned inside the village 
and some jobs outside the village are casual. The breakdowns of each 
decile of total income by three different components for each year are 
provided in Tables 4 (a)-(d) . It may be seen that the proportions vary both 
across the years and by decile. For the village as a whole in 1983/84, 
outside jobs contributed 34% of total village income, the proportion being 
as high as 51% for the top decile. For the three earlier surveys 
agricultural income was the dominant source of income for all households^.
It is interesting to note that the comparatively low inequality of 
income observed for the 1974/75 survey year is also mirrored in an average 
per capita income for the top decile that was just over 6 times greater 
than for the bottom decile®. For the other three survey years the 
comparable ratio was over 10, and nearly 20 for 1962/63. Although the top 
decile in 1974/75 did enjoy the highest average per capita income of all
®. Generalized Lorenz dominance is also explored in greater detail 
in chapter 4.
.^ It should be noted that agricultural income as we have defined it 
is not solely the difference between output and costs on land cultivated 
by the household. It also reflects share-rents received by households on 
land which they have leased out, and paid by tenants on the land they have 
leased in.
®. Although see Sen (1973) for a criticism of the range as an 
attractive measure of income inequality.
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survey years, the striking observation is that average per capita incomes 
for the poorest decile in that year were more than twice as high than for 
any of the other survey years.
The surveys are essentially snap-shots of the village in their 
respective years, and we must therefore consider the possibility that 
inequality may to some extent simply reflect variations in harvests due to 
fluctuations in climate or other stochastic factors which can affect 
households in different ways. Indeed, as we noted, the harvests in 1957/58 
and 1974/75 were generally regarded as being average or above while those 
in 1962/63 and 1983/84 were less successful. One idea investigated was 
that these fluctuations might explain a considerable portion of the rise 
in inequality between the last two survey years. In the last year outside 
job income had become particularly important. A poor harvest might 
increase inequality by widening the gap in income between those whose 
income derives mostly from agriculture and those with outside jobs. In 
Tables 4(a)-(d) we saw that the proportion of total per capita income from 
agricultural activities was around 80% in the first three years, but only 
56% in 1983/84. We tried to obtain a more accurate measure of permanent 
income by scaling agricultural revenue up in 1962/63 and 1983/84, and down 
in 1957/58 and 1974/75 (see Table 5). Because inputs in cultivation are 
generally applied some time before the harvest and with the expectation 
that this will correspond perhaps to the preceding or some 'average' of 
past harvests, it seems reasonable to scale agricultural revenue while 
leaving costs unchanged. This approach assumes that good or bad harvests 
do not have any marked effect on output prices, and that the reason for the 
bad or good harvest does not appear until late in the season (often but not 
always true). Alternatively, the scaling exercise can be thought to 
encapsulate the output-price effect. These adjustments have little effect 
on measured differences in inequality across the years. Note also in Table 
5 that by scaling up cultivation incomes in 1983/84 does not reduce 
inequality as we would have expected but increases inequality. Similarly, 
scaling down cultivation incomes for 1974/75 reduces measured inequality. 
We can see why and begin to understand the reasons for the differences in
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inequality by looking more carefully at the components of income.
In Table 6a and 6b we present the Gini coefficients of the four 
survey years, decomposed by income components. Following Shorrocks (1982) 
the contribution of components to total income inequality, as measured by 
the Gini coefficient, can be obtained from the product of a 'pseudo-Gini' 
coefficient for each component and a weight given by the proportion of the 
mean of the component to the mean of total income*. The 'pseudo-Gini ' 
simply consists of the Gini for the distribution of the income component 
when individuals are ranked in terms of their total (rather than component) 
income^ *. If income inequality is decomposed in this way, one can readily 
see why scaling agricultural income by some factor does not result in a 
significant change in inequality.
Suppose we consider changes in the income components which multiply 
each component by a scalar factor and which together are sufficiently small 
not to change the overall income ranking. Then Gj^, the pseudo-Gini for 
component k, is unchanged. Suppose the mean of component k changes from 
|l^ to &nd the mean of the overall income from |1 to . Then
(1)
*. similar techniques for decomposition by factor components have
been discussed in Anand (1983), Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1978), and Pyatt, Chen
and Fei (1980) .
The 'pseudo-Gini' for a particular component divided by the true
Gini for that component can be shown to be equal to the rank correlation
coefficient between incomes from the component and total incomes (see note 
2 in Table 6b). Hence the lower the 'pseudo-Gini' the more uncorrelated 
are incomes from that component with total incomes. Note also that the 
'pseudo-Gini' can take a value less than one.
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and
G - G ' =  [-üi-i4 ]Gi*+...n n' W (3)
^ H'
In 1974/75, for example, (see Table 6a) we have very different pseudo-Ginis 
for agricultural income and outside income, yet an increase of five 
percentage points in the share of outside job income and a corresponding 
reduction in the share of agricultural income (a fairly large adjustment) 
would reduce the Gini (if the above assumptions apply) by 0.05 
(0.321-0.065) = 0.013, small relative to the difference between the
observed Ginis for 1974/75 and 1983/84.
From Table 6a we see that for the first three surveys inequality is 
largely 'explained' by inequality in agricultural income whereas in 1983/84 
only around half can be 'attributed' to agricultural income with the other 
half coming from outside jobs. The 'pseudo-Ginis' for agricultural income 
showed a slight tendency to decline over time. For outside income, there 
was a striking increase in the 'pseudo-Gini' between the 1974/75 and 
1983/84 survey year, suggesting that not only did this component become 
more important in the later year (as seen by the higher relative mean) but 
the distribution of incomes from this source was along lines quite similar 
to the distribution of total incomes, unlike in 1974/75 when these incomes 
were virtually uncorrelated with total incomes (see Table 6b) . These 
considerations led us to look more closely (sections 3 and 4 below) at the 
causes of inequality in these two components.
In Table 7a we present mean per capita incomes for the different 
castes in Palanpur. Following Shorrocks (1980) and others (Cowell, 1980 
and Bourgignon, 1979) we decompose inequality between castes, using the 
Theil Index, to assess the extent to which total income inequality is due
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to between caste or within caste differences. We see in Table 7b that the 
bulk of inequality in all four survey years can be attributed to the within 
caste component. Nonetheless, roughly 25% of inequality as represented by 
this particular summary statistic is the result of between caste 
differences in all four years. There appears to have been little change 
in this respect over the whole survey period^.
The determinants of household income, as summarized using simple 
regressions, are set out in Table 8. The important influences appear to 
be land, the number of adult males, family size and outside jobs.
Interestingly, education does not appear to play a major role, although it
is possible that our measure, years schooling attained by the most educated 
household member, does not proxy education well. A large part of the 
variation is explained by the regressions in Table 8, although, as in some 
other respects the 1962/63 results are less satisfactory. The influence 
of land is particularly strong in 1974/75 and of outside jobs in 1983/84. 
The influence of the caste variables, allowance having been made for other 
attributes, is not strong although the coefficients for Muraos are 
generally positive whereas those for the Thakurs are negative. The Thakurs 
and Muraos are the two richest castes and own most land (respectively 29.4%
and 41.3% in 1983/84). We have already mentioned that Muraos are a
traditionally cultivating caste and Thakurs traditionally a warrior caste.
One of the problems encountered when looking at the individual survey 
years and attempting to describe trends by following particular households 
through the whole period is that in each survey year the composition of the 
village in terms of households can be different. First, households in the 
village may split over time. In the earlier years this usually occurred
. While the between group component here seems low, it should be 
noted that it is higher than what is frequently observed elsewhere. For 
example, in an investigation of inequality in Malaysia in 1970, Anand 
(1983) notes that perceived racial inequalities had prompted an extensive 
range of government policies favouring Malays vis-a-vis Chinese, Indians 
and Europeans. Yet he found that less than 10% of individual income 
inequality could be attributed to the between-race component in his 
decomposition of the Theil index.
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when brothers set up independent households upon the death of their father, 
and was generally associated with the division of the household's land 
between them. Later, it became increasingly common for members of the 
household to separate from their parents while these were still 
economically active. This then involved being a landless household until 
the family land was divided, with perhaps the son getting the usufruct of 
some of his father's land. Second, between 1957/58 and 1983/84 a few 
households entered the village while some others left. Sometimes a 
particular household was away for one of the survey years and could not be 
questioned. Thus it is not always possible to trace each household in one 
year to its antecedents in all other survey years. In order to examine the 
development of a given population, a subset of the village households in 
each year consisting of those which could be traced through all four survey 
years, was examined. This subset can be thought of as representing the 
'permanent population'. Any newcomer or departing household was ignored, 
but splitting households were retained. Inequality of income within this 
group appears to mirror the experience of the population as a whole, 
although in all years inequality is a little lower. In particular, changes 
between the years seem to be of roughly the same magnitude. It is useful 
to use this subset of the population when looking at issues which are 
amenable to panel data analysis^.
The distribution of land is represented in Figure 3 for the whole 
population in each year. As before, we attribute an equal proportion of 
a household's land to each member. The Lorenz curve for 1983/84 can be 
seen to generally lie outside that for the other years (but becoming 
indistinguishable from other Lorenz curves at the two ends). However, if 
we take the 'permanent population' and merge the households which split 
over the 26 year period, so that we are effectively considering the 
distribution of land between 'dynasties', we see that much of the 
difference in the distribution of land between the survey years is 
eliminated (Figure 4). In particular, while before the distribution of
. See chapter 5 for a more complete discussion of this 'permanent 
population'.
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land in 1983/84 was the most unequal, in Figure 4 the 1983/84 Lorenz curve 
for 'dynasties' in the 'permanent population' was inside (at least 
partially) that for the other years. It is clear therefore that the main 
determinant of the changes in the distribution of land over time has been 
the phenomenon of household splits. The market for land in Palanpur is not 
very active, and land sales played a minor role in the changing 
distribution of land.
In Table 9 we contrast the distribution of land ownership and land 
operated (or operational holding), focusing now on a household basis since 
the point of interest is the difference between land owned and land 
operated, i.e. tenancy. Tenancy is almost exclusively share-cropping 
throughout this period. The total amounts of land leased in the four years 
were 1957/58, 209 bighas, 1962/63, 341 bighas, 1974/75, 538 bighas and
1983/84, 73 6 bighas. This corresponds to an increase from about one quarter 
of all land cultivated to roughly a third. We have more confidence in this 
aspect of the data for the last two survey years and we can assert that 
leasing has shown a significant increase across that period. For 1962/63 
the Gini coefficients for the distribution of land owned and land operated 
were roughly equal although this conceals considerable tenancy (see next 
section). For 1957/58 and 1983/84 the Ginis for land operated are larger 
than for land owned but this ranking is reversed for 1974/75. Hence on 
balance tenancy had an equalising effect on operational holdings in 1974/75 
but not in other years. The reversal by 1983/84 of the equalising effect 
of tenancy is associated with some larger landowners leasing in land in 
1983/84 where very few of them did in 1974/75, together with more smaller 
households leasing out land. As agriculture becomes a more intensive 
activity it appears to involve greater commitment of time and energy.
2.3. Agricultural Change
It has been suggested by some that the Green Revolution benefits large 
landowners more than small farmers for a number of reasons (see Lipton and 
Longhurst, 1989, for a useful survey). Large farmers may have greater
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access to the credit market and are therefore more able to acquire the seed 
varieties, fertilizers and capital goods (largely for irrigation) that the 
more intensive cultivation practices require. Large farmers may be able 
to reap economies of scale from cultivating intensively on larger plots of 
land by utilizing their capital stock more efficiently. Large farmers may 
be quicker to adopt the new practices because the risks posed may be less 
severe as they need not devote their entire landholdings to the new 
techniques. One can try to trace further linkages between the distribution 
of income and agricultural change through the general equilibrium of the 
village. For example, Braverman and Stiglitz (1989) suggest that 
credit-market rationing for small farmers could lead to land sales, forcing 
these farmers to turn to sharecropping, and leading to a reduction of the 
initial productivity gains as well as a widening income distribution. In 
Palanpur things worked out differently with, between 1974/75 and 1983/84, 
few land sales but with the bigger and better farmers taking on more land 
under share tenancy.
New farming practices and seeds were introduced in the period between 
1962/63 and 1974/75. Average per capita income from agricultural 
activities in 1957/58 and 1962/63 was roughly constant, but between 1962/63 
and 1974/75 it grew by 75% (see Tables 4a-4d). Average real income from 
cultivation of the poorest 30% (in terms of total income in 1974/75), was 
76% greater than that of the poorest 30% in 1962/63. Average real income 
from cultivation of the richest 30% in 1974/75 was 36% higher. However, 
average real income from cultivation of the middle 40% was 107% higher in 
1974/75 than in 1962/63. The effect of the new farming practices seems to 
have been spread over the distribution, with the largest rise among those 
around the median.
Although 1983/84 was a poor year for agriculture, agricultural 
practices had intensified still further. In 1974/75, for example, Persian 
wheels made a large contribution to irrigation (there were 22 Persian 
wheels and 9 diesel pumping sets) whereas in 1983/84 very few Persian 
wheels were in active use and there were 22 diesel pumping sets.
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The impact of the Green Revolution on the distribution of agricultural 
income can be seen in Table 6b. The Gini for agricultural income fell from
0.509 to 0.372 between 1962/63 and 1974/75, suggesting an initially- 
equalizing influence. However, between 1974/75 and 1983/84 this Gini 
coefficient rose from 0.372 to 0.487, a considerable increase. Having 
suggested that agricultural change between 1962/63 and 1974/75 did not 
exacerbate agricultural income inequality, it is necessary to consider how 
this might have happened, and why some of the mechanisms suggested above 
did not apply strongly to Palanpur. Agricultural change in Palanpur over 
the years between 1957/58 and 1974/75 took various forms. In 1957/58, less 
than half of the village land was irrigated. Most of it was single-cropped 
and cultivation consisted largely of sowing and harvesting. By 1974/75 
double-cropping was commonplace. The use of Persian wheels and diesel 
pumping sets was widespread and almost all the village land was irrigated. 
An active market for the services of existing Persian wheels, tubewells and 
pumpsets developed alongside the rise in their numbers. High yielding 
varieties (HYVs) of wheat had been introduced and were widely used. The 
expansion in irrigation as well as the increased adoption of HYVs in 
Palanpur was not the result of an integrated programme of public investment 
and extension services. In fact it appears that the new technologies made 
their way into the village on a gradual basis with farmers acquiring new 
capital and seed varieties as and when they could afford these. When new 
practices had been successfully adopted by some farmers, they would be 
imitated by others. Although a government Seed Store had been established 
in Palanpur, providing new seed varieties and fertilizer on credit, it was 
widely accepted that these were often deteriorated or mixed and of lower 
quality than what was available on the market. Most seed loans taken out 
from the Seed Store were for consumption purposes. Pumpsets and Persian 
wheels were occasionally purchased with loans from banks in the nearby 
towns of Chandausi and Bilari, but this was by no means the rule and 
occasionally they were purchased from accumulated savings^L
. See chapter 6 for further details on the credit market in 
Palanpur.
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We may think of agricultural income as being determined by a 
combination of three factors. First, land cultivated, second inputs per 
acre and third an 'unexplained' contribution to output per acre which we 
may associate with skills, land quality, luck and the like. The dispersion 
of land cultivated was discussed in section 2 above and we saw that in 
1974/75 this was indeed lower than in other years. The relationship 
between output and land cultivated is explored in Table 10(a). We can see 
from the regressions of the logarithm of output on the logarithm of land 
cultivated and that of the logarithm of cultivation costs on the logarithm 
of land cultivated that for all four years the two regressions suggest 
proportionality of both output and cultivation costs to the area 
cultivated.
The proportionality conclusion is confirmed when we look at the small 
covariance of the logarithm of output per bigha and the logarithm of land 
cultivated (Table 10(b)). Hence we may investigate the dispersion of 
output in terms of the dispersion of land cultivated and of output per 
bigha. From the variances presented in Table 10(b) we see that the more 
important is that of the logarithm of land cultivated but that the variance 
of the logarithm of output per bigha also plays an important role, 
particularly in the last year. This latter variance was low for the two 
good years (1957/58 and 1974/75) and higher for the bad, it being 
particularly low in 1974/75 and high in 1983/84. It is possible that in 
good years a generally more intensive agriculture leads to more equality 
in yields with errant practices being punished less, but that in bad years 
it leads to more inequality in yields as better farmers are more able to 
protect themselves.
Finally, we examined the relationship between the logarithm of 
output per bigha and the logarithm of cultivation costs per bigha to see 
how far the latter accounted for the variation in the former (Table 10(c)) . 
We see that the in the bad years are indeed higher than those in the 
good years, being as high as 0.42 in 1983/84 and essentially zero for 
1957/58, prior to the Green Revolution. It should be emphasized that we
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have greater faith in the data for 1974/75 and 1983/84 with respect to the 
issues discussed here than that for the earlier years. Finally we should 
note that there is still a sizeable variation in output per bigha after 
allowing for variation in input costs.
We conclude then that the most important determinant of agricultural 
output is, not surprisingly, land cultivated. But output per bigha is not 
related to farm size either before or after the Green Revolution, a result 
which is quite striking given the arguments at the beginning of this 
section. Further, whilst variation in output per acre is strongly related 
to input per acre, particularly post-Green Revolution and in bad years, 
there is a great deal that is unexplained. This, we take it, corresponds 
(apart from the usual reasons of problems of modelling and data) to 
household effects (better and worse farmers) and 'genuine' stochastic 
factors. This is a topic which merits further research.
2.4. Outside Jobs
The rise in the importance of outside jobs (by which we mean jobs 
outside agriculture) in Palanpur can be seen both in terms of the rise in 
the number and variety of occupations that villagers filled and in the 
increasing proportion of income from outside jobs to total income. In 
Table 6a and 6b we saw that outside job income made up about 8% of total 
income in 1957/58 and that this proportion had reached 34% by 1983/84.
The number and types of regular jobs available in the four survey years 
are displayed in Table 11. There were nine villagers employed outside the 
village in 1957/58. By 1983/84 this number had risen to 54. The expansion 
of outside jobs occurred primarily after 1962/63, with increasing 
employment in occupations (such as the railways) which had already existed 
in 1957/58, and also with villagers finding new employment opportunities, 
such as in a bread factory or cloth mill.
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In Table 6a we can see that regular outside job income had a differing 
impact on the distribution of total income in the different years. In 
1974/75, for example, the pseudo-Gini for outside job income was 0.065. 
This meant that income from outside jobs was very equally distributed when 
villagers were ranked in terms of total per capita incomes. In 1983/84 on 
the other hand, the pseudo-Gini was 0.444. With the proportion of per 
capita outside job income to total per capita income reaching 34% in 
1983/84, the contribution of outside job income inequality to total income 
inequality reached 50% by that year.
Outside jobs, particularly the more remunerative ones, went to 
villagers positioned differently along the income distribution in the four 
survey years. In the two earlier years, as well as in 1983/84, those who 
held the well-paying outside jobs were also those who were well off in 
total income terms. This was not the case in 1974/75 where 16 out of the 
37 villagers with a regular outside job came from households in the bottom 
half of the income distribution, and only six out of the 20 richest 
households had any member with outside employment.
2.5. Income Inequality and Economic Growth
Before concluding this chapter we digress briefly to examine the 
relationship between income inequality and the process of economic 
modernization (for example the inter-sectoral transfer observed over time 
in Palanpur) . It has been suggested, if we take an aggregate economy-wide 
perspective, that the development process is characterized by increased 
inequality during the initial stages, that this then peaks at some level 
of output, and then further growth is accompanied by a decline in income 
inequality^^. This process could stem from development along Lewis-type
. The possible existence of such an "inverted U-curve" was 
originally proposed in a series of papers in the 1950s and 1960s by Kuznets 
(see for example Kuznets, 1955) . While this hypothesis was originally 
proposed rather tentatively, it has come to be viewed by many as a 
"stylized fact" which theories of growth should incorporate (see for 
example Aghion and Bolton, 1991). Others however, have stressed the
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lines where a rural economy, with everyone at or near subsistence level, 
evolves towards a level of advanced industrialization^^. At first 
inequality will be quite low as incomes are uniformly distributed at the 
subsistence level. Over time however, a small urbanized sector will 
emerge, offering higher incomes and attracting migration from the rural 
sector. The distribution of income will widen and continue widening as the 
urban sector itself develops. More and more people will leave the rural 
sector for the urban sector and its growing incomes. At some point 
however, the majority of the population will be in the high income sector, 
and any further economic growth will be accompanied by a reduction in 
inequality.
When we turn to the path traced out by inequality over time in one 
community as opposed to the economy as a whole, the model above clearly 
does not apply directly. However, we have already observed that one of the 
major changes in the economy of Palanpur has been the rise in the number 
and variety of outside jobs. These regular jobs generally offer high and 
stable wages and for this reason are highly prized in the village. In this 
context we could plausibly present a story analogous to the one above, 
describing how inequality may move over time in Palanpur. The spread of 
jobs could lead initially to an increase in inequality, until so many 
villagers hold outside jobs that any further spread in the number available 
leads to a decline in inequality. We have seen that the contribution of 
outside job income to total income inequality has indeed risen sharply 
between 1974/75 and 1983/84, a period during which the number and variety 
of jobs increased significantly. However, what deserves to be stressed from 
the Palanpur example, is that we have observed increasing involvement in 
the outside economy without much migration (something which standard 
stories have tended to emphasize). In addition, intersectoral transfer in 
Palanpur has been characterized in most cases by changes in the range and
fragile empirical basis for this hypothesis (see Anand and Kanbur, 1984, 
also Stern, 1989) .
. See Lewis (1954).
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balance of a household's portfolio of occupations. The process does not 
appear to have been associated with a discrete occupational shift by 
households from one sector into another.
A related point, which we will briefly discuss, relates to the success 
of conventionally used inequality measures in representing changes in the 
distribution of income in the presence of economic growth as described 
above. For example, Gary Fields (1987) has recently expressed his 
dissatisfaction with a number of commonly used inequality measures when the 
question being addressed is how inequality has changed in the presence of 
economic growth. He argues that these measures occasionally present a 
picture of increasing inequality when, under some circumstances, it would 
in fact we be reasonable to expect them to do the opposite. His argument 
holds for the case when we have economic growth of the form described above 
- the enlargement over time of a high income sector - and can be most 
easily seen in an example. Suppose there are six individuals in a 
community with their distribution of income represented by the vector 
y=[1,1,1,1,1,4]. The Gini coefficient for this distribution is 0.278. 
Suppose that the individual with the income of 4 is the one with an outside 
job and that the other five individuals are involved in subsistence 
cultivation. Suppose further that over time, as the economy as a whole 
grows, another outside job becomes available to the village. One of the 
cultivators will now be able to earn the high outside job income and the 
distribution of income in the economy can now be represented by 
x= [1,1,1,1,4,4]. Fields argues that with the enlargement of this high 
income sector many observers might expect this to reflect a decline in 
inequality because the elite position enjoyed by the individual with the 
outside job in the initial period has been eroded. Average income is 
higher, and the distance between the high income earners and low income 
earners has not changed. Yet, the Gini coefficient is now 0.333, a clear 
rise from 0.278. If inequality had been measured using an index from the 
Atkinson family (except for the case with £=0), as well as many from the 
General Entropy family (such as the Theil, or Theil L), then inequality 
would also be observed to rise. Fields argues that if we do not agree that
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inequality has risen in the example above, then how can we be sure that 
measures such as the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson measure will 
properly reflect changes in inequality in the presence of economic growth?
What is being observed in this example is the role played by the 
implicit, and in some cases explicit (e.g. with the Atkinson index), 
normative judgements embodied in these various measures of inequality. The 
Gini coefficient has long been criticized because it tends to give a 
greater weight to transfers in the middle of the income distribution than 
on either ends of the distribution. The Atkinson measure and the two Theil 
measures have all been constructed so as to be more sensitive to changes 
in the bottom end of the distribution. In the situation described by 
Fields it is perhaps more appropriate to use a measure which focuses on 
changes in the top of the income distribution. One such measure is the 
square of the coefficient of variation, and indeed, when we use this 
measure we see that the whole process of development from a distribution 
such as y to x to z=[1,4,4,4,4,4] will be marked by a fall in inequality 
(0.556 to 0 .500 to .102) . It is noteworthy that in the Palanpur experience 
the square of the coefficient of variation rose from 0.254 to 0.297 between 
1974/75 and 1983/84.
While this example serves principally to reaffirm the need for care 
when measuring inequality with summary measures, it also interesting in the 
way it explores the evolution of inequality in the presence of inter­
sectoral transfer. This is an area which has been comparatively under 
researched in the context of rural India as a whole, and one which deserves 
further attention.
2.6. Concluding Comments
We shall be brief since a summary was provided in the opening section. 
Inequality in incomes and land holdings decreased across the 'Green 
Revolution' period to 1974/75. This was partly from the apparently 
equalising effect of a good agricultural year, together with the splitting
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of some large households and the division of their land. Tenancy exerted 
a further equalising effect as the more committed farmers amongst the 
larger landowners had not yet begun leasing in. Outside jobs were becoming 
important but not yet a major source of inequality. Inequality had 
increased again by 1983/84. This was associated particularly with the 
continuing growth of outside jobs which had now become more favourably 
distributed towards the rich as they began to take more work outside the 
village. Further, the traditional cultivating caste (Muraos), and major 
landowners, were farming more intensively and leasing in land. This was 
compounded by the unequalising effect of a poor agricultural year. 
Landlessness increased with the growing practice of sons living separately 
from fathers before division of the land.
There was no strong relationship between output per acre and farm size 
before or after the 'Green Revolution'. This suggests that the bias 
towards richer farmers which has been suggested by some authors is not the 
dominant force in explaining inequality in Palanpur. Farmers do vary 
considerably in their techniques but this appears to be greatly influenced 
by their commitment to, and their skills in, their activity. The 
relationship between inequality of incomes and of land cultivated! is 
influenced by the absence of a specific labour market in Palanpur, namely 
a market for farm managers. In a world of complete and perfect markets, 
inequality would be determined by endowments (for given factor prices and 
abstracting away from non-convexities such as those involved in 
productivity/consumption links) and could be clearly traced back to them. 
In Palanpur, an explicit market exists for agricultural labour but not for 
farm management skills. These skills cannot be directly marketed, but 
divergent abilities can be manifested through the taking of more land under 
tenancy. Land cultivation thus reflects the distribution of these farming 
skills, particularly after 1974/75, when the further intensification of 
farming through technological change, as well as the increased range of 
alternative sources of income outside the village, led to a clearer 
realization among the (more) skilled farmers of their comparative 
advantage.
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The picture that emerges then is one where inequality arises from 
endowments, sector or type of employment, risk/good fortune and different 
types of behaviour. These factors receive some reinforcement from 
imperfections in markets (e.g. differential access to, or price for, credit 
and labour) but from our evidence it would be difficult to argue that the 
market imperfections, as opposed to the aspects just described, played the 
major role in determining inequality, and its changes, in Palanpur.
The big changes described in development stories, namely agricultural 
advancement, the decreasing relative role of agriculture, and population 
growth, are having major effects on the level and distribution of income 
in Palanpur. Their interaction and variation over time require careful 
analysis more generally.
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Table 1
Broad Indicators of Economic Change in Palanpur
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Population 528 585 757 960
Village real income (Rs) 85,166 94,712 208,024 186,432
Real income/capita (Rs/capita) 161.3 161.9 274.8 194.2
Price index 1.07 0.92 3.78 5.28
Agricultural daily wages, real 
1962=100 123 100 123 158
Agricultural daily wages 
(kg wheat/day) 2.5 2.25 3.1 5.0
Index of real wages for regular 
outside jobs n. a. 100 122 193
Wheat yields, actual kgs/bigha 40 40 114 97
Wheat yields, normal kgs/bigha 40-50 50 100 150-160
Notes
1. The price index is taken from the consumer price index (CPI) for 
agricultural labourers in Uttar Pradesh. See Lai, Economic and Political 
Weekly, June (Review of Agriculture), 1976, for 1957/58 index. This is 
taken as the interpolation of 1956/57 and 1958/59. For 1962/63 the index 
at 92 was estimated by S.S. Tyagi Jr and communicated to us. For 1974/75 
see the Bulletin of Food Statistics (197 6) estimating the average between 
July 1974 and June 1975. The 1983/84 estimate is obtained from the mean 
CPI for agricultural labourers between November 1983 and October 1984 in 
the Bulletin of Food Statistics (1985).
2. "Normal" yields correspond to the perceived normal yield for Palanpur 
in the respective year.
Table 2
Inequality of Individual Incomes
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Gini 0.336 0.390 0.253 0.307
Coefficient of variation 0.649 0.871 0.504 0.545
Atkinson =1 0.178 0.251 0.105 n. a.
=2 0.338 0.485 0.206 0.319
=5 0.647 0.821 0.483 0.739
No. of observations 528 585 757 960
(No. of households) (100) (106) (111) (143)
Note
one
Individual income is household income divided by household size. 
The Atkinson measure with e=l cannot be computed for 1983/84 because
household recorded a negative income in that year.
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TaÜDle 3
Impact of Different Equivalent Scales and Income Unit Weighting on Inequality
Inequality
Measure
Unadjusted 
Household 
Income Inequality
Equivalent Household Income Inequality 
ICRISAT Pinstrup-Anderson Paul
Gini coefficient 0 .466 0.467 0.471 0.477
Atkinson Class 
e=2 
e=5
0 .591 
0 .910
0.573
0.886
0.594
0.906
0.635
0.926
General Entropy
c=2 0 .520 0.519 0 . 530 0.533
Inequality
Measure
Unadjusted 
Individual 
Income Inequality
Equivalent
ICRISAT
Individual Income Inequality 
Pinstrup-Anderson Paul
Gini coefficient 0 .307 0.305 0.305 0.305
Atkinson Class 
e=2 
e = 5
0.319 
0 .739
0.312 
0 .719
0.316
0.729
0.328 
0 .758
General Entropy
c=2 0.149 0.146 0.145 0.146
Notes :
1. This simulation is carried out using income data for 1983/84 only.
2. The equivalence scales used by the ICRISAT studies were provided in a 
private communication from staff at ICRISAT in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 
the Pinstrup-Anderson and Jaramillo equivalence scale is taken from 
Jaramillo and Pinstrup-Anderson (1986), and the Paul scales are taken from 
Paul (1989).
3. Higher values of e in the Atkinson class imply greater inequality 
aversion.
4. A General Entropy parameter of c-2 is ordinally equivalent to the 
coefficient of variation. As c becomes smaller, the
inequality measure becomes increasingly sensitive to income differences 
at the bottom of the distribution.
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Table 4(A)
Anatomy of Income Distribution; Components of Income by Decile
1957/58
village
g=i g=2 9=3 g=4 9=5 g=6 9=7 9=8 9=9 9=10 average {%)
pcrinc 41.70 72.59 87.23 110.74 133.51 158.20 183.41 227.04 292.86 446.73 161.32 (100)
pcraginc 23.30 32.89 65.78 89.08 80.41 136.72 134.80 212.62 236.59 363.50 126.63 (79)
pcroutinc 0.00 8.48 9.54 0.00 20.49 16.55 6.47 15.67 30.59 36.85 13.09 (8)
pcraglab 6.74 23.96 9.58 13.38 26.53 4.98 35.51 0.00 11.01 12.82 14.21 (9)
HH size 5.5 6.7 4.7 5.1 5.4 6.1 5.2 7.3 3.3 3.5 5.3
Adm. 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.6 1.4 1.4 1.7
education 1.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.6 1.8 2.9 1.0 0.6 1.4
jobs 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
pc land 1.75 1.57 2.55 4.63 2.94 5.93 4.40 7.93 12.03 13.26 5.20
pc cult. 2.04 1.52 4.23 3.51 3 . 65 4.26 4.58 6.38 6.45 10.43 4.41
Notes:
pcrinc=per capita real income 
pcraginc=per capita real agricultural income 
pcroutinc=per capita real regular outside job income 
pcraglab=per capita real casual wage labour income 
jobs=proportion of households with at least one job 
pc cult=per capita land cultivated.
HH size= household size
Adm=number of adult males in household
education=years of shooling of most educated member of
household
pc land=per capita land holdings
Individuals are ranked into deciles on the basis of their per capita real income. g=l corresponds to the bottom 
10% in terms of real per capita income.
Entries in the table are the average of the variable in the row for the decile in the column.
Table 4(B)
Anatomy of Income Distribution; Components of Income by Decile
1962/63
village
9=1 9=2 9=3 9=4 9=5 g=6 9=7 g=8 9=9 9=10 average (%)
pcrinc 27.89 62.82 86.13 104.44 129.00 156.96 191.13 236.64 309.88 535.40 161.93 (100)
pcraginc 38.74 50.94 73.15 80.11 93.35 121.62 117.64 188.87 206.32 517.75 130.04 (80)
pcroutinc 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.04 14.28 13.91 72.06 39.97 59.12 0.00 19.98 (12)
pcraglab 6.65 6.13 15.84 9.62 9.69 17.17 0.00 0.00 8.23 0.00 7.91 (5)
HH size 6.1 5.3 6.4 5.5 5.4 6.8 6.1 6.2 3.3 3.9 5.5
Adm. 1.7 1.2 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.4 1.2 1.7 1.7
education 0.8 2,7 1.8 2.2 2.0 3.8 2.1 3.1 0.4 2.3 2.1
jobs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.2
pc land 4.85 3.17 3.27 3.30 2.80 4.59 3.02 6.27 5.45 13.38 4.65
pc cult. 4.76 4.03 3.50 3.43 3.29 4.56 3.21 5.82 5.09 13.21 4.76
o
Notes:
pcrinc=per capita real income 
pcraginc=per capita real agricultural income 
pcroutinc=per capita real regular outside job income 
pcraglab=per capita real casual wage labour income 
jobs=proportion of households with at least one job 
pc cult=per capita land cultivated.
HH size= household size
Adm=number of adult males in household
education=years of shooling of most educated member of
household
pc land=per capita land holdings
2. Individuals are ranked into deciles on the basis of their per capita real income. g=l corresponds to the bottom
10% in terms of real per capita income.
3. Entries in the table are the average of the variable in the row for the decile in the column.
Table 4(C)
Anatomy of Income Distribution: Components of Income by Decile
1974/75
village
9=1 9=2 9=3 9=4 9=5 g=6 9=7 9=8 9=9 9=10 average (%)
pcrinc 98.58 153.89 193.87 222.27 242.11 267.86 296.95 328.15 412.89 616.25 274.77 (100)
pcraginc 48.58 114.30 123.23 188.44 153.00 217.30 293.80 261.17 371.19 605.44 227.40 (83)
pcroutinc 26.44 30.22 37.36 22.03 90.94 55.91 10.19 46.51 46.88 37.67 41.48 (15)
pcraglab 21.11 7.28 20.41 11.80 -1.83 -5.35 -7.05 3.39 -5.18 -26.86 2.32 (1)
HH size 5.9 7.4 6.7 7.5 7.5 8.2 6.0 7.5 6.1 5.5 6.8
Adm. 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.7 2.5 1.7 1.9 2.0
education 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.1 0.8
jobs 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4
pc land 1.05 1.58 1.93 3.04 2.00 3.39 3.80 3.25 5.51 8.95 3.30
pc cult. 1.20 2.11 2.29 2.73 2.29 3 .00 4.55 3.80 4.10 7.29 3.22
Notes:
1. pcrinc=per capita real income 
pcraginc=per capita real agricultural income 
pcroutinc=per capita real regular outside job income 
pcraglab=per capita real casual wage labour income
jobs=proportion of households with at least one job 
pc cult=per capita land cultivated.
HH size= household size 
Adm=number of adult males in household 
education=variable taking a value of 0 if no household 
member is literate, if maximum schooling in household 
is to primary level, and 2 if education is greater than 
primary level.
pc land=per capita land holdings
2. Individuals are ranked into deciles on the basis of their per capita real income. 
10% in terms of real per capita income.
g=l corresponds to the bottom
Entries in the table are the average of the variable in the row for the decile in the column.
Table 4(D)
Anatomy of Income Distribution; Components of Income by Decile
1983/84
village
9=1 9=2 9=3 g=4 9=5 g=6 9=7 g=8 9=9 9=10 average {%)
pcrinc 35.86 77.17 101.86 130.10 151.66 186.49 213.36 253.34 308.64 394.84 194.17 (100)
pcraginc 20.75 40.60 58.26 80.30 85.29 99.232 126.51 148.06 205.40 178.19 109.65 (80)
pcroutinc 2.37 17.91 18.81 23.52 38.24 57.51 76.12 95.39 86.51 202.55 65.61 (12)
pcraglab 12.52 12.85 15.01 12.90 10.24 5.90 1.03 5.00 0.21 4.59 7.58 (5)
HH size 5.3 5.7 4.9 7.4 7.6 6.0 7.7 7.6 7.8 7.3 6.7
Adm. 1.3 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.7 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.8 2.0
education 3.4 2.1 3.9 3.6 4.7 6.2 4.6 4.9 6.2 6.2 4.5
jobs 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5
pc land 2.14 1.15 2.77 3.10 2.37 3.30 3.32 3.09 2.92 2.59 2.70
pc cult. 2. 61 1.72 2.09 2.72 1.92 2.27 3.53 3.57 3.19 3.46 2.76 CN
Notes :
pcrinc=per capita real income 
pcraginc=per capita real agricultural income 
pcroutinc=per capita real regular outside job income 
pcraglab=per capita real casual wage labour income 
jobs=proportion of households with at least one job 
pc cult=per capita land cultivated.
HH size= household size
Adm=number of adult males in household
education=years of shooling of most educated member of
household
pc land=per capita land holdings
2. Individuals are ranked into deciles on the basis of their per capita real income. g=l corresponds to the bottom 
10% in terms of real per capita income.
3. Entries in the table are the average of the variable in the row for the decile in the column.
Table 5
Impact on Inequality of Scaling Cultivation Income Up or Down 
I. Scaling Cultivation Up to Adjust for Bad Harvests (1962/63 and 1983/84)
Scaling Factors
Inequality
Unadjusted
Individual
Measure Income Inequality 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
1962/63
Gini coefficient 0.390 0.387 0.385 0.384 0.384 0.383
Atkinson Class 
e=2 
e = 5
0.485
0.821
0.460
0.788
0.452
0.776
0.445
0.765
0.440
0.757
0.436
0.750
General Entropy 
c=2 0.379 0.381 0.383 0.385 0.388 0.391
1983/84
Gini coefficient 0.307 0.307 0.308 0.309 0.310 0.311
Atkinson Class 
£ = 2 
£ = 5
0.319
0.739
0.321
0.747
0.322
0.750
0.324
0.754
0.326
0.758
0.328
0.762
General Entropy 
c=2 0.149 0.149 0.150 0.150 0.151 0.152
II. Scaling Cultivation Down to Adjust for 
1974/75)
Good Harvests (1957/58 and
Unadjusted 
Inequality Individual 
Measure Income Inequality 10%
Scaling Factors 
15% 20% 25% 30%
1957/58
Gini coefficient 0.336 0.337 0.337 0.338 0.340 0.342
Atkinson Class 
£=2 
£ = 5
0.338
0.647
0.335
0.627
0.334
0.619
0.335
0.611
0.336
0.605
0.339
0.601
General Entropy 
c=2 0.210 0.210 0.210 0 .212 0.213 0.216
1974/75
Gini coefficient 0.253 0.247 0.244 0.241 0.239 0.238
Atkinson Class 
£=2 
£ = 5
0.206
0.483
0.198
0.476
0.194
0.473
0.190
0.471
0.187
0.471
0.184
0.471
General Entropy 
c=2 0.127 0.120 0.117 0.114 0.110 0 .108
Notes
1. Higher values of E in the Atkinson class imply more inequality aversion.
2. A General Entropy parameter of c=2 is ordinal ly equivalent to the 
coefficient of variation.
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Gini Agricultural income
Table 6a
Outside income Other Income Sources
1957/58 528 obs. 0 .308 (92%) 0.028 (8%) 0.002 (1%)
0.336 |I„/|I=0.79 G^=0.390 |ik/p.=0 .081 G^=0 .350 p.k/p.=0 .134 Gj;=0 .012
1962/63 585 obs. 0.315 (81%) 0.050 (13%) 0.023 (6%)
0.390 |1„/H=0 .80 G;=0.3 94 |i„/M,=0.123 0^=0.410 Hk/kl-0.073 G^= 0.318
1974/75 757 obs. 0 .265 (105%) 0.010 (4%) -0.022 (-9%)
0 .253 |I]ç/|l=0 .83 G^=0.321 |lk/M-=0.151 Gk=0.065 \lJ\L=0.021 Gj;=-1.052
1983/84 960 obs. 0.164 (53%) 0.152 (49%) -0.009 (-3%)
0.307 M.k/p.= 0.5 6 Gk=0 .293 |Ll^/jU.= 0 .3 40 0^=0.446 |lk/|I=0.097 Gk=-0.095
^otes
1
2
Gini coefficient G = E  (|X),/|i,) G^ , where |ix/p. is the share of component k in total income.
When G=2/n^|i E^ [r^-(n+1 )/2 ] Y^ , for n households indexed i, where r^  is the income ranking of total incomes, then 
the pseudo-Gini, G^ , is obtained in the same way except with Y^ i, the kth component of income replacing 
total income Y^ .
The true Gini coefficient for component k is equal to neither (|ik/p.)G^ , nor G^  - see notes to Table 3b.
The percentage contribution of inequality in component k to total inequality is [ (|i,,/|i,)Gj^ ]/G.
Table 6b
Gini Agricultural income Outside income Other Income Sources
1 G:/Gk Gk I G^/Gk Gk 1 lik/H G^/Gk Gk
1957/58 0.336 1 0.79 0.842 0.463 1 0.08 0.390 0.897 1 0.13 0.013 0.962
1962/63 0.390 1 0.80 0.774 0.509 1 0.12 0.470 0.872 1 0.07 0.159 2.000
1974/75 0.253 1 0.83 0.863 0.372 1 0.15 0.088 0.739 1 0.02 -0.452 2 .328
1983/84 0.307 1 0.56 0.602 0.487 1 0.34 0.645 0.691 1 0.10 -0.107 0.889
Notes :
1. The Gini
2. It can be
coefficient can 
readily shown
also be 
that G^/G
decomposed as 
k is equal to
G=E (^ k/^ l) (G*/Gk)Gk.
R=Cov (Yk, ry)/Cov(Yk, Tk), where rk is income ranking of the kth
component.
Table 7a 
Caste and Incomes In Palanpur
Per Capita Real Income (Rupees)
Caste No. 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Thakur 1 186 .34 (17) 174..27 (19) 354..76 (25) 199..83 (30)
Murao 2 253,.94 (21) 222 .62 (25) 364..91 (27) 230..82 (27)
Dhlmar 3 114,.93 (10) 96..72 (9) 202..38 (8) 180..56 (13)
Gadarla 4 187,.88 19} 209..31 (9) 242.,10 (10) 202 .08 (12)
Dhobi 5 235,.51 (2) 730..98 (1) 154..47 (3) 159..35 (4)
Tell 6 107,.56 (8) 104..33 (9) 203..59 (12) 147,.12 (16)
Passl 7 174,.57 (11) 281..58 (16) 275..15 (8) 217..67 (14)
Jatab 8 149,.39 (16) 110..70 (13) 195..04 (14) 84 ,.64 (19)
Others 9 128,.73 (6) 101..84 (5) 255..79 (4) 183 ,.89 (8)
Note
1. Figures In 
2 . Per capita
brackets correspond to number of households In 
Income figures correspond to average household
each 
per (
1957/58
1962/63
1974/75
1983/84
The11 Index 
T(Y)
0.1858
0.2742
0.1106
0.1510
TABLE 7b 
Inequality between Castes
Within Component
0.1438 (77%)
0.2201 (80%)
0.0825 (75%)
0.1126 (75%)
Between
0.0419 (23%) 
0.0541 (20%) 
0.0281 (25%) 
0.0384 (25%)
Note : There are nine caste groupings In Palanpur. Ranlced from highest In
social ranking to lowest they are: Thakur (217); Murao (217);
Dhlmar (74); Gadarla (83); Dhobi (27); Tell (92); Passl (79); Jatab 
(118); and a composite group of various others (53). The numbers 
In brackets refer to the number of Individuals In each caste In 
1983/84. Land owned In blghas In 1983/84 was Thakur, 758, Murao, 
1053, Dhlmar, 65, Gadarla, 195, Dhobi, 21, Tell, 101, Passl, 141, 
Jatab, 217, and other,17. In Palanpur there are 6.4 blghas per 
acre.
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TABLE 8 
Income Regressions
Model: The dependent variable is current nominal income for the year in 
question
Income = piLand + BjAdm + pjFam + P4BUI locks + P^He-Buf f alo + P^Animals + 
P^Educ + pgdThakur + pgdMurao +PioJobs + stochastic term
No. of
observations
1957/58
100
1962/63
106
1974/75
111
1983/84
143
constant -15.4 (-0.14) 6.8 0.05) -1909.7 (-2.74) -3216.6 (-5.60
Pi 10.1 ( 5.75) 13 .7 4.85) 86.7 ( 5.01) 23.9 (1.13
P 2 123 .4 ( 2.31) 65.6 1.58) 564.8 ( 1.78) 1756.3 (6.27
P3 57 .2 ( 2.25) 15.2 0.34) 610.8 ( 4.51) 881.6 (7.04
P. 52 .7 ( 0.91) 37 .7 0.54) 622.1 ( 2.58) -173.9 (0.44
P5 101 .7 ( 1.32) -8.8 -0.10) 264.3 ( 0.64) -945 . 5 (-2.62
Ps 44 .8 ( 1.92) 47.8 1.72) 411.4 ( 2 .6) 203.4 (1.79
Pv -26 .3 (-1.09) 30 .7 1.32) 518.7 ( 1.19) 119.3 (1.72
Pa -95 .3 (-0 .66) -145.2 -0.81) 1276.8 ( 1.67) -385.1 (-0.47
Pa 224.8 ( 1.81) 22 .5 0.14) 709.9 ( 0.89) 1593.2 (1.71
Pio 617.6 ( 4.11) 521.9 2.81) 1310.9 ( 2 .22) 3042.1 (6.03
R: 0 683 0 498 0 720 0 800
Note 
1 .
2 .
t-statistics are given in brackets.
Land = land owned in bighas; Adm = number of adult males; Fam = number of 
family members; Bullocks = number of bullocks; He-buffalo = number of 
he-buffalos; Animals = number of other animals; Educ = years of schooling 
of most educated household member; dThakur = dummy for Thakurs; dMurao = 
dummy for Muraos; Jobs = number of outside jobs.
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Table 9
Size Distribution of Land Holdings
No. ownership holdings No. operational holdings
juana noiaing 
size (bighas) 1957 1962 1974 1983 1957 1962 1974 1983
>100 4 3 0 0 6 3 0 2
75-100 4 4 3 6 5 4 1 3
50-75 6 6 12 5 8 9 8 4
40-50 6 7 4 4 6 6 4 8
30-40 12 14 5 11 8 14 16 22
20-30 21 24 31 24 16 27 35 18
15-20 4 4 10 12 5 9 8 9
10-15 11 14 15 12 9 5 6 9
5-10 17 14 9 23 9 8 9 9
2.5-5 0 0 8 12 0 1 4 7
0 .1-2 .5 1 1 4 7 1 0 2 6
0 14 15 10 27 27 20 18 46
No. of obs 100 106 111 143 100 106 111 143
Average 27 26 22 18 27 26 22 19
Gini 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.57 0.61 0.49 0.44 0.60
Notes
1. 6.4 bighas = 1 acre; 2 .5 acres = 1 hectare
2 . Land holdings are presented for households not individuals.
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Table 10 
Outputs, Inputs and Farm Size
10(a) Output and Land
Model : Log(output)= Log(land cultivated)+intercept+residual 
___________________________________1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Land cultivated
Intercept
R2
0.956
(21.95)
3 .220 
(22 .54)
0.850
1.070 
(11.54)
2.73
(8.75)
0 .615
1.080
(27.0)
5.06
(84.33)
0.940
0 .937 
(13.50)
5.207
(23.78)
0.673
Model : Log(cultivation costs) = Log(land cultivated)+intercept+residual
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
land cultivated
Intercept
R2
0.961
(7.3)
0.573
(1 .2 0 )
0.498
1.051
(10.46)
1.393
(4.15)
0.567
1.15
(8.62)
9.69
(3.84)
0.519
0 .902 
(12.94;
4.43
(20.26
0 .652
10(b) Variance/Covariance Matrices of Log (output/blgha) and Log (land 
cultivated)
Log (output/biqha)
1957/58
Log (output/bigha)
Log (land cultivated) 
1962/63
Log (output/bigha)
Log (land cultivated) 
1974/75
Log (output/bigha)
Log (land cultivated) 
1983/84
Log (output/bigha)
Log (land cultivated)
0.1812 
■0 .0902
0.3333
0.0367
0 .0826 
0.0638
0.4652
-0.0695
Log (land cultivated)
-0.0902
0.8147
0.0367
0.4610
0.0638 
0.5297
-0.0695 
1.0998
10(c) Output and Costs
Model:Log(output/bigha)= Log(cultivation costs/bigha)+intercept+residual 
_______________________________ 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
cultivation costs
Intercept
R2
0.069
(0.99)
2.95
(47.71)
0.00
0.585
(7.27)
2 .08 
(15.46)
0.385
0.143 
(3.64)
5.07
(56.91)
0.153
0.663
(8.18:
2 .258 
(6.60
0.428
Notes 
1.
2 . 
3 .
Cultivation costs in 1957/58, 1962/63 and 1983/84 included irrigation 
costs, costs of seeds, costs of fertilizer and costs of fodder, while 
in 1974/75 the only cultivation costs available were fertilizer costs. 
Figures in brackets denote t-statistics.
Output is in rupees and land cultivated in bighas.
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Table 11
Regular Jobs Outside Agriculture, 1957-1994
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Regular job involving good 
education or skills
teacher 0
mechanic 1
electrician 0
insurance salesman 0
tax collector 0
cook 0
skilled work in bread factory 0
clerk in factory 0
Regular job involving limited 
training or skills
chowkidar (watchman) 2
permanent railway employee 3
non-permanent railway work 1
permanent servant 1
cloth mill or spinning factory 0 
cane centre 0
bread factory 0
security guard or policeman 0
coal depot in Moradabad 0
work in chakki 0
selling bricks in Moradabad 0
unspecified regular job 1
6
3
0
11
2
0
0
0
0
0
9
10
6
0
14
0
7
2
1
1
1
0
10 37 54
Note
This list does not include occupations that are seasonal, casual/semi-regular,, or 
which are carried out on the basis of traditional arrangements.
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Chapter 3 : Poverty In Palanpur
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the definition, identification and 
determinants of poverty in Palanpur. The information which has been 
acquired over the four survey years, as well as during numerous shorter 
visits since 1974/75, permits a detailed evaluation of commonly proposed 
correlates of poverty. Such correlates can be of importance to the design 
of policy. We shall pay particular attention to understanding to what 
extent, and why such correlates may or may not be appropriate.
In order to explore such questions we require a welfare indicator 
which can at least provide an ordinal ranking of households. In a recent 
contribution to the literature, Anand and Harris (1990) provide an 
illustration of how conclusions reached regarding the extent of poverty can 
vary with the particular choice of welfare indicator, drawing on evidence 
from Sri Landkan household budget survey data for 1981/82. They describe 
how the bottom 10 per cent of individuals in the urban sector of Sri Lanka 
have a monthly per capita food expenditure of Rs 116 (in 1981 rupees) when 
individuals are ranked by per capita income; Rs 95 when per capita total 
expenditure is used as the ranking variable ; Rs 88 when per capita food 
expenditure is used; and Rs 171 when food share in total expenditure is 
used. Needless to say, such widely differing predictions of the food 
consumption of the lowest 10 per cent (if we were to assume that they were 
the target group for food strategies) would clearly affect our assessement 
of the magnitude of the problem of hunger, and poverty. In this chapter 
we will be discussing in particular the success of per capita income as the 
ranking variable.
The close study of one village provides details on living standards 
which are not available by other means. Examples include whether the 
lifestyle of a villager looks very different from that which might be
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implied by measured income, whether there are any particular circumstances 
concerning the health of members of the household or problems with its 
animals, equipment or fields which might influence standard of living, 
whether employment outside agriculture is likely to persist, whether 
tenancy exists, and so on. Such questions can be crucial to the sensible 
definition, measurement and accurate interpretation of income, or more 
broadly standard of living, and thus also of poverty.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the remainder of this section 
we consider briefly the problems of measuring standard of living in a 
village like Palanpur. In Section 2 we examine the relationship between 
poverty and household characteristics in 1983/84 incorporating different 
definitions of income and poverty. A more formal analysis of the 
determinants and correlates of poverty is presented in Section 3. In 
Section 4 we consider the incidence of poverty in earlier survey years and 
follow this with, in section 5, a discussion of some longitudinal 
considerations. Section 6 is devoted to concluding remarks.
3.1.1. Measuring Standard of Living
An important initial consideration involves which measures of standard 
of living one would, in principle, like to use and second whether or not 
these are likely to be workable in practice. A natural first concept to 
be considered is income^ . The difficulties with defining income, which 
can be substantial in developed countries (see Atkinson, 1989, Ch. 1), are 
much more troublesome in developing countries. First we have the problem 
of the period. Yearly income in agricultural communities is a natural 
concept given the seasonal cycles in agriculture. But the year is in some 
respects too long, because seasonal hardship can be severe, and it is in 
some respects too short, because there are considerable year-by-year
^. Anand and Harris (1990) argue that regardless of whether one 
wishes to attach a utility connotation to it or not, long-run average 
income is a reasonable indicator of standard of living in that it 
determines an individuals long-run command over resources and the 
consumption level that can be sustained.
85
fluctuations, so that income in one year may not reflect the long-term 
standard of living. Related to the problem of period is the problem of 
inputs. Like other activities, agriculture involves inputs which go in in 
one period and outputs which come out in another. How are the inputs to 
be debited against outputs? In some cases inputs will obviously be 
associated with outputs in a particular season but, in the case of 
investment in water resources, for example, the inputs are much more long­
term. Similarly we have inputs which are used both for production and 
consumption purposes. For example, bicycles and carts can be used to go 
to town for shopping simultaneously for consumption or productive inputs. 
A third problem is the family unit. Household sizes in a village can quite 
easily range from 1 to 30 and vary considerably in composition. Does one 
use equivalence scales? Are there important consumption goods which are 
public within the household? Different treatments of income can lead, as 
we shall see, to very different results.
Besides income, there are a number of other dimensions one would like 
to measure. In some respects expenditure or expenditure on food may more 
reliably measure living standards than income^ . Such data were not 
collected in Palanpur however. Land is an important indicator of wealth 
and earning power, as are other assets. Health and nutrition are crucial 
aspects of the standard of living often not well captured by income 
measures (see, e.g., Drèze and Sen, 1990).
The empirical work reported here concentrates on two particular 
measures of standard of living. The first, the 'apparent prosperity' index 
for 1983/84, is based on the observations and assessments of Jean Drèze and 
Naresh Sharma who lived in Palanpur throughout the agricultural year
^. In the conceptual framework proposed by Sen, income and 
consumption data can be used to examine the entitlements and achievements 
of individuals, respectively (see for example. Sen, 1992). Atkinson (1989) 
emphasizes that analyses based on income may reach different conclusions 
from those based on expenditure because of factors such as borrowing and 
saving as well as the existence of various market imperfections. One way 
of distinguishing between these indicators is that expenditures may be 
taken to represent the choices which have been made, while incomes are 
argued to better reflect opportunities faced.
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1983/84 (see next section). The second is a measure of current per capita 
income, intended to measure the returns to land, labour and other household 
assets. Largely for data reasons, it has not been possible to construct an 
income measure able to capture these factors perfectly. The income measure 
used here does not go beyond the data availability for early years. We 
have subtracted current input costs from gross revenue, including payments 
for labour hired but not family labour. It should be noted that the income 
measure used here is sensitive to the quality of agricultural year. This 
is particularly so for the first three survey years where more than 80% of 
income came from agriculture (see Chapter 2).
One further measure of income for Palanpur is examined. We construct 
a 'permanent' income measure which involves taking averages across all four 
years of the survey (or in some cases, across the last two survey years). 
The income measures used in this chapter are constructed first for the 
household but are then translated into income per capita for the household. 
This is taken as the main income-based indicator. As was seen in Chapter 
2 experiments with the use of equivalence scales did not lead to 
dramatically different results in the analysis of income distribution.
3.2. Poverty and Household Characteristics
This section investigates the characteristics of poor households in 
Palanpur. There are different ways of defining and measuring "poverty", 
even if we restrict ourselves to the conventional view of poverty as a lack 
of commodity command. In this chapter we shall be concerned with rankings 
by living standards and income. We will look at the characteristics of 
those households ranked lowest so that the notion of poverty is, in this 
sense, a relative one. In what follows, unless otherwise stated, we shall 
use the term 'poor' to describe those households (59 in 1983/84) which are 
located among the poorest 4 deciles of the population in terms of the 
particular measure of standard of living we are using. This chapter does 
not follow conventional practice of estimating the incidence of "absolute" 
poverty by calculating the number of households located below a specific
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poverty line defined in income terms. More detailed discussion of such an 
approach is provided in Chapter 4 and also Chapter 5. Note, however, if 
we take a widely used poverty line for rural India, 40% of Palanpur 
households would be regarded as having been poor in 1983/84^.
It will become clear in this paper that the poor in Palanpur are a 
heterogeneous group and not easily described in any simple or 
unidimensional way. However, a particular example might contribute to some 
understanding of the circumstances, and especially the vulnerable state, 
in which most poor households in Palanpur might find themselves, and thus 
help understand what it means to be poor in Palanpur. Roshan (household 
number 613) is an elderly man of the Teli caste who heads a household of 
four. He has no land, and earns his income working as an agricultural 
labourer. He lives with his family in a one-room house with mud walls. 
For one year during the mid-1980s (after the 1983/84 survey) Roshan's 
fortunes appeared to be improving after he succeeded in obtaining a loan 
and setting himself up as a oil-seller in Palanpur and nearby villages. 
However, this success proved short-lived when he was involved in an 
accident in which 42 litres of oil were spoilt and he was unable to 
continue his business. At the time of a visit to Palanpur during January 
and February of 1990, Roshan was in a desparate situation. His wife was 
ill and needed medication which Roshan was unable to purchase. Because of 
his age and feeble physical health he was finding it difficult to get work 
as a casual labourer. His children were young and not contributing to 
household income, although Roshan's eldest son was nearing the age when he 
would be able to work as well. Finally, Roshan was heavily indebted after 
having borrowed money to purchase a rope-making machine and some goats. 
All but one of the goats had died, and the rope-making machine was not 
producing rope of sufficient quality to be able to sell in the village. 
Roshan was at a loss as to how he was going to repay these loans.
^. To calculate this, we selected an all India poverty line for rural 
areas proposed by Dandekar and Rath (1971) , of Rs. 15 per person, per month 
(at 1960/61 prices). Relative prices between Uttar Pradesh and India as 
a whole in 1963/64 were used to obtain a poverty line of Rs 11.3 for U.P. 
in 1960/61 (see the contribution by Bhattacharya and Chatter]ee in Bardhan 
and Srinivasan, 1974).
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3,2,1 The Apparent Prosperity Classification
We begin with the 'apparent prosperity' classification of the 
households of Palanpur according to their apparent level of economic 
prosperity. The affluence of a household in a small Indian village is, to 
a some extent, a matter of common knowledge. Similarly, the extent to 
which a particular household's asset position, or the health and 
nutritional status of its members, bears on the household's prosperity is 
also widely understood. The investigators who constructed the 
classification were involved in intensive fieldwork in Palanpur for more 
than a year and therefore were able to observe many of the assets owned by 
households as well as have access to the common knowledge in the village 
about villagers' affluence.
The classification was carried out in several stages. Initially, all 
households were divided into seven "fractiles" of increasing prosperity by 
Jean Drèze. These groups were labelled "Very Poor", "Poor", "Modest", 
"Secure", "Prosperous", "Rich" and "Very Rich"^. The number of households 
in these respective fractiles turned out to be as follows: 8, 8, 43, 38, 
29, 6, and 11. Next, Naresh Sharma (who collaborated with the field work 
throughout 1983/84) was requested to produce his own independent 
classification of Palanpur households, aiming at fractiles of the same size 
as Drèze's. Table 1 presents the combined results of these
classifications. In this table, each 3-digit number represents one 
household, and the position in the table indicates how the household has 
been classified by both Drèze and Sharma^. For instance, household 209 
has been put in the "modest" category by Sharma, but in the "prosperous"
^. These labels roughly correspond to the way in which different 
households would be expected to be described in the village itself. There 
is no implication that any of the households of Palanpur can be considered 
as "very rich" in an objective sense. For further details see Drèze (1988).
^. Throughout this chapter, the first digit of household 
indentification numbers indicates the caste of the household. The position 
of a household in the tentative caste hierarchy is detailed in Table 2 
(with, for example, the identification number of Thakurs beginning with the 
digit 1, Muraos with digit 2 and Jatabs with digit 8).
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category by Drèze. Reassuringly, there was a strong degree of agreement 
between the classifications of Drèze and Sharma, with 137 of the 143 
households being put in the same or adjacent categories. This high 
compatibility confirms the view that relative positions in terms of
apparent prosperity are in many cases reasonably clear.
It is not, of course, easy to spell out precisely what the basis of 
one's impressions about the prosperity of different households is, even 
when these impressions are quite strong. To a great extent prosperity is 
associated with "lifestyle": the quality of housing, food and clothing, the 
possession of durable goods, the consumption of luxuries, etc. There are, 
however, some difficulties with this observation, which account for many 
of the discrepancies between the classifications of Drèze and Sharma. Two 
of these difficulties deserve special mention.
First, one has to bear in mind the distinction between consumption or 
lifestyle on the one hand and income or commodity command on the other. 
A good illustration of this difficulty is provided by household 226, 
classified as "Modest" by Drèze but "Rich" by Sharma. Bhikkay (226) is an 
old and childless man who lives alone and exclusively from the rent of his 
land. He owns 25 bighas (about 4 acres) of land and, under the standard 
terms of share-cropping in Palanpur, this would give him a per-capita 
income well above the Palanpur average. However, for one reason or other 
Bhikkay ' s consumption patterns are those of a poor man: his small mud house 
is dilapidated and empty, his clothes are tattered and he eats barely 
enough to survive. This contrast seems to have led Drèze into classifying 
Bhikkay as "Modest", while Sharma classified him as "rich" in view of his
relatively high income. Later it appeared that the motive of Bhikkay's
high savings rate was his desire to build a small temple. The 
classification of such households for which income and lifestyle measures 
differ widely can be problematic.
Second, there can be important intra-household inequalities of 
lifestyle. A good example is provided by household 705, consisting of a
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widow (Champa), her adolescent son (Raj Kumar), and a small daughter. Raj 
Kumar works in a steel polish workshop in Moradabad, and his earnings are 
the main source of household income. Polishing steel is hard work, but 
under the piece rate system it yields relatively high daily wages (about 
Rs 20 per day), and Raj Kumar himself leads the relatively privileged life 
of those who have daily access to a substantial sum of cash. But his 
mother Champa is comparatively neglected, and leads a severely deprived 
life. She even engages in wage labour, a symptom of severe deprivation in 
Palanpur. This household has been classified as "Modest" by Drèze and as 
"Very Poor" by Sharma.
The final stage of the classification exercise consisted of ranking 
the households from the seven fractiles into deciles of equal size. This 
was carried out by Jean Drèze, and mainly involved an effort to integrate 
the separate scales produced by Drèze and Sharma.
3.2.2. Apparent Prosperity and Current Income
We have noted that current income is often used to measure poverty and 
to identify a target population for poverty alleviation programmes (see 
Drèze, 1990a, on income and eligibility conditions of the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme, IRDP). It is of some interest therefore to compare 
the position of different households in the scale of 1983/4 per-capita 
income with their position in the classification discussed in the preceding 
section. A basis for this comparison is provided in Table 3, which shows 
the position of each of Palanpur's 143 households both in the apparent 
prosperity scale (row index) and in the per capita income scale (column 
index), both scales having been divided into deciles®. It is clear that 
there are substantial differences between the rankings obtained under each 
method. These reflect partly the inaccuracies inherent in each method of 
assessment, but also some real differences in the underlying concepts of 
prosperity and poverty.
®. The number of households in the poorest decile is 17 for each 
scale and 14 in all other deciles.
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One of the most obvious and important contrasts arises from the fact 
that current income varies widely from year to year. As a result, per- 
capita income in 1983/84 can be quite a poor indicator both of the longer- 
run earning opportunities of a household, and of its living standard in 
that year.
Among the factors that account for the short-run instability of 
income, the quality of the harvest is one of the most influential. The 
year 1983/84 was one of poor harvest in Palanpur but good harvest in Uttar 
Pradesh as a whole (and hence low output prices), resulting in depressed 
incomes for households which derive a substantial part of their earnings 
from farming. As can be seen from Table 3, for the majority of households 
cultivating 10 bighas of land or more, 1983/84 per capita income is 
somewhat depressed relative to "apparent prosperity". The incomes of Murao 
farmers are particularly depressed, as cultivation tends to account for a 
large part of total income for this cultivating caste. For example, of the 
24 Murao households cultivating more than 10 bighas, 16 were found to lie 
below the diagonal in Table 3 indicating that their per-capita income 
ranking understated their apparent prosperity. In only two out of the 24 
cases did per capita income overstate the prosperity of Murao households.
Fluctuations in the quality of the harvest for the village as a whole 
are compounded by fluctuations for individual farmers related to factors 
such as pests, management errors or risk-taking behaviour. An extreme 
example is provided by household 122, which had a negative income in 
1983/84. This household owns a large amount of land, excellent draught 
animals, a variety of consumer durables and a good house. But, for one 
reason or other, this household experienced a disastrous harvest in 
1983/84, resulting in a negative income for that year’. There are other 
important sources of instability of short-run income. These include: (1) 
fluctuations in prices and wages (with, for example, real agricultural
’. Referring forward to the section on averaged incomes, it is 
interesting to note that this household is ranked quite high in the 
permanent income scale.
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wages being at a temporary peak in 1983/84); (2) temporary illness
(household 113); (3) job search (household 715).
As far as inaccuracies of assessment are concerned, we have already 
commented on a number of difficulties earlier in this paper. Two further 
problems deserve mention. First, our measure of current income excludes 
income earned from illegal activities (e.g. stealing coal from passing 
trains and selling liquor) as well as interest income. This appears to 
lead to some systematic underestimation of the incomes of richer 
households. Thus, it is revealing that among the 8 households which are 
positioned in the richest decile in terms of apparent prosperity but not 
in terms of per-capita income, all the non-Murao households (5 in total) 
are moneylenders®. One of them (410) is also notorious for earning large 
sums of money from illegal activities, especially selling liquor. Other 
omissions in the measurement of income, such as the imputed rent of houses 
will also have led to some underestimation of richer households' income.
The second problem relates to the treatment of household size. As can 
be seen from Table 4, there is a systematic tendency for the scale of 
apparent prosperity to boost the position of large households (in square 
brackets), and reduce the position of small ones (in bold type), compared 
to the scale of current incomes. The reason for this is not obvious, and 
two non-exclusive possibilities come to mind. First, it could be that 
perceptions of lifestyle are overinfluenced by total household income as 
opposed to per-capita income, and biased upward, especially for large 
households, by intra-household inequalities. A good example of this 
possibility is provided by household 224. This household is widely 
regarded as one of the most well-off in the village, and its endowment of 
land and other assets in 1983/84 was indeed very impressive (it possessed, 
for instance, the only functioning tubewell in the village, the only
®. The neglect of interest income can also lead to overestimation of 
the incomes of heavily indebted households. One example is that of 
household 609, which borrowed a large sum of money just before the survey 
year to buy a she-buffalo. The operation of the credit market in Palanpur 
is discussed further in Chapter 6.
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tractor and the only flour mill) . The head of the household, Bhupal, 
rarely works himself, smokes cigarettes as opposed to bidis, travels and 
gives generous feasts at marriages. However, when it is remembered that 
this exceptionally large household contains no less than 35 members, and 
that the other 34 members rarely smoke cigarettes or travel, it becomes 
much harder to make up one's mind where to place it in the prosperity 
scale -
The other possibility is that the observed bias arises from the 
failure of per-capita income measures to capture the effects of economies 
of scale and adult equivalence. There are obvious economies of scale 
involved, for instance, in the ownership of a number of consumer durables 
such as handpumps, radios and bicycles. The use of adult equivalence 
scales would also lead to upward corrections of the incomes of large 
households, where the proportion of children tends to be higher than 
average.
It is clear from this discussion that apparent prosperity and current 
per-capita income both have strengths and weaknesses as indicators of the 
standard of living. What should be stressed, perhaps, is that defining 
"poverty" simply in terms of current income leads to rather unsatisfactory 
and counter-intuitive classifications. Consider, for instance, the set of 
households falling in the richest three deciles of the apparent prosperity 
scale in Table 3 or 4. This group contains households which appear quite 
low in the current income scale. It includes Dumber (410), the liquor 
dealer, and Gulabo (112), the leading moneylender in the village. It also 
includes a number of households whose incomes were temporarily depressed 
by a bad harvest, illness or job search.
The observation that current income has major deficiencies as an 
indicator of prosperity is hardly surprising, but it has far-reaching 
policy implications since current income is often taken as the basis for 
"targetting" government assistance to vulnerable households. Even in the 
absence of measurement errors, the benefits of such schemes would accrue
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to the "transient poor" as well as to the "chronic poor". Further, there 
are good reasons to believe that the transient poor would, in general, have 
greater chances of being selected than the chronic poor. This is because 
the transient poor usually have more influence, are better educated, and 
can incur the costs of search and bribery more easily, not to mention the 
fact that government officials themselves often prefer to deal with the 
less poor among eligible households.®
3.2.3. Current Income and Permanent Income
An obvious remedy to the problems for measurement caused by short-run 
fluctuations in income is to average income over several years. As the 
data available for Palanpur is in a panel form, we are able to compare the 
ranking of households in terms of 1983/84 per capita income with their 
ranking in terms of per capita income averaged over these four years (Table
5 )^ °.
There is an obvious difficulty in interpreting the contrast between 
current income and a measure of permanent income based on such a long 
period of time. For any particular household, current income can deviate 
from permanent income either because of a long-run change in economic 
status (caused, say, by the loss of an earning member) or because of a 
short-run fluctuation (e.g. due to a poor harvest). In spite of this 
difficulty, some interesting observations do emerge from Table 5.
First, access to employment opportunities outside the village seems 
to have played a major role in upward income mobility^^. For instance.
®. For a discussion of income and the eligibility conditions of the 
IRDP programme see Drèze (1990a).
. Household incomes are averaged over the years for which survey 
data were collected. Not all households were present in all four survey 
years, having migrated in after the earlier surveys or being away during 
one or more survey years. Incomes were made comparable by deflating with 
the appropriate price index (see Chapter 2).
. Economic mobility in Palanpur, in particular the immobility of 
the poor agricultural labour households, is examined further in Chapter 5.
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of the 11 households which were not in the richest decile in the permanent 
income scale but which moved into the richest decile in the 1983/84 per- 
capita income scale, 8 had at least one (in four cases, more than one) 
member employed in the formal sector outside the village - in spinning 
factories, railways, teaching, e t c A s  Table 5 shows, regular 
employment outside the village also accounts for a large part of upward 
mobility at other levels of income. To some extent, this observation 
reflects the short-run downward fluctuation in farm incomes in 1983/84. 
However, much the same conclusion is retained if we compare permanent 
income with apparent prosperity in 1983/84 instead of current income.
Second, a number of the more dramatic cases of downward mobility are 
clearly related to the loss of income-earning household members. In some 
cases (113, 225), the loss is temporary, and due to illness or accident. 
In other cases (613,711,712,714), the loss is permanent, due to death or 
permanent disability^^ .
Third, Table 5 throws light on the relationship between caste and 
poverty. A very high incidence of poverty emerges among Jatabs, not one 
of whom fails to be included in the poorest 40% by at least one of the two 
criteria of current or permanent income. Similarly, a high proportion of 
large Murao farmers among the unambiguously rich households is noticeable. 
Downward mobility is discernable among Thakur households, with only eight 
of them below the diagonal (in 5 cases due to access to outside 
employment). It is not likely that all of this downward mobility can be 
attributed to the bad harvest, since many Thakur households were 
comparatively less dependent on cultivation than other households. This 
fits with the widely held view in Palanpur that the relative economic 
position of the Thakur caste has deteriorated in the last few decades.
. Six of these eight households have access to a pacca (permanent) 
job, involving security of employment and comparatively high monthly 
salaries.
. On the connection between widowhood and downward mobility in 
Palanpur, see Drèze (1990b), section 4.
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3.2.4. Poverty and Household Characteristics
This section investigates the incidence of poverty among households 
in relation to economic, demographic, occupational and caste 
characteristics. Some relevant information is presented in Table 6, where 
a number of different household groups are considered. The last column of 
this table indicates the number of households included in each group. The 
first column indicates the proportion of households which would be included 
in the poorest 40% of households under the apparent prosperity criterion. 
The second and third columns denote the proportion of households in the 
poorest 40% of the population according to the current income and permanent 
income classifications, respectively. Note that in this exercise permanent 
income refers to the average of 1974/75 and 1983/84 incomes only, as the 
household characteristics considered apply to 1983/84 and some are not 
likely to be long-term.
It is reassuring that different approaches to the assessment of 
poverty do not give wildly diverging indications of the relative incidence 
of poverty in particular household groups. For example both the apparent 
prosperity and the current income criteria suggest that households without 
land, households with no fit adult male, households headed by widows 
without a fit adult male, agricultural labour households and households of 
the Jatab caste are substantially more vulnerable than average, while there 
is relatively little poverty among joint families, households with access 
to regular jobs, Thakurs and Muraos. The criterion of permanent income 
produces similar levels of poverty for most household groups, except those 
defined in terms of transient demographic characteristics. For example, 
widow-headed households without a fit adult male in 1983/84 was a highly 
vulnerable group in that year according to both the apparent prosperity and 
current income criteria, but less particularly so in terms of permanent 
income. This is hardly surprising, since most of these widows would have 
been living with their husbands in the earlier survey year.
We turn now to a brief discussion of the relationship between poverty
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incidence and a few specific household characteristics. Depending on the 
classification used, the risk of poverty among landless households ranges 
from about 70% above the village average risk (using the apparent 
prosperity criterion) to roughly the same as the average. The link between 
poverty and landlessness is therefore not so strong as might have been 
imagined.
The reason for this is that the landless comprise a highly 
heterogeneous group, which includes households with widely divergent 
economic opportunities. In Palanpur we can identify at least three sub­
groups of landless households which one would not expect to be particularly 
poor. First, there are landless households with access to regular 
employment outside the village. Important examples relate to the two 
households of the Kayasht caste (906 and 907). This caste is generally 
renowned for its high educational achievements and has a long tradition of 
involvement in white-collar jobs. It lives up to its reputation in 
Palanpur, with an adult literacy rate of 100 percent (compared with 10% of 
males and 1% of females in the village as a whole) and, in each of the two 
households, access to a secure and well-paid job outside the village.
Second, there are households from castes traditionally providing 
particular services not involving the use of land, e.g., carpenters, 
barbers, potters, sweepers. In Palanpur as in much of the rest of India, 
some of these traditional occupations have been markedly displaced in and 
by the urban economy. Others, however, have recently prospered. This 
applies, for instance, to carpenters, who are in high demand in Palanpur 
and are benefitting from the current construction boom in the village.
Third, a number of landless households are those of grown-up sons who
live separately from their parents and have no legal title to land but have
privileged access to their fathers' land. This can take the form of being
granted the usufruct of a particular plot from the family holding, or of
leasing in on preferential terms. One would not expect such households to 
be as deprived as households which are completely landless.
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Such qualifications serve to remind us that landlessness is not a 
straightforward indication of vulnerability to poverty in a village such 
as Palanpur. One could further speculate that the link between 
landlessness and poverty has become less strong over time, with the 
diversification of the economy, the expansion of outside employment 
opportunities, and the greater tendency of grown-up sons to live separately 
from their parents.
Aside from the landless, households without a fit adult male 
immediately come to mind as being particularly vulnerable, especially in 
villages such as Palanpur where female employment and land rights are 
severely restricted. However, once again this is a heterogeneous group. 
The means through which some of these households escape poverty in Palanpur 
include the ownership of milch animals (household 409), access to a secure 
job (103), and remittances from a male family member living outside the 
village (503, 9 0 7 ) . Table 6 itself indicates that there are sub-groups 
among the group of households without a fit adult male for which poverty 
incidence is very high. For instance, the households of widows without a 
fit adult male are highly vulnerable.
The condition of widows in Palanpur is discussed in detail in Drèze 
(1990b). Once again this is a heterogeneous group including a number of 
very deprived households but also Gulabo (112) who is the largest 
moneylender in Palanpur and is entered in the richest decile of the 
apparent prosperity classification. The vulnerability of widows in 
Palanpur is strongly affected by the presence or absence of a grown-up son. 
Through the practice of patrilocality, a woman in Palanpur normally joins 
her husband's village immediately after marriage and is generally unable 
to appeal to her own relations when she becomes widowed. Employment 
opportunities in Palanpur are very limited for women, given purdah and 
related practices, so a widow has great difficulty in earning income by
. Note that a male family member who normally resides outside the 
village is not counted as a member of the "household". Thus, households 
"without a fit adult male" include some households with an adult male 
working and residing outside the village.
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hiring out her labour. In-laws in Palanpur rarely provide any support to 
a widow. As a consequence of these factors, usually only a widow with 
grown-up sons can be confident that she will receive some support.
Indicators of poverty incidence by caste (see the last block of rows 
of Table 6) broadly confirm the patterns discussed earlier. The incidence 
of poverty is very high among Jatabs, and relatively low among Thakurs and 
Muraos. Poverty among Muraos is practically non-existent, though current 
incomes reveal some poverty in this group mainly due to the bad harvest. 
The rapidly rising economic prosperity of this caste of hard-working and 
skilful farmers is recognised in the village as one of the basic socio­
economic changes of the last few decades.
Although a considerable amount of change has taken place at the top 
of the economic and social heirarchy, little progress has been made in 
Palanpur by the lower castes, especially the Jatabs. Among this group, 
poverty remains endemic. This is a reflection not only of poor endowments 
of productive assets, but also of low educational standards and 
vulnerability to caste-based discrimination resulting in, among other 
things, little access to any kind of regular employment outside the 
village.
3.2.5. Systematic Biases Resulting From the Use of Current Income
Before concluding this section it is of interest to comment briefly 
on an aspect of systematic deviation between the observed poverty incidence 
for households with different characteristics based on the apparent 
prosperity criterion as opposed to the current income criterion. We have 
already discussed the numerous ways in which our current income measure 
fails to capture the underlying 'true' living standard of Palanpur 
villagers. One way that we can regard the imperfections found in our 
income measure is by representing these as an element of 'noise', such that 
our observed income is equal to 'true' income plus a random noise 
component. If we make this assumption, it is necessary to ask what are the
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implications in terms of our calculations of poverty risk of having a 
'noisy' measure of true living standards^. To answer this we can make 
use of a result presented in Ravallion (1988) in which he shows that the 
presence of noise increases the incidence of poverty for any unimodal 
distribution if the poverty line lies to the left of the distibution's mode 
(and vice verca)^. This result suggests that if we consider two groups 
within the population and we find that one group is concentrated to the 
left of the poverty line and the other group has a greater concentration 
to the right, then we will overstate the incidence of poverty for the group 
whose mode lies to the right of the poverty line and understate the 
incidence for the group whose mode lies to the left of the poverty line.
The intuition of this argument can be easily seen from Figure 1. 
Suppose that per-capita income in a particular year is the product of a 
'normal income' and a random component. Assume for simplicity that both 
components are log-normally distributed with mean (of the logarithem) zero. 
Due to the presence of the random component, actual (per capita) incomes 
(as measured by the logarithem) will have a 'flatter' distribution than 
normal incomes, with the same mean. As a result, if the poverty line is 
below that mean, the estimated proportion of households below the poverty 
line (based on actual incomes) will be higher than the proportion 
corresponding to the distribution of normal incomes. If the poverty line 
had been drawn to the right of the mean income level, our conclusions would 
be the reverse; we would be understating the incidence of poverty on the 
basis of actual income. If we suppose there are two groups in the 
population, one with its mean income to the right of the poverty line and
. Note, we are putting aside for the momemt the effect on incomes 
of non-random shocks, for example, the effect of a drought, which would 
reduce observed incomes for many villagers in the same way. We assume here 
that the only deviation of observed income from the 'true' income is the 
result of shocks specific to particular households and un-correlated with 
shocks to other households. See also Anand and Harris (1990) for a 
discussion of the 'noisiness' of current incomes.
Ravallion's (1988) result is specific to poverty as represented 
by the headcount measure. If we measure poverty with any measure which is 
member of the Atkinson class, Ravallion showes that the presence of noise 
will increase poverty regardless of where the poverty line is relative to 
the mode of the distribution.
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one with its mean below the line, then by examining actual instead of 
'normal' income we would overstate the poverty incidence of the group 
concentrated above the poverty line, and understate the poverty incidence 
of the group below the line.
To check for evidence that this argument may actually apply in 
Palanpur, we can refer to Table 6 and compare the poverty incidence which 
we obtain on the basis of the current income criterion to the poverty 
incidence obtained in terms of apparent prosperity. We take the poverty 
incidence on the basis of this latter criterion to be the 'true' poverty 
incidence. We can argue that joint-family households are generally 
unlikely to be highly represented among the poor, because of the various 
scale-economies that such households enjoy in terms of cultivating 
undivided landholdings, consumption of durables, etc. Indeed, on the basis 
of apparent prosperity these households have an incidence of poverty of 
0.19, considerably below the village average of 0.41. On the basis of 
current income, however, the incidence of poverty among this group is 
higher (at 0.22). Because the incomes of this group would be concentrated 
at a level above the 'true' poverty line, our argument above would suggest 
that current income is overstating the incidence of poverty among this 
group^^.
For other groups likely to be concentrated above the poverty line such 
as Thakurs and Muraos, we also find that current income overstates their 
incidence of poverty relative to the apparent prosperity criterion. If we 
examine groups whose incomes would tend to be concentrated below the true 
poverty line such as the landless, landless without regular job, 
agricultural labour households, and households without fit adult male, we 
see that for these groups the poverty incidence obtained on the basis of 
current income is consistently lower than the 'true' poverty incidence, as
Note, because we do not have a cardinalization of the 'true' 
income represented by the apparent prosperity measure, it is not possible 
to check whether the mode of a particular group's 'true' income 
distribution lies to the left or right of the poverty cut off point (here 
the bottom 40% in terms of 'true' income).
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would be expected on the basis of our argument above. In fact, only in one 
case of households thought to be concentrated below the poverty line, 
namely households with a widow, is the poverty incidence on the basis of 
apparent prosperity greater than that obtained on the current income 
criterion. We have already mentioned that this particular group is very 
heterogeneous and the mode of its distribution of income may lie to the 
right of the poverty line. Note also that the assumption of a unimodal 
distribution of income for any group in Palanpur need not necessarily 
apply. This point may apply in particular to the first row in Table 6, 
where, in contrast to our expectations the poverty incidence of households 
with a regular outside job on the current income criterion is greater than 
on the apparent prosperity criterion. Given that outside jobs take many 
forms and involve varying skills, the assumption of a unimodal distribution 
of outside job income may not be reasonable.
3,3, The Determinants and Correlates of Poverty
The discussion of the preceding section can be extended using simple 
econometric analysis of the determinants of poverty. The problems of 
specifying exogenous variables are both important and difficult here. We 
have selected two types of variables in this category. The first consists 
of three zero-one variables characterizing the household's asset or labour 
market position. The first of the three is landlessness. Since this 
condition arises for many families from their historical position at the 
time of the Zamindari abolition (in the early 1950s) and since in Palanpur 
the land market is highly inactive, there is a case for thinking of this 
variable as exogenous. The second is the presence of a fit adult male - 
which we may view as arising from birth, marriage, or health. The third 
is the presence in the household of an outside job. Access to these jobs 
may depend on factors unrelated to a household's economic position (for 
example, a relative in urban employment who can approach his own employer 
on behalf of his relations) . We must acknowledge that one can provide 
arguments why each of these might be endogenous (particularly the last) but
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the problems with these variables are rather less strong than with other 
possible selections. The second group of explanatory or exogenous 
variables are zero-one variables representing four of the castes in the 
village.
There are three measures of poverty employed for this part of the 
analysis. The first is derived from the apparent prosperity index, the 
second from current income, and the third from income averaged across the 
four survey years (permanent income). For each of the criteria we call a 
household poor if it is among the poorest 4 deciles of the corresponding 
standard of living criterion. Results from probit analysis of the 
influence of household characteristics on the risk of poverty are presented 
in Table 7. We first display results without and then with the caste 
dummies included. Without the caste dummies we find that for the apparent 
prosperity criterion the important explanatory variables are landlessness 
and employment in a regular outside job (the effect of landlessness 
increases the probability of poverty while the opposite occurs with 
possession of an outside job) . Using the estimated parameters in the first 
part of Table 7 we find that the landless are more than 2 times as likely 
to be poor as those with land (for average values of other variables)^®. 
Similarly, holding the other explanatory variables constant at their means, 
households without a regular job have a probability of poverty 26 
percentage points higher than households with outside jobs.
Turning to the current income criterion, the influence of landlessness 
becomes insignificant, possibly the consequence of the poor harvest in 
1983/84. With the permanent income criterion, once again landlessness and 
employment in a regular job significantly related to the probability of
In this example we can show that if the household is landless and 
the other variables are at their means the probability of poverty is 70%%, 
while if the household has land, the probability is 33%. This is calculated 
using the fact that the mean for the regular job dummy is 0.34 (see Table
6) and the mean for the no fit adult male dummy is 0.13. Putting these 
means in the estimated equation and a one for the landless dummy gives a 
z value of 0.514, while a z value of -0.426 is obtained if the landless 
dummy is set at 0. From standard Normal tables it is possible to obtain 
the accompanying probabilities.
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being included among the poor.
The presence or absence of a fit adult male does not seem to be of 
independent significance. Where the coefficients on landlessness or on a 
regular job are significant, the significance generally survives the 
introduction of variables representing caste. Only in the case of
permanent income does the landless dummy loose its significance.
For given values of the three asset/labour market variables, Jatab 
caste membership had a significant effect (increasing the probability of 
poverty) regardless of the poverty criterion used (see the second part of 
Tables 7). For the apparent prosperity criterion the likelihood of poverty 
among Jatabs, with all other variables held constant at their means, is 
almost 7 times higher than among non-Jatabs (on the basis of estimated 
parameters in the second part of Table 6). With the apparent prosperity 
and current income criteria, membership of the Thakur and Murao castes does 
not appear to have a significant independent effect on poverty, but with 
the permanent income criterion both of these caste dummies become 
significant (decreasing the probability of poverty). The dummy
representing Dhimar households is significant and positively related to the 
probability of poverty for the apparent prosperity and current income 
criteria, although not for the permanent income criterion. Households of 
this caste have become highly indebted in Palanpur in recent years (see 
Chapter 6) and have experienced a decline in earning opportunities. 
Although they are ranked reasonably high in the social hierarchy their 
economic position appears to be increasingly precarious.
The correlates of poverty are displayed in the correlation matrix 
presented in Table 8. Here we focus only on households which are 
considered poor according to the apparent prosperity criterion. We see 
that the caste variables are again significant. It is also striking that 
participation of the household in agricultural labour is strongly 
correlated with poverty. This should perhaps be recognised as a 
consequence of poverty and may well be useful for policy purposes as an
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indicator. Results from further investigation into the nature of poverty 
among agricultural labour households can be found in Chapter 5.
3.4. Poverty and the Characteristics of the Poor in Earlier Survey Years.
So far in this chapter the focus of our attention has been on the 
poverty of Palanpur households during the 1983/84 survey year. The 
construction of an apparent prosperity measure has allowed us some 
comparison with income measures in identifying the poor in the village. 
As this apparent prosperity measure draws, albeit informally, on a very 
wide range of living standards indicators such as wealth, ownership of 
durables, health, etc., we have regarded this measure as an appopriate 
benchmark against which to assess income. Unfortunately, it has not been 
possible to replicate the creation of an apparent prosperity index for the 
earlier survey years. To examine the poverty incidence of different 
household groups in the earlier years we are therefore compelled to make 
use of the income criterion while acknowledging that this measure is going 
to be imperfect (and may systematically understate the incidence of poverty 
for precisely those groups we would expect to be highly represented among 
the poor). Therefore, while we do present figures on the poverty incidence 
of groups in earlier survey years, and also repeat the probit analysis on 
the probability of being among the poor in those years, we will confine our 
discussion to a few brief remarks and only with respect to current income 
figures for each year.
In Table 9 we provide figures for the incidence of poverty in terms 
of the current income criterion for each of the four survey years, and for 
the same household characteristics that were examined in the previous 
sections^ .^ During no survey year was the poverty incidence of households 
with regular outside jobs above the village average. Note that in 1974/75 
households with outside jobs had only a slightly lower incidence of poverty
Note that for the earlier survey years, it was not possible to 
ascertain whether a household has a fit adult male member or not. We 
therefore examine the less common characteristic of households without any 
adult male.
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than the village average. This echoes the finding in Chapter 2 that income 
from outside employment in 1974/75 contributed little to total income 
inequality (i.e. it was distributed rather evenly over the total-income 
distribution). Consistently high poverty incidence in all four survey 
years is observed for agricultural labour households, as well as Jatab, 
Dhimar and Teli households. Thakur and Murao households were consistently 
less likely than average to be among the poor in all four survey years.
For no household characteristic is there evidence of a clear monotonie 
trend towards increasing or decreasing poverty incidence. Only for 
landless agricultural labour households did the incidence of poverty never 
fall between any two years, and it rose over the whole period from 0.33 in 
1957/58 to 0.64 in 1983/84. Two factors which are likely to account for 
the general absence of a trend are the varying harvest quality in different 
years and the presence of outside job incomes in the village. The poverty 
incidence of households with regular jobs was lowest in the two years 
during which harvests were poor, and therefore cultivating households had 
depressed incomes. Similarly, households of the actively cultivating Murao 
caste registered the highest incidence of poverty in those two years. As 
our poverty criterion consists of being among the bottom two quintiles in 
the income distribution, it is clear that variations in income components 
will affect relative total incomes and hence the identity of the poor in 
any one year.
Our finding in Table 9 of a high incidence of poverty among 
agricultural labour households (as well as among Jatab households) suggests 
the possibility that such households are experiencing chronic poverty. 
This is an important question and one which will be given further attention 
in Chapter 5.
In Table 10 we present results from probit analyses of the 
characteristics of the poor for all survey years. The specifications 
reported here are the same as those presented for 1983/84 only, in order 
to facilitate comparisons. Without the inclusion of the caste dummies,
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only the regular job dummy exercises a signficant influence, and then only 
for the 1983/84 survey year. When the caste dummies are included, the 
regular job dummy becomes weakly signficant in 1974/75 and 1957/58 as well. 
The caste dummies are found to be most influential in affecting the 
likelihood of being among the poor in the different survey years. Murao 
households were significantly less likely to be among the poor in all 
survey years except 1983/84 (probably due to the effect of the bad 
harvest). Thakur households were also generally less likely to be among 
the poor, although only significantly so in 1974/75. The probability that 
Jatab households were among the poor became statistically significant only 
in the last two survey years. This suggests that over time their 
vulnerability has increased. The probability of poverty was strongly 
significant among Dhimar households only in 1983/84, but weakly so in 
1957/58 and 1962/63 as well.
3.5» Apparent Prosperity and the Duration of Poverty
Whether the poor in any one year are always the poor is an important 
question which merits exploration^® . Our attitudes towards poverty will 
be affected by the degree to which poverty is a sustained or temporary 
condition. In the above sections we have pointed to the advantages in using 
the apparent prosperity measure of poverty, and have noted that the index 
is available only for 1983/84. We explore in this section some 
longitudinal considerations which can be addressed while retaining the use 
of the apparent prosperity measure. A more complete discussion of mobility 
and the duration of poverty, conducted in terms of current income, will 
be postponed until Chapter 5.
In this section we examine the movement of households in the
In a study using panel data for rural South India, Gaiha and 
Deolalikar (1990) find, among other things, that about one fifth of 
households were chronically poor in that they were poor in all nine survey 
years (between 1975/76 and 1983/84). For a discussion at the all-India 
level, Gaiha (1988) finds that only about half of the poor in 1968 were 
also poor in 1969 and 1970.
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distributions of current income between the last two survey years. In 
Table 11 we present a transition matrix showing the movements of individual 
households between the deciles of the income distribution of the 1974/75 
and 1983/84 survey years. For instance, household 571900 moved from the 
poorest decile of the income distribution in 1974/75 to the second decile 
of the income distribution in 1983/84. Note that household numbers in 
these tables are not the same as those in earlier sections, as they are 
constructed to reflect not only caste (first digit) but also household 
splits and departures from the village. If a household split between 
1974/75 and 1983/84 the last digit of the household number will be greater 
than 0 but less than 9; if the household split between 1962/63 and 1974/75, 
the second to last digit will be between 0 and 9, etc. If a household was
not present in the village for a year, the corresponding entry in the
appropriate digit of the last three digits is 9^ .^
In Table 11 we indicate which households are among the poor in terms 
of apparent prosperity in 1983/84 (in bold type). Not all 59 "poor" 
households are entered in the transition matrix between 1974/75 and
1983/84, because ten of the poor households arrived in Palanpur between 
these two survey years. Similarly only 126 out of a total of 143 
households in 1983/84 are entered in this matrix. Even fewer of the poor 
in 1983/84 can be traced before 1974/75^ .^
In previous sections we discussed several possible reasons for
divergence between rankings according to current per capita income in 
1983/84, and rankings according to apparent prosperity and these can
. For example, if the household with the number 704 in 1957/58 
split into two households by 1962/64, the two new household's respective 
numbers would be 7041 and 7042. If these two households did not split 
further and were present in the village during the following survey years, 
their numbers in 1974/75 would be 70410 and 70420 respectively, and 704100 
and 704200 respectively in 1983/84. If one of them was not present during 
a particular year then the entry for the corresponding year would have been 
a 9.
In this chapter make will not attempt to trace the poor in 1983/84 
further back to earlier survey years. Mobility over all four survey years 
is examined systematically in Chapter 5.
109
explain why some of the poor, in apparent prosperity terms, are quite 
highly ranked in the 1983/84 per capita income distribution.
Despite evidence of considerable movement in income space it is 
significant that among the 14 households which belonged to one of the 
poorest three deciles of the per capita income scale in both 1974/75 and 
1983/84, all but one were regarded as poor in terms of the apparent 
prosperity criterion for 1983/84^. This lends some support to the claim 
that the apparent prosperity measure is successful in identifying those 
households in 1983/84 which are experiencing sustained deprivation.
Of the 49 households which were "poor" by the criterion of apparent 
prosperity in 1983/84 and which were already present in the village in 
1974/75, 29 households were in the poorest 40% of the distribution in
1974/75. It thus appears that, in spite of the high degree of mobility 
found in the income space, low current income in 1974/75 is quite a good 
predictor of low apparent prosperity in 1983/84. Recall that 1974/75 was 
a good year agriculturally, when bad farming practices were less severely 
penalised, and that tenancy exerted an equalising influence on land 
cultivated. Those households which were poor in 1974/75 were thus likely 
to be disadvantaged in some basic sense, in that they did badly at a time 
when the environment was generally favourable. This suggests that income 
poverty in a good year may be a useful measure for analysis and for policy.
3.6. Concluding Comments
The analysis of policy towards poverty and the poor involves first 
asking "who are the poor?". This requires specifying definitions of the 
poor which can be used in applied analysis, and identifying who are the 
poor under the different definitions. We may then ask how policy can be 
designed so that the standard of living of the poor is advanced, together 
with the cost and efficiency, appropriately defined, of the different
. 21 out of the 24 households among the poorest 40% in income terms
in both 1974/75 and 1983/84 were poor in apparent prosperity terms.
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possible policies. Indicators that can be used for applied research may 
not be feasible for policy administration. The emphasis in this chapter 
has been on the first set of questions although our answers to them for 
Palanpur do have implications for the second.
We have concentrated in this paper on two indicators of standard of 
living for the purpose of examining who are the most vulnerable. The first 
is the apparent prosperity index constructed independently yet with 
strongly similar results by Jean Drèze and Naresh Sharma. The second is 
income, both current and 'permanent' where the latter refers to a simple 
average over four survey years. Although it has not been our concern here 
to explore in detail the precise meaning and content of the standard of 
living (see, e.g.. Sen, 1987), we have been concerned via the apparent 
prosperity index with indicators which go beyond income such as wealth (via 
land, consumer durables, or productive assets), education, health and 
occupation.
The index of 'apparent prosperity' was constructed only for 1983/84 
since it was based on extended and close knowledge which was available for 
that year. Some aspects of mobility were explored in terms of the other 
indicators, notably current income, and the relationship between these and 
the 'apparent prosperity' criterion was explored. Interestingly, the poor 
in 1983/84, as identified by the 'apparent prosperity' index, coincided 
much more closely with the poor defined in terms of current income in 
1974/75 than those defined in terms of current income in 1983/84. This 
points to two things, namely the variability of income, and the fact that 
poverty in terms of current income in a good agricultural year may provide 
a better indication of sustained poverty than it does in a bad agricultural 
year. It cannot, of course, be asserted that income in a good year is the 
appropriate concept. Generally, the changes in the picture resulting from 
the different measures ('apparent prosperity', current income, and 
'permanent' income), together with the volatility of income, confirm the 
inadequacy of income, in its short-term sense, as a basis for identifying 
the poor. This conclusion is strengthened if we consider that 'noise' in
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an income measure may systematically bias our conclusions regarding the 
incidence of poverty among different groups.
Other aspects of the standard of living have an association with 
'apparent prosperity' but are far from perfectly correlated with it. The 
changes in both the inequality of land owned and in landlessness have been 
particularly associated with the splitting of households in advance of the 
division of land among sons. Hence, if these sons retain entitlement to 
the use of their fathers' land, a sharp rise in landlessness should not 
necessarily be associated with a dramatic increase in poverty, 
notwithstanding the fact that the landless are more likely to be poor than 
the landed.
Involvement in agricultural labour (around 3 0% of households) is 
strongly associated with poverty. Conversely, those households with 
regular outside employment are unlikely to be poor. The other group with 
high "poverty risk" is the Jatab caste, which ranks lowest in the caste 
hierarchy of Palanpur. Whilst education in Palanpur is unevenly 
distributed and illiteracy is common, it is remains striking that the 
Jatabs are almost entirely illiterate.
The identification of the poor, and particularly their association 
with agricultural labour and the Jatab caste, provides pointers for policy. 
Notice that one cannot change caste, and we argue in Chapter 5 that 
mobility out of agricultural labour is low. This suggests that those who 
are included in these two groups are not likely to be poor as a result of 
transitory, or life-cycle factors. In addition, where one targets a caste 
with assistance, it would not be easy for ineligible villagers to claim 
benefits. Jatabs (who make up 13% of the population) , over 80% of whom are 
poor, could provide a well-targeted group.The provision of regular 
employment, at current wage levels, could provide substantial improvement 
in the position of poor agricultural labourers. For the usual reasons 
there would be the administrative advantages of self-targeting. However, 
whether such options are politically feasible or palatable is clearly an
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important issue which is not being addressed here.
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Tabla 1
ClaaalfIcatlon of Apparent Prosperity By Naresh Sharma and Jean Drèze
Naresh
Sharma
Jean
Drèze
Very Rich Rich Prosperous Secure Modest Poor Very
Poor
101 217 410 205
112 221
Very Rich 125 224
208 502
213
201 116 702
706 118 907
Rich
207 111 203 222 902 212 704 209
211 119 204 225 906 405 708
Prosperous 121 210 401 412 709
127 215 408 603 909
202 220 701
126 102 310 104 216 311 123 406
106 105 218 404 206 503
Secure 108 107 219 411 223 602
109 124 227 607 308 617
110 129 305 707 312 715
122 214 306 813 402 805
226 604 103 409 114 304 615 807 818 705
113 601 120 309 703 809 819 817
Modest 115 605 128 315 712 810 901
117 811 301 407 713 814 905
131 903 302 504 803 815
403 303 606 806 816
501 710 307
611 808
Poor 612
801
804
609 608 613
610 711
Very Poor 802 714
812
Table 2
Palanpur: Basic Socio-Economic Characteristics (1983/84)
Caste No. of 
Households
No. of 
Individuals
Traditional
Occupations
Main Current 
Occupations
Land Owned No. of Households with
Per Capita at Least One Member
(bighas) in Regular Employment
1. Thakur
2. Murao
3. Dhimar
4. Gadaria
5. Dhobi
6. Teli
7. Passi
8. Jatab
9. Others 
VILLAGE
30
27
13
12
16
14
19
8
143
217
217
74
83
27
92
79
118
53
960
Landlords
Farmers
Water-Carriers 
Shepherds 
Washermen 
Oil Pressers
Mat-makers
Leather
workers
Miscellaneous
Cultivation; 
outside jobs
Cultivation
Cultivation; 
outside jobs
Cultivation; 
outside jobs
Cultivation; 
agric. labour
Cultivation; 
agric. labour
Outside jobs
Cultivation; 
agric. labour
Miscellaneous
3.64
6.50
0.68
2.72
0.53
1.13
1.30
1.85
0.30
2.64
13
6
10
LD
6
1
2
47
Note ; Except for the 'others' category, this list of castes follows a tentative hierarchical ranking, with Thakur at 
the top and Jatab at the bottom (for details see Bliss and Stern, 1982).
Dhobi and Teli households are Muslim.
Table 3
Current Income and Apparent Prosperity
1983/84 
pc.income
apparent
prosperity
poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 richest
608 711 80« 501 808 307 610 802 609
poorest «3.3 714 817 «11 812
613 801 710
303 809 712 713 901 705
2 810 818 815 80«
81« 819 905 807
803 309 128 302 504 301 615
3 315 409 811 «0«
403 816 703
113 «05 117 407 115 103 114 304
4 S03 «17 308 131 120
«01
715 813 105 40« 129 404 503 403 123
5 333 318 805
337 319
108 «07 107 31« 104 602 «04 206
6 134 311 30« 707
305 312
133 313 13« 110 909 109 411 103 314
7 412 704 10«
603 310
335 131 315 127 303 304 708
8 303 333 310 209 709
906 902
307 119 226 111 408 330 907
9 305 614 311 701 405
401 703
113 135 331 101 334 11« 308
richest 410 313 lie 317
503 301 706
Note: Each column of the table represents one decile of the scale of "current income" and each row represents one decile of the scale of "apparent prosperity",
with deciles ranked in increasing order of afluence (i.e. the poorest are in the top left hand corner.
Households cultivating at least 10 bighas are shaded. (Note that 1 acre = 6.4 bighas).
Tabla 4
Currant Incon» and Apparent Prosperity
1983/84 
pc.income
apparent
prosperity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
608 73.1 804 501 d08 307 610 eoa <00
1 612 714 817 <11 S13
613 801 710
303 809 712 713 901 705
2 810 818 815 806
814 819 905 807
803 309 128 302 504 301 615
3 315 409 811 606
403 816 703
113 605 117 407 115 303 114 304
4 903 617 308 131 120
601
715 813 105 406 129 [404] 503 402 123
5 223 218 805
227 219
108 [607] 107 216 3 0« 602 <0« 206
6 124 311 306 707
305 333
122 212 126 110 909 109 411 102 33«
7 412 704 106
603 310
225 [121] 215 127 [202] 204 708
8 203 222 210 209 709
906 902
207 119 33< 111 408 220 907
9 205 614 333 701 405
401 702
112 125 [221] [101] [224] [116] 208
10 «30 [213] 118 217
502 201 706
Note: Each column of the table represents one decile of the scale of "current income" and each row represents one decile of the scale of "apparent prosperity",
with deciles ranked in increasing order of afluence (i.e. the poorest are in the top left hand corner.
Households with 3 members or less are in bold type. Households with 12 members or more are in square brackets.
Table 5
Permanent Income and Current Income
1957-84 
avg. income
1983/84 
pc. income
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
303 817 810 608 613 711 113 122
1 612 903 814 803 714 225
801 804 715
309 617 @13 605 403 710
2 315 808 809 611
501 812 819 818
307 117 223 227 128 406 105 212
3 905 816 308 815 409 713
806 129 219 218 131 203 112 713
4 303 807 404 126
811 610
C07 503 607 305 222 134 108
5 805 802 504 901 606 215
703
301 €03 131 137 107 402 410 125
6 609 413 110 207
909 115
311 SIS 130 704 90S 216 103 2 05 303 210
7 601 109 2 21
119
313 114 €14 903 502 101 104 226
8 411 30€ 309 204
602 213
111 310 133 106 222 102 709
9 604 705 334 401 408
708 701
304 405 330 118 lis 301 70S 208
10 702 907 30S 217
214 707
00
Each column of the table represents one decile of the scale of "average income" and each row represents one decile of the scale of
with deciles ranked in order of increasing afluence (i.e. the poorest are in the top left hand corner).
Households with at least one member in a regular outside job are entered in bold type.
"curent income".
TABLE 6
«'Poverty Risk" for Different Household Groups
Household
Characteristic
Proportion of Households with Stated 
Characteristic Classified as Poor
Apparent
Prosperity
Current
Income
'Permanent ' 
Income
Total 
Number of 
Households
With Regular Job 
Landless
Landless without 
Regular Job
Agricultural Labour
Landless Agricultural 
Labour
Without Fit Adult Male
Landless Without 
Fit Adult Male
With Widow
Widow Without Fit 
Adult Male
0.25
0.70
0.76
0.78
1.00
0.67
0.57
0.45
0.67
0.19
0.27
0.00
0.62
0.25
0.50
0.69
0.43
0.89
0.50
0.41
Joint Family
Thakur 
Murao 
Dhimar 
Gadaria 
Dhobi 
Teli 
Passi 
Jatab 
Other
All Households 
Notes :
1. In brackets are the total number of households in the corresponding 
year which have the household characteristic indicated in the respective 
row.
0.15
0.44
0.53
0.63
0.64
0.56
0.43
0.48
0.67
0.22
0.30
0.26
0.46
0.33
0.25
0.44
0.36
0.89
0.38
0.41
0.21
0.59
0.65
0.68
0.73
0.61
0.57
0.48
0.56
0.30
0.20
0.11
0.46
0.25
0.75
0.63
0.43
0.89
0.50
0.41
48
27
17
41
11
18
7
33
9
37
30
27
13 
12
4
16
14 
19
8
143
119
Table 7
Probit Analysis of the Characteristics of the Poor
Household
Characteristic
Apparent
Prosperity
Poverty Criterion
Current ' 
Income
Permanent' 
Income
Without Caste Dummies 
Landless
Regular Job
No Fit Adult Male
Constant
With Caste Dummies 
Landless
Regular Job
No Fit Adult Male
Thakur
Murao
Jatab
Dhimar
Constant
Note :
1. Probability Values 
coefficient is equal to
0.94
(0 .0 0 )
-0.71
(0 .00)
0.41
(0 .21)
-0.24
(0 .10)
0.64
(0.05)
-0.91
(0 .00)
0.55
(0.17)
-0.31
(0.34)
-6.94
(0.99)
1.35
(0 .0 0 )
0.89
(0.05)
-0.09
(0.71)
indicating 
zero are in
0.15
(0.61)
-1.17
(0.00)
0.23
(0.49)
0.06
(0.69)
-0.03
(0.93)
-1.34
(0 .00)
0.35
(0.32)
-0.07
(0.85)
-0.46
(0 .20)
1.36
(0 .0 0)
1.03
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.84)
0.61
(0.04)
-0.89
(0 .00)
0.31
(0.35)
- 0.11
(0.43)
0.30
(0.35)
-0.97
(0 .00)
0.37
(0.31)
-0.76
(0.03)
-1.31
(0.00)
1.11
(0 .01)
0.40
(0.36)
0.14
(0.53)
the probability that the estimated 
brackets.
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Table 8
Correlation Analysis of Household Characteristics on Poverty
Poverty Dummy Based on the Apparent Prosperity Criterion
Pearson
Correlation
Household Characteristic Coefficient Mean Sum
Landless (Dl) 0.29 (0.00) 0.19 27.00
No Fit Adult Male (D2a) 0.20 (0.02) 0.13 18.00
No Adult Male (D2b) 0.04 (0.66) 0.04 6.00
No Outside Job (D3) 0.23 (0.00) 0.66 95.00
Agricultural Labour (D4) 0.47 (0.00) 0.29 41.00
D1D2A 0.07 (0.38) 0.05 7.00
D1D2B -0.02 (0.78) 0.02 3.00
D1D3........................ 0.26 (0.00) 0.12 17.00
D1D4 0.34 (0.00) 0.08 11.00
D2AD3 0.13 (0.12) 0.10 15.00
D2AD4 0.25 (0.00) 0.04 6.00
D2BD3 -0.00 (0.95) 0.03 5.00
D2BD4 na na 0.00 0.00
D3D4 0.47 (0.00) 0.22 32.00
D1D2AD3 -0.00 (0.95) 0.03 5.00
D1D2AD4 0.14 (0.09) 0.01 2.00
D1D2BD3 -0 .02 (0.78) 0.02 3.00
D1D2BD4 0.10 (0.23) 0.01 1.00
D1D2AD3 4 0.14 (0.09) 0.01 2.00
D1D2BD34 0.10 (0.23) 0.01 1.00
D2AD3D4 0.25 (0.00) 0.04 6.00
D2BD3D4 0.10 (0.23) 0.01 1.00
Joint Family -0 .27 (0.00) 0.26 37.00
Widow 0.05 (0.58) 0.23 33.00
Widow No Fit Adult Male 0.13 (0.11) 0.06 9.00
Thakur -0.15 (0.07) 0.21 30.00
Murao -0.40 (0 .00) 0.19 27.00
Dhimar 0.13 (0.12) 0.09 13.00
Gadaria -0.10 (0.23) 0.08 12.00
Dhobi 0.03 (0.72) 0.03 4.00
Teli 0.20 (0.02) 0.11 16.00
Passi 0.01 (0.90) 0.10 14.00
Jatab 0.38 (0.00) 0.13 19.00
Other 0.04 (0.61) 0.06 8.00
Note:
1. Probability values indicating the liklihood that the correlation coefficient 
is equal to zero are given in brackets.
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TABLE 9
"Poverty Risk" for Different Household Groups
Household
Characteristic
Proportion of Households with Stated 
Characteristic Among Bottom 40% In 
Current Income Terms^
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
With Regular Job 0,.25 (8) 0,.00 (9) 0..34 (35) 0,.15 (47)
Landless 0,.50 (14) 0,.25 (12) 0,.50 (10) 0..44 (27)
Landless without 0.54 (13) 0.30 (10) 0,.40 (5) 0,.53 (17)
Regular Job
Agricultural Labour 0.54 (26) 0.75 (16) 0.78 (32)
Landless Agricultural 0.33 (6) 0.33 (3) 0.60 (5)
Labour
Without Adult Male 0.67 (3) 0.00 (6) 0.00 (0)
Landless Without 0.50 (2) 0.00 (4) 0.00 (0)
Adult Male
With Widow 0.48 (27) 0.37 (27) 0.38 (21)
Widow Without Adult 1.00 (1) 0.00 (4) 0.00 (0)
Male
0.63 (41) 
0.64 (11)
0.60 (5)
0.33 (3)
0.48 (33) 
0.75 (4)
Joint Family 0..39 (38) 0..40 (35) 0 ,.41 (44) 0,.22 (37)
Thakur 0..29 (17) 0..37 (19) 0 ,.16 (25) 0 ,.30 (30)
Murao 0..14 (21) 0..28 (25) 0 ,.15 (27) 0,.26 (27)
Dhimar 0,.70 (10) 0,.78 (9) 0 ,.75 (8) 0 ,.46 (13)
Gadaria 0..33 (9) 0..33 (9) 0..50 (8) 0,.33 (12)
Dhobi 0,.00 (2) 0,.00 (1) 0 ,.67 (3) 0,.25 (4)
Teli 0..63 (8) 0,.56 (9) 0 ,.67 (12) 0 ,.44 (16)
Passi 0 ,.45 (11) 0..19 (16) 0 ,.25 (8) 0.36 (14)
Jatab 0 ,.56 (16) 0,.54 (13) 0 ,.79 (14) 0.89 (19)
Other 0 ,.50 (6) 0,. 60 (5) 0 ,.50 (4) 0.38 (8)
All Households 0,.40 (100) 0,.40 (106) 0 ,.40 (111) 0.41 (143)
Notes :
1. In brackets are the total number of households in the corresponding 
year which have the household characteristic indicated in the respective 
row.
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Table 10
Probit Analysis of the Characteristics of the Poor
1983/84
Using the
Household
Characteristic
Current
1957/58
Income Poverty Criterion
1962/63 1974/75
Without Caste Dummies
Landless 0.22 0.10 0.34 0.18
(0.56) (0.85) (0.42) (0.53)
Regular Job -0.43 -6.78 -0.24 -1.18
(0.39) (0.99) (0.38) (0.00)
No Adult Male 0.55 -6.83 0.00 0.06
(0.48) (0.99) ( n.a) (0.92)
Constant -0 .27 -0.10 -0.22 0.08
(0.06) (0.45) (0.13) (0.55)
With Caste Dummies
Landless 0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.01
(0.91) (0.97) (0.86) (0.99)
Regular Job -0 .88 -7.04 -0.47 -1.32
(0.12) (0.99) (0.12) (0.00)
No Adult Male 0.47 -6.91 0.00 0.36
(0.55) (0.99) ( n.a) (0.55)
Thakur -0.47 -0.38 -1.16 -0.07
(0.26) (0.33) (0.00) (0.83)
Murao -0.99 -0 . 62 -1.20 -0.48
(0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.17)
Jatab 0.23 0.31 0.60 1.35
(0.57) (0.51) (0.19) (0.00)
Dhimar 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.96
(0.11) (0.18) (0.25) (0.04)
Constant -0.08 0.04 0.25 -0.01
(0.78) (0.87) (0.37) (0.97)
Note:
1. Prob Values indicating the probability that the estimated coefficient is equal 
to zero are in brackets.
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Table 11
Transition Matrix of Per Capita Income Distribution Between 1974/75 and 1983/84
1983/84
1974/75
9=1 9=2 9=3 9 = 4 9=5 9=6 9=7 9=8 9=9 9=10
g=i
373900 809030 830003 810001 605030 «05030 572900
210000
605010 403020
g=2
@3.3003. 303000
803003
809020
803003
83«000 833003
703000
608000
«04000 218000 401010
307200
9 = 3
300003
33.3000
«0«300
834000
804000
807003
807003 330003
704300
30«000
408000
930003
330003 910002 30«003
9=4
«03003 803000
407000
219000
309000
110021 307010 206020 307102
603000
601002
403010
110022
9=5
3.00001
108002
«07030
403003 404000 309003 201000 305000
403003
116020
309003 309003 706200
116010
271900
g = 6
115020 101000 906001
102000
333033
204030 704300
303000
220000
906002
105000
703000
111032
9=7
600100 808000
216000
113020 207000 110010 209000 171900 161000 103000
9=8
«03003
903003
803003
208010
833000
206010 214100 208020
«03003
«03003 702000
261010
205000
9=9
901000 221000 «07030 403033 401021
202000
115010
214300
111020
705110
406000
204010
9=10
573900 211000
117000
304000 203000
111010
114000
214400
113010
214200
215000
204020
Notes
TT g=l represents the bottom 10% in income per capita terms. Correspondingly, g=10 represents the 
top 10%.
2. The 59 households which are poor in 1983/84 (in apparent prosperity terms) are in bold type.
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Chapter 4
An Assessment of Living Standard Within 
the Stochastic Dominance Framework^
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we focus on the measurement of living standards in 
Palanpur, following an approach which examines poverty, inequality and 
welfare within a unified framework. In earlier chapters we have discussed 
some issues associated with the use of income as. a measure of living 
standards. We have suggested that a comprehensive measure of real income 
could represent the standard of living of an individual, but that income 
as it is measured from the Palanpur data, does not reflect many components 
of living standards which might be included in a more comprehensive 
measure. A more satisfactory indicator would take into account not only 
earnings but also health, disutility of labour, the consumption of public 
goods, wealth, life-style, etc. The ranking of households in Palanpur on 
the basis of apparent prosperity, as was explored in Chapter 3, is an 
example where we have informally considered several aspects of living 
standards such as standards of health, income, wealth, life-style, etc., 
in a simultaneous manner. However, this was possible for one survey year 
only, and at best could allow an ordinal ranking of the village population 
into deciles.
We have argued that in a setting such as Palanpur purchasing power, 
which is represented fairly well in our income measure, is of great 
importance in determining the standard of living. Many villagers in 
Palanpur are sharply constrained by cash-shortages in their day-to-day
1 The methodological exposition in this chapter is taken from Howes and 
Lanjouw (1991a). The methodology is developed further in Howes (1991) . For 
another application of the methods described here, see Howes and Lanjouw 
(1991b) in which household survey data on urban incomes collected in China 
are analyzed.
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lives and are much concerned with their money incomes. Moreover, the 
common environment in which the villagers live as well as their common 
access to public goods, means that differences between individuals in terms 
of the ability to translate commodity command into welfare may not be as 
large as in data sets drawn from more widely dispersed or differentiated 
environments. It is for these reasons that in this chapter we retain the 
use of income as a useful indicator of living standards in Palanpur.
In the previous two chapters of this thesis we have measured income 
inequality in Palanpur for different survey years, and have attempted to 
relate changes in the distribution of income to the evolving village 
economy and the widening of its links with the outside economy. We have 
also investigated in some detail the nature and degree of poverty in 
Palanpur, and have discussed conceptual issues in its measurement. In 
these chapters we have generally followed the common practice in the 
literature of treating the measurement of income inequality, poverty, and 
welfare as separate problems which can be investigated independently.
The measurement of these three aspects of living standards has 
generated a vast literature and a large number of different measures have 
been proposed. However, the conclusions which arise from the 
implementation of any particular measure may carry little weight if we 
disagree with its embodied assumptions. In addition, the chosen measure for 
say, poverty, may conflict with that chosen for measuring some other aspect 
of living standards such as inequality. Only recently has there been a 
growing recognition in the measurement literature of the many linkages 
between, for example, inequality, and poverty^. This has prompted a 
number of researchers to adopt approaches to measurement which take 
explicit account of such linkages (see, for example, Atkinson, 1970, 1987, 
1989, Atkinson and Bourgignon, 1987, 1990, Cowell, 1981, Foster and
^. This is not to say that the conceptual linkages between 
inequality, poverty, welfare and also growth have not been widely 
recognised and explored. For example, the World Development Report for 
1990, published by the World Bank, is devoted to examining the large number 
of inequality-poverty-growth relationships which can exist in developing 
countries.
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Shorrocks, 1988, Shorrocks, 1983, and Sen, 1976). This chapter draws on 
an approach originally developed in Atkinson (1970) which makes possible 
the evaluation of living standards without the need to restrict oneself to 
specific measures and their embodied assumptions.
The framework adopted in this chapter takes as bench-mark an aggregate 
"living-standards function" which is assumed to be an additively separable 
function of the incomes of individuals in Palanpur. Also assumed is that 
this function is non-decreasing in income and that it is continuous. 
Within this framework attention can be confined to questions of poverty by 
paying attention only to those villagers' incomes in the living-standards 
function which are below some designated upper bound. If our concern is 
with inequality we examine the incomes of all villagers in this function, 
but we normalize these by average village income so that our focus is 
entirely on the dispersion of incomes as opposed to levels. Finally, if 
our concern is with welfare in the village we focus on the level of all 
incomes in the village and their dispersion at the same time.
The procedure followed in this chapter is to assess the relative 
standard of living in Palanpur in different survey years on the basis of 
how our living-standards function compares between the years. This chapter 
begins by drawing on the work of Atkinson (1970, 1987) and discussing two 
possible frameworks within which one can compare the living-standards 
functions. The first consists of examining for Lorenz dominance and is so- 
called because it employs the Lorenz curve when comparing distributions of 
mean-normalized income (for the purpose of evaluating inequality). This 
approach has been extended by Shorrocks (1983) who introduced the 
'generalized' Lorenz curve and showed that it could be used to make welfare 
comparisons of distributions which have different mean incomes. The Lorenz 
dominance approach was briefly described and applied to the Palanpur data 
in Chapter 2, although the discussion of this technique was not detailed.
The second, and closely related, framework within which we can compare
128
our living standard function is the stochastic dominance framework^. This 
approach (which is also denoted the 'primal' approach, see Atkinson and 
Bourgignon, 1990) does not involve comparing distributions of income using 
Lorenz, or 'generalized' Lorenz curves, but rather compares cumulative 
distribution functions, or alternatively 'deficit' curves (where a 
'deficit' curve is the integral of a cumulative distribution function). 
We argue in this chapter that this second approach is somewhat better 
suited for our purposes because it more readily permits us to consider 
poverty as well as inequality and welfare, with only minimal redirection 
necessary as we turn from one aspect to another.
The two analytical tools described above have been developed to permit 
comparisons of distributions to be made which command the support of people 
with differing views and distributional judgements. We describe specific 
classes of living standard functions and say that one distribution 
dominates another if it is preferred for all living standard functions 
belonging to a specific class. These classes of living standard functions 
can be very wide, such that sharply divergent distributional viewpoints may 
be represented within a class. Where we find that one distribution 
dominates another for such a class of living standard functions, we can be 
confident that our dominance judgement is likely to command widespread 
support.
A feature of the above framework is that because we seek agreement 
among possibly divergent viewpoints, we may not always be able to observe 
a clear dominance relation between two or more distributions. Both 
approaches may generate only a partial ordering. Moreover, there is no 
distinction made between a 'strong' or a 'weak' rejection of dominance in 
such partial orderings. For example, where we compare two cumulative 
distributions (in the 'primal' approach), dominance of the first 
distribution over the second would occur if the cumulative distribution of
^. The stochastic dominance approach was initially applied in the 
literature on risk and uncertainty, see for example Hadar and Russel 
(1969), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Atkinson (1970) introduced 
this approach to the measurement of inequality.
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the first was nowhere above the second, and at least somewhere below. If 
we observed a crossing we would be obliged to reject dominance but would 
be unable to offer any further judgement between crossings which ocurred 
at different places. In this chapter a third approach is also considered, 
that of e-dominance, which explores more closely the relationship between 
the ranking of distributions and use of specific indices. Here we enquire 
whether it is possible to improve on our ability to rank distributions when 
we introduce the more restrictive, but very simple, notion of e-dominance, 
where e is the inequality aversion parameter of Atkinson (1970) . If we 
restrict our permissible living standard functions to the specific class 
described in Atkinson (1970) and restrict the range of e which we will 
accept, then it may be possible to improve on the rankings possible in 
either of the two approaches discussed above. This third approach can be 
regarded as intermediate to the very general stochastic or Lorenz dominance 
approach and the highly specific approach entailed by measuring either 
poverty, inequality or welfare with any one particular measure.
The outline of this Chapter is as follows. In section 2 we describe 
the framework of stochastic dominance and Lorenz dominance and we indicate 
why we follow the former approach in the section 4 of this Chapter. In 
section 3 we discuss the limitations of the stochastic dominance approach 
and introduce the e-dominance approach. Following this discussion of 
methodological issues, the stochastic dominance and e-dominance approaches 
are applied in section 4 to the Palanpur data for the four survey years. 
An attempt is made to arrive at some overall evaluation of living standards 
on this basis. The detailed knowledge of circumstances in the village 
during the four survey years is invoked to assess the extent to which the 
stochastic dominance approach allows sensible conclusions to be made. 
Section 5 concludes.
4.2. Stochastic Dominance and Lorenz Dominance
The framework of stochastic dominance was originally explored in
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relation to welfare economics by Atkinson (1970) and we begin by drawing 
together some results presented by him in his 1970 and 1987 papers. Assume 
a standard of living function, S, which is additively separable, so that 
the aggregate standard of living can be written as an integral
S =  j S{Y,Z^) f{Y)dY (1 )
defined over the distribution, with density function f(Y), with which one 
is concerned. The distribution function is assumed to be normalized by 
population size (F(Z”'®*)=1, where F( . ) is the cumulative distribution) so 
that S may be seen as per-capita living standard. No other restrictions 
need be placed on S, other than that it be continuous and non-decreasing 
in Y. Y is taken to be either income or income divided by the mean. The 
parameter b is the lower bound of income such that F(b)=0 and Z”®* is the 
upper income bound of the segment of the distribution one is interested in.
Our notation allows us to interpret S as a welfare, an inverse- 
poverty or an inequality measure. If we are looking at welfare, and Y is 
our income measure, then Z”®* will be no lower than the maximum income of 
the distributions being compared (i.e. we are looking at the entire income 
range) . If we are examining poverty, Y is again income but Z"*®* will be 
typically below the maximum income (although this need not be the case). 
2m®x here is to be thought of as the upper bound on the set of possible 
poverty lines one is prepared to consider. In other words, we are examining 
a truncated distribution.
Finally, if we are looking at inequality, Y will be not income, but 
mean-normalized income. Z”*®* here will refer to the highest income in the 
population we are considering, normalized by the mean income. While 
inequality could be studied over a complete or truncated distribution, in 
practice it is normally used as a tool of analysis for complete 
distributions, and we follow that convention here.
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It is possible to show that all particular forms of S which satisfy 
our assumptions (additive separability, non-decreasing and continuous), 
will show an improvement or at least no deterioration in living standards 
in moving from distribution f* to f if and only if
A f ( z )  i  0 for all Z e [0,Z^]
(2)
where A f {Z) = j{f{Y)-f* {Y) ) dY
If this condition holds, then there is said to be first-order stochastic 
dominance up to Z*"®* (or that fd^ f* (Z®®*) ) .
Similarly, if one is prepared to make the additional assumption that 
S(Y,Z”'®*) is (weakly) concave as a function of Y, i.e. that increases in 
income carry less weight in the living standards evaluation at higher 
levels of income, then one can use a condition of second-order stochastic 
dominance, and show that all particular forms of S will show an 
improvement, or at least no worsening, in moving from distribution f*(Y) 
to f(Y) if and only if
A g {Z)  ^ 0 for all Z 6 [O.Z^]
r  (3)
where AG {Z) = J (F(Y) -F* (Y) ) dY
that is, if fdgf* (Z""®*) . Note that first-order implies second-order 
stochastic dominance but not vice versa.
Whether first-order stochastic dominance holds between two 
distributions of income can be very easily checked because it involves 
simply comparing their two cumulative distribution functions. If the first 
lies nowhere above the other and it lies at least somewhere below the 
second, then first-order stochastic dominance of the first distribution 
over the second holds. Checking for second-order stochastic dominance is 
also straightforward and involves drawing 'deficit' curves by integrating 
over the cumulative distribution functions for income. A distribution will
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second-order stochastic dominate another if over the whole range of incomes 
in the distribution its deficit curve lies nowhere above the deficit curve 
of the other, and it lies at least somewhere below. Atkinson (1970), 
drawing on a result in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), shows that if we 
have two distributions with equal mean income for which f*(y) could have 
been reached from f (y) by a sequence of mean-preserving transfers of income 
from a person with income y^  to a person with a lower income y^ , then f (y) 
dominates f*(y) under the second-order stochastic dominance criterion. In 
other words the density functions f(y) and f*(y) would be distributed over 
the same mean income, but the tails on f*(y) would be fatter than on f (y) . 
It can be seen that first-order stochastic dominance is a more restrictive 
requirement than second-order stochastic dominance because any intersection 
of two cumulative density functions excludes the possibility of the first- 
order stochastic dominance. However, as long as the area under the 
intersecting cumulative distribution function F (which is what the deficit 
curve represents) is always smaller than the area under distribution 
function F*, F would still stochastically dominate in a second-order sense. 
For this to be possible (although it is not sufficient) the dominating 
cumulative distribution function must cross the other from below if they 
intersect only once. Where the curves intersect more than once the 
dominating cumulative distribution function must cross the other from below 
for the first intersection.
Consistent with our earlier remarks, let us say that, if Y is defined 
as income, we have poverty-domination (for the poverty line Z"'®"') if 
domination (of whatever order) holds up to Z""®* < max(Y”*®*,Y*"®*) . Note that 
if we have such poverty-dominance then one distribution will dominate the 
other not only at Z"®"' but at any poverty line up to and including Z"®*. 
Welfare-domination is obtained if domination holds up to Z®®* > max(Y®®^ , 
Y*max) ^ If Y is mean-normalized income we will have Inequallty-domlnatlon^.
^. Note, however, that while scale-neutrality is widely regarded as 
an attractive property in the measurement of inequality, it is not 
essential that differences in mean incomes be ignored when making 
inequality comparisons.
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These results are important. From each of the perspectives of 
poverty, inequality and welfare they provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for agreement of measures embodying possibly widely divergent 
assumptions. For a discussion of this in relation to inequality measures 
see Atkinson (1970). In relation to poverty the conditions of stochastic 
domination provide conditions for agreement not only over different poverty 
measures, but they also permit statements to be made about poverty even 
where there might not be agreement about where to draw a specific poverty 
line (Atkinson, 1987)^ . Domination up to Z”*®* is also domination up to any 
poverty line less than Z""®*. Of course there is a cost, namely that a 
stochastic dominance ordering will generally be a partial one. But even so, 
this approach provides a useful starting point........................
Higher orders of stochastic dominance can also be examined but this 
requires making assumptions on the shape of S beyond the assumption of 
concavity. It seems unlikely that such restrictions would command 
widespread support. It is therefore first and especially second-order 
stochastic dominance which are most widely examined, and which are the 
focus of this chapter.
It is more common in the literature, however, to find researchers 
exploit the close relationship between second-order stochastic domination 
and Lorenz and generalized Lorenz domination, and to work with these more 
familiar curves. Atkinson (1970) showed how the ordinary Lorenz curve 
could be used to make statements of inequality domination. Shorrocks (1983) 
has shown how the generalized Lorenz (GL) curve can be used to make 
statements of welfare domination. While not wishing to deny the usefulness 
and appeal of Lorenz and generalized Lorenz curves, it is argued in Howes
.^ Note however, that the second-degree dominance condition is not 
strong enough to ensure the same ranking by the Sen poverty measure or the 
headcount ratio. This is because neither of these two measures satisfy the 
Dalton transfer principle which states that a disequalizing transfer from 
a poor person to someone richer cannot reduce poverty. In the case of the 
headcount ratio the transfer could raise someone above the poverty line 
when they had previously been just below. In the Sen index, the weights 
on individual poverty gaps change with the number of poor people, and again 
a disequalizing transfer could reduce poverty if the total number of poor 
are reduced and hence the weights change.
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and Lanjouw (1991a) and (Howes, 1991) and also discussed in Atkinson and 
Bourgignon (1990) that the use of these curves is less natural where we 
also wish to examine poverty®.
This point can be demonstrated following the exposition in Atkinson 
and Bourgignon (1990). As in our discussion above we let F(.) denote the 
cumulative distribution defined over the finite interval [b, Z”®*] where Z"*®* 
is an upper bound for all individual incomes so F(Z“‘®*)=1. Here, we let 
Y(.) represent the inverse of the cumulative distribution, defined on the 
interval [0,1], where Y(g) indicates the income level at which the gth 
percentile is attained. We can then define the generalized Lorenz curve 
by:
L(F) = fY(sr)dsr. (4)
where F varies between 0 and 1^ . The generalized Lorenz curve differs 
from the ordinary Lorenz curve only in that it is not divided by mean 
income, so that L(l) is equal to mean income in the population, instead of 
1 as with the Lorenz curve. The right-hand endpoints of two generalized 
Lorenz curves will differ if the distributions being compared have 
different mean incomes.
In the Lorenz dominance approach (which can also be regarded here as
®. Howes (1991) also develops a statistical test for the similarity 
of deficit curves which permits the assessment of whether claims concerning 
living standards made about samples can be extrapolated to populations. 
As the Palanpur data cover the entire village during each survey year, it 
is not clear that such a test would be meaningful.
The close relationship between the generalized Lorenz curve and 
the deficit curve can be seen by recalling that Y(g) is the inverse of the 
cumulative distribution function and by examining the equation for the 
deficit curve:
G(Y) = JfF(Y)dY. (1)
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the "dual", see Atkinson and Bourgignon, 1990) the derived variable is 
Y(g), the amount of income required for a person to occupy the gth 
percentile in the distribution of income. This can be compared with the 
"primal" or stochastic dominance approach, where we start from a particular 
level of income or less, F(Y). The distinction between these two 
approaches can be easily recognised where we focus on the measurement of 
poverty. In the primal approach we simply specify a particular income 
level as the upper-bound on poverty lines we are prepared to consider, and 
then we examine whether the cumulative distribution function or the deficit 
curve (depending on what restrictions we have made on our class of living 
standards functions) of one distribution lies everywhere below that of 
another up to the cut-off point which we have designated (Z”®*) .......
In the "dual" or Lorenz dominance approach, we have seen that the 
derived variable for any two distributions we wish to compare is Y(g), the 
amount of income required to attain the gth percentile. A particular 
income level (representing our choice of the poverty line) may be 
associated with different percentiles in the two distributions we wish to 
compare. Within the generalized Lorenz framework we would not be able to 
directly infer poverty dominance up to the designated poverty line, but 
rather we would have to examine whether one generalized Lorenz curve was 
everywhere above the other up to the greater of the percentiles in the two
distributions with which the poverty line was associated. If the
generalized Lorenz curves intersected at some point below the lower
percentile, then we would clearly not have dominance. However, if the two 
generalized Lorenz curves intersected somewhere in between the two
percentiles associated with the poverty line, then we are left unclear as 
to whether we have poverty dominance up to the designated poverty line. 
In this case, the generalized Lorenz curves cannot provide us with the 
answer we are seeking (for a more detailed and also formalized treatment 
of this argument see Howes, 1991) .
Since the deficit curve can be simply applied to examine inequality, 
welfare and poverty, and can be readily generated from the data, the
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evaluation of living standards in Palanpur in section 4 follows this 
approach®.
4.3. The Limitations of Stochastic Dominance and the Use of E-domlnance
In the section above we advocated the use of second-order stochastic 
dominance rather than generalized Lorenz dominance as a criterion for 
judgements on living standards. In this section we want to point to some 
of the weaknesses of the stochastic dominance framework. Note that all 
these weaknesses will also be shared by a generalized Lorenz framework.
For one distribution to dominate another it is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition that its mean and its minimum income be no lower than 
those of the other distribution. If we examine two deficit curves at 
max(Y”’“ , the ranking of distributions we obtain will be the same as
if we had examined the means of the two distributions (although we must 
remember that a deficit curve is ranked higher than another if it lies 
below the other.) Similarly, our ranking of two deficit curves at min(Y”'^", 
Y*’"^") will be identical to the ranking we obtain if we only look at the two 
minimum incomes. If this necessary condition is met we will say that mean- 
mlnlmum dominance obtains. This has a very natural interpretation, as focus 
on the two variables, mean and minimum, spans the range of possible 
concerns with distribution, namely from zero (in which case only the mean 
matters) to one approaching infinity (where we focus exclusively on the 
least advantaged, as in the Rawlsian approach) .
While mean dominance is not necessary for third- and further orders 
of stochastic dominance, minimum dominance is. The sensitivity of 
stochastic dominance measures to the minimum income may give cause for 
concern. One must distinguish two problems. The first is one of 
measurement. It is very hard to ascertain anyone's income, let alone the
®. Atkinson and Bourgignon (1990) also suggest that the 'primal' 
approach appears to be more direct when one is interested to investigate 
the treatment of living standards and differences in needs (such as family 
size) .
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poorest's. In particular, the reported minimum income will be very 
sensitive to decisions made concerning cleaning the data. One way to get 
round the measurement problem may be to widen the income bands for relative 
frequency groups. For example, one may be prepared to believe that if 
someone's income is reported as 20 rupees, it is certainly no bigger than 
100. However, this could result in the loss of much valuable distributional 
information.
This problem of measurement is of immediate relevance to the Palanpur 
data. The income figures calculated, while quite detailed, are not 
exhaustive nor were they calculated with exactly the same precision for 
each survey year. There are several components of income which could not 
be accurately assessed, notably illegal income and income earned from 
moneylending. In addition, the quality of the data collected in the two 
earlier survey years is not of the same quality as the data collected in 
1974/75 and 1983/84. Both of these factors might make one uncertain as to 
the reliability of the actual minimum income figure obtained for any one 
year.
A second problem is conceptual. Do we really want to accommodate the 
full range of viewpoints, including those of strict 'Rawlsians'? Say that 
we could measure income perfectly. If one distribution had incomes which 
were double those of another, except for the minimum income which was ever 
so slightly less, would we really want to refrain from ordering the former 
distribution as superior in welfare terms?
Related to this sensitivity to minimum income is the broader problem 
of what we call 'slight rejection'. The stochastic dominance criteria do 
not distinguish between a strong and weak rejection of dominance. One 
distribution may record dominance over one half of the income distribution, 
and not over the other; another may record dominance over 99%. In both 
cases the same verdict of dominance-failure will be recorded. But the 
welfare significance of the former is likely to be much greater than that 
of the latter, and more robust to small changes in the data.
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One way of dealing with the problem of slight rejections is to make 
more restrictive assumptions on the living-standards function. For example, 
consider the class of additively separable homothetic functions:
l-efa
where e is the inequality-aversion parameter introduced by Atkinson (1970) . 
One might be prepared to restrict oneself to this class of functions and 
to a certain range of values of e^ . Thus one might specify a maximum value 
of e, e”^ , which one is prepared to consider, and look for what we call e- 
dominance over the range 0 to e***.
This very simple procedure has two attractive features. Firstly, e has 
a very natural interpretation: it increases as we become more sensitive to 
transfers of income at lower income levels. Secondly, this approach is 
intermediate to both the very general approach of stochastic dominance and 
the very specific approach entailed by using any one particular measure. 
In an examination of inter-provincial variation of welfare in urban China 
by Howes and Lanjouw (1991b), it was found that switching from second-order 
stochastic dominance to e-dominance (with an e”’“ equal to 2) more than 
doubled the number of pairs of provinces that could be ranked, from 39% to 
84%.
The notion of e-dominance can be applied to an examination of both 
inequality and welfare. Where we wish to focus on inequality we simply 
deal with mean-normalized income rather than by income itself. Extension 
to the examination of poverty is less straightforward, at least if one 
wants to consider a range of poverty lines (See Howes, 1991, for further 
exploration of this point).
.^ Howes (1991) also considers the less restrictive General Entropy 
class of welfare functions in this context.
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4.4. Poverty, Inequality and Welfare Dominance in Palanpur
We now turn to an application of the stochastic dominance methodology 
to income data collected in Palanpur in the four survey years between 1957 
and 1984. Where conclusions are drawn regarding poverty, inequality or 
welfare, it is important to remember that these will be dependent on the 
extent to which we are satisfied that income represents living standards. 
In section 1 of this Chapter and in previous chapters of this thesis we 
have already discussed some of the difficulties involved in the use of our 
income measure as a proxy for living standards in a village such as 
Palanpur. Problems may exist with omitted components of a comprehensive 
"real income" measure, our choice of interval over which income was 
measured, and the influence of harvest fluctuations in our income measure.
For quick reference. Table 1 provides a broad overview of economic 
change in Palanpur for the survey years in 1957/58, 1962/63, 1974/75 and 
1983/84. The population of the village nearly doubled over the 26 year 
interval, and village real income also increased significantly. Although 
real income in either of the earlier two years was at best only about 50% 
of village income in the later two years (due to the income-enhancing 
impact of technological change in agriculture and the spread of off-farm 
employment), income in 1983/84 was less than in 1974/75. This is the 
consequence of poor harvests for both the rabi and kharif seasons in 
Palanpur during the later survey year. Per capita real income in the four 
survey years did not follow a monotonie path either, with the lowest 
average incomes recorded in the two earliest survey years, and the highest 
per capita income obtaining in 1974/75.
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical depictions of the density functions 
of incomes in the four survey years, following smoothing using a kernel 
smoothing technique^. Two units of analysis are used in these density
The kernel smoothing technique used here is the Epanechnikov 
kernel utilized also by Deaton (1989) in his non-parametric analysis of 
rice prices and income distribution in Thailand. I am grateful to Angus 
Deaton for his program and advice on these calculations.
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functions. In Figure 1 we consider household per capita income, while in 
Figure 2 the unit of analysis is individual per capita income obtained by 
allocating to each individual in a household his household per capita 
income. Although an implicit assumption that income is distributed equally 
between all household members is made regardless of which of the two income 
units we use, and this could lessen the appeal of either, the second is 
considered to be preferable in the evaluation of living standards in 
Palanpur because it reflects household size not only when establishing 
household per capita income, but in the weighting of these per capita 
incomes in the distribution of income^. We can see from a comparison of 
Figures 1 and 2 that the shapes of the distributions can differ 
significantly when different units are utilized. .....................
In Figure 2 we see that the density functions for the four years are 
not spread around the same average income, and also that they are very 
different in shape. All display some skewness to the right. The density 
function for 1974/75 seems closest to being symmetric while the density 
function for 1983/84 is not unimodal and has fatter tails than the 1974/75 
distribution at both extremes of the income range.
4.4.1 Stochastic Dominance and Poverty
The traditional approach to measuring poverty in a village such as 
Palanpur would entail specifying a poverty line below which people would 
be considered poor. For India as a whole, Dandekar and Rath (1971) have 
proposed a poverty line based on nutritional requirements of Rs 15 per 
person, per month (at 1960/61 prices). Taking relative prices between 
Uttar Pradesh and India as a whole in 1963/64 (see the contribution of 
Bhattacharya and Chatterjee, in Bardhan and Srinivasan, 1974) a poverty 
line of Rs 11.3 obtains for Uttar Pradesh, in 1960/61 prices. In annual 
terms this corresponds to Rs 13 6 per person. It is clear that in arriving
. We have already discussed in an earlier chapter that when drawing 
Lorenz curves, failure to use individual per capita income instead of 
household per capita income can lead to some conceptual problems.
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at a poverty line such as this, numerous assumptions have been made, 
explicitly or implicitly. One of the attractions of the stochastic 
dominance approach is that one is not obliged to commit oneself to a 
particular poverty line, and in fact, where rankings are possible they will 
occur over all poverty lines up to a specified upper limit. Although it 
is of interest to measure poverty up to this 'official' poverty line for 
benchmark purposes, we will also consider poverty over all poverty lines 
up to 1.5 times and two times the official poverty line.
Turning first to an examination for first-order stochastic dominance 
we present in Figure 3 cumulative density functions for real individual 
incomes in the four survey years with reference lines representing the 
'official' poverty line of Rs 136 as well as another representing Rs 204, 
or 1.5 times the official poverty line. A third reference line is drawn 
where the cumulative density functions are truncated at Rs 272, or two 
times the official poverty line. From the figure it is clear that the 
cumulative density function for 1974/75 lies nowhere above the functions 
for the three other years, and as a result we can state that poverty, 
measured by a wide range of poverty measures including the head-count 
ratio, is lowest in that year. On the basis of the 'official' poverty 
line, and reading off from Figure 3, just over 10% of the population of 
Palanpur was poor in 1974/75, about 35% of the population was poor in 
1983/84 and around 50% of the population was poor in the earlier two survey 
years. Even at 1.5 times the official poverty line, poverty in 1974/75 was 
below 3 0%, while for the other three survey years it ranged between 55% and 
75%.
Measuring poverty using the headcount ratio as in Figure 3, although 
widely practised, has been criticized by numerous commentators (see for 
example Sen, 1976, and Atkinson, 1987) . The headcount measure ignores the 
distance of a particular individual from the poverty line and in this way 
neglects important issues associated with degree of destitution. 
Similarly, a disequalizing transfer from one individual below the poverty 
line to a somewhat richer individual also below the poverty line could lead
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to a reduction in the headcount measure of poverty, because the transfer 
recipient might cross the poverty line as a result of the transfer.
If we are prepared to consider a class of poverty measures which does 
not include the headcount ratio, but which does include the poverty gap and 
related measures, we can make use of the second-order stochastic dominance 
result described in section 2 of this chapter^. This result states that 
a distribution will dominate a second distribution if the deficit curve 
(the integral of the cumulative distribution function) for the first lies 
everywhere on or below the deficit curve for the second distribution, up 
to the upper bound of income (Z”®*) which we will accept as poverty line. 
Figure 4 presents such deficit curves drawn for the four survey years up 
to two times the income level of the official poverty line. From this 
figure we can see that the deficit curve for 1974/75 lies nowhere above the 
deficit curves of the other survey years. We could have already concluded 
this point from figure 3, as the cumulative density function for 1974/75 
was also below that of all other survey years. As first order stochastic 
dominance is a sufficient condition for second order stochastic dominance, 
we know that the deficit curve for 1974/75 will lie below the other curves 
as well.
From Table 1 we can see that the minimum income recorded in 1983/84 
is lower than for all other survey years. This means that 1983/84 cannot 
dominate, neither first order nor second order, any of the other 
distributions. Although the deficit curve for 1983/84 appears to lie well 
below the 1957/58 and 1962/63 curves, in fact at very low incomes the 
1983/84 curve lies slightly above the other two curves and therefore we 
cannot conclude that all poverty measures in the class we are considering 
will rank poverty as lower in 1983/84 than in the two earlier survey years. 
In Figure 4a when we focus more closely on the lowest income levels we can 
see that the deficit curve for 1983/84 incomes starts above the curves for 
the other years. It intersects with the deficit curve for 1962/63 at about
. Recall that this class also does not include the Sen poverty
index.
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Rs 26, and then intersects with the curve for 1957/58 at about Rs 65. At 
least one of the measures in the class will consider poverty in 1983/84 to 
be greater than the two earlier surveys. This point emphasizes the 
observation that the stochastic dominance approach does not always give a 
full ranking. We can clearly rank 1974/75 above the other survey years,
but are unable to do the same with 1983/84.
Comparing the 1957/58 and 1962/63 deficit curves, we know that the 
latter survey year cannot dominate the former because the lowest income in 
1962/63 was Rs 10.3 while in 1957/58 it was Rs 21.5. Close scrutiny of the 
curves in Figure 4a reveals that the deficit curve for 1962/63 starts
rising steeply at about Rs 15 with the deficit curve for 1957/58 beginning
to rise more steeply at around Rs 25. Because the deficit curve for 1962/63 
lies on or above the curve for 1957/58 over the whole range of incomes up 
to and including two times the official poverty line (Figure 4) , the 
earlier survey year poverty dominates the latter^^.
4.4.2. Stochastic Dominance and Inequality
Without the need to substantially redirect our attention, the approach 
we are taking next allows us to evaluate the distribution of income in the 
four survey years. When we wish to consider this aspect of living 
standards we can utilize the results of stochastic dominance by considering 
deficit curves over the whole range of incomes. Because we are 
specifically concentrating on income inequality, we normalize all incomes 
by their respective means.
The focus on mean-normalized income allows us to rank one distribution 
as being more equally distributed (over a wide range of inequality 
measures) if its deficit curve lies nowhere above the deficit curves of the 
distributions with which it is being compared, i.e. if the first 
distribution second-order dominates all other distributions. In the focus
. Recall that poverty-dominance here refers to the situation where 
the dominating distribution has lower poverty than the other.
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on inequality we do not work with first-order stochastic dominance because 
we need to invoke the assumption of (weak) concavity in our class of living 
standards functions in order to be able to compare distributions which have 
the same mean. When we examine for first-order stochastic dominance, the 
only three restrictions on our standard of living function which we allow 
are additive separability, continuity, and non-decreasing in income. On 
the basis of these assumptions we are unable to rank distributions which 
have the same mean but which have diverging distributions.
In Figures 5-8 the results of comparing deficit curves are presented 
in the form of differences between the deficit curve for a benchmark year 
against those for the other years. This approach was taken because 
comparing actual deficit curves for mean-normalized incomes is visually 
difficult due to the range of normalized income and the magnitude of the 
differences between the deficit curves. The deficit curves would appear 
to lie on top of each other. In Figure 5 we compare differences between 
the deficit curve for 1983/84 and those for the other survey years. If the 
difference is always positive, then the 1983/84 year is being dominated. 
Equally if the difference between two deficit curves is always negative, 
then 1983/84 dominates the distribution with which it is being compared. 
We can see in Figure 5 that the difference curve comparing 1983/84 and 
1974/75 lies clearly above the 0 reference line over the lower range of 
normalized income. Beyond a mean normalized income of around 1.5 however, 
the 1983/84 deficit curve lies below the 1974/75 curve, and consequently 
the difference curve becomes negative. This implies that incomes in 
1983/84 would be considered more equally distributed than incomes in 
1974/75 by measures very sensitive to transfers among the rich, and 
therefore the 1983/84 survey year is not dominated by 1974/75.
The difference curves for 1962/63 and 1957/58 lie largely below the 
0 reference line, but do lie above 0 over a small part of the normalized 
income range. (Although the 1962/63 difference curve does not perceptibly 
lie above the zero reference line, we know it has a higher minimum income 
and therefore must cross the reference line from above at least once) We
145
are therefore unable to rank 1983/84 higher than those two survey years,
and can state that there will be at least one summary measure of income
inequality which would consider incomes in 1983/84 as distributed more 
unequally than the earlier survey years. Because the difference curves for 
the two earlier survey years lie above the 0 reference line at low values 
of the normalized income range, we can see that inequality measures which 
are very sensitive to transfers among the poor would be likely to rank 
1983/84 below the first two survey years.
In Figure 6 we take 1974/75 as the benchmark year, and see that income
inequality in this year was clearly lower than the 1962/63 survey year, but 
not lower than the 1983/84 and 1957/58 survey years. The 1957/58 
difference curve lies just marginally above the zero reference line beyond 
a mean normalized income level of about 3. For these latter two survey 
years, there would be some inequality measure (very sensitive to transfers 
among the rich) which would consider incomes to be distributed more equally 
than in 1974/75. In Figure 7 we compare 1962/63 with the other survey 
years, and here it is clear that 1962/63 is dominated by nearly all other 
years. We know (from a comparison of minimum incomes) that a very small 
part of the curve representing the difference between the 1962/63 and 
1983/84 deficit curves must lie below the zero reference line, so we are 
unable to rank 1983/84 above 1962/63. Finally, in Figure 8 we see that 
1957/58 inequality dominates 1962/63, but cannot be ranked against 1974/75 
and 1983/84.
4.4.3. Stochastic Dominance and Welfare
An evaluation of welfare using the dominance approach involves the 
assessment of income inequality while taking into account average incomes 
as well. If we are only prepared to assume that the welfare function is 
separable, continuous and increasing in incomes, then the first-order 
stochastic dominance result states that one distribution will be preferred 
over another if the cumulative density function of the first distribution 
lies nowhere above that of the second. If we are prepared to accept a
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further restriction on the welfare function, namely that welfare increases 
at a decreasing rate as incomes rise, then we can make use of the second 
order stochastic dominance result which compared deficit curves instead of 
cumulative density functions.
In Figure 9 we present cumulative density curves for incomes in the 
four survey years. This figure is essentially the same as Figure 3 except 
that for the purpose of welfare evaluations we now consider the curves over 
the entire income range. In Figure 9 we can see that the cumulative
density curve for 1974/75 lies everywhere below the curves for the other
years. This means that we can rank 1974/75 as higher in terms of welfare 
over the other years, even if we are only prepared to make very
unrestrictive assumptions on the form of welfare function to be used 
(although the assumption of separability is not without its critics, see 
for example. Sen, 1979) . Because first order dominance is a sufficient 
condition for second-order dominance, 1974/75 will continue to dominate if 
we make further restrictions on the welfare function.
The cumulative density functions for the other three survey years 
intersect at several points, and we are therefore unable to extend our 
ordering any further, unless we are prepared to make the additional
assumption of welfare increasing at a decreasing rate with income. In 
Figure 10a, when we examine deficit curves for the four survey years over 
the entire income range we are considering, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether any of the curves are intersecting. We saw in Figure 4a that the 
deficit curve for 1983/84 lies above those for all other years at very low 
levels of income, and intersects with the curves for 1962/63 and 1957/58 
at slightly higher levels of income. This is because it has the lowest 
minimum income recorded for all four years. This means that incomes in 
1983/84 cannot welfare dominate those of any other survey years. 
Similarly, we saw in Figure 4a that the deficit curve for 1962/63 rose 
sooner than that for 1957/58, and was therefore dominated by the earlier 
survey year at low income levels. We know however, that average income in 
1962/63 was marginally higher than in 1957/58, so these two deficit curves
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have to intersect at some point, making welfare dominance impossible. As 
the two deficit curves lie virtually on top of each other at the scale we 
are drawing when looking at the entire income range, it is preferable to 
focus on the upper income range in Figure 10b to examine where intersection 
actually occurs. In Figure 10b we plot the difference between the 1957/58 
and 1962/63 deficit curves over the income range between Rs 1050 and 1150. 
Here we can see that the dominance of the first survey year over the second 
is overturned at an income level of about Rs 1090. Because of this 
intersection, we are unable to state that the 1957/58 income distribution 
welfare dominates that of 1962/63.
It is interesting to note that we have encountered two different cases 
of a distribution being unable to dominate others because of our insistence 
that orderings should find agreement even among observers with extremely 
divergent attitudes towards welfare measurement. In the case of the 
1983/84 income distribution, we are unable to rank this year higher than 
the 1957/58 and 1962/63 survey years because we want 'Rawlsians', whose 
concern is with the least advantaged in the distribution of income, to 
agree with our orderings. In the case of the 1957/58 survey year, we find 
that although incomes in this year are significantly more equally 
distributed than in 1962/63, we are unable to rank this year higher in 
welfare terms, because those who hold the opinion that only average income 
is relevant to welfare comparisons would not be in agreement with this.
Both types of judgements that we are catering for above are somewhat 
extreme. It is therefore of interest to investigate how we can increase 
the number of rankings we achieve, if we restrict the range of judgements 
we are prepared to countenance.
4.4.4. E-Dominance and Welfare
In section 3 above, we introduced the alternative option of evaluating 
welfare in different years by adopting the approach of restricting the 
range of the inequality aversion parameter. In the dominance framework
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considered so far, the inequality aversion parameter was implicitly allowed 
to range from zero to infinity. A parameter of zero represents a total 
indifference to the distribution of income when assessing welfare; only 
average income is important. A parameter approaching infinity corresponds 
to concern only for the level of income of the poorest individual in the 
income distribution^. In this section the approach taken is to restrict 
the range of the inequality aversion parameter from zero to 3. It should 
be noted that a value of three for the inequality aversion parameter would 
still be regarded by most observers as a great concern for the lower end 
of the income distribution. It is most unlikely that in practice making 
this restriction would be found to be controversial.
In Table 2 we present calculations of per capita welfare in the four 
survey years at 20 values of e (the inequality aversion parameter) ranging 
between 0 and 3. If the level of welfare in one year is consistently 
higher at all values of e, then the distribution of income in that year is 
said to e-domlnata the other distributions. We can see in Table 2 that on 
this basis 1974/75 clearly dominates all other years (once again, first- 
order stochastic dominance is sufficient for e-dominance, as is second- 
order stochastic dominance). However, unlike in the previous exercises, 
we find that now 1983/84 also dominates the two earlier surveys. This is 
because restricting e to no greater than 3 means that we are able to rank 
one distribution over another despite it having a lower minimum income. 
With a range of e from zero to 3 we are still unable to order the first two 
survey years in terms of welfare.
If we look at the levels of welfare actually recorded at different 
levels of e for the 1957/58 and 1962/63 survey years we see that with an 
e value of zero, welfare in 1962/63 is higher than in 1957/58. This is 
because average income in 1962/63 is (slightly) higher than in 1957/58.
. The increase in welfare associated with an increase in the income 
of the ith individual in this function dW/dY^ = Y'®. The rate at which this 
changes as income increases further is (dW/dYJ /dY^  = . It can be
seen that if e=0, this second derivative is zero, and for all e>0 it is 
declining at an increasing rate with e. Hence the greater is e the more 
transfers from the rich to the poor will increase welfare.
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However, with an e of 0.15 welfare in 1957/58 is greater than in 1962/63, 
and at all other levels of e, this relationship continues to hold. This 
means that if we were prepared to restrict our values of e from below, as 
well as from above, we could obtain a ranking of the two earlier survey 
years as well. The extent to which we have to make a restriction (setting 
e to no less than 0.15) would probably be very uncontroversial to most 
observers.
The e-dominance approach has permitted significant headway to be made 
in the ordering of the four survey years in terms of welfare. Whereas the 
stochastic dominance approach allowed us to rank 1974/75 as unambiguously 
higher in terms of welfare than the other years, we were unable to extend 
our ordering beyond that. Implementing the e-dominance approach we made 
two restrictions on the range of the inequality aversion parameter in our 
welfare function. This allowed us to complete the ranking of the four 
survey years such that 1983/84 emerged as the year ranked below 1974/75, 
followed by 1957/58 and finally by 1962/63. The approach has the clear 
attraction of requiring us to explicitly state what kind of assumptions we 
are prepared to make, and what distributional judgements we are prepared 
to permit.
4.5. Concluding Comments
This chapter was written with two objectives in mind. The first is 
an exposition of a specific methodology which permits the analysis of 
poverty, inequality and welfare within a unified framework. It has the 
additional advantage of not being prey to criticisms that conclusions are 
based on specific implicit assumptions or judgements. To recapitulate 
briefly, we began this paper with a simple presentation of the stochastic 
dominance results and pointed to the advantage of second-order stochastic 
domination over generalized Lorenz domination in providing a unified 
framework for the study of welfare, poverty and inequality. We then 
turned to some of the weaknesses implicit in the second-order stochastic 
dominance framework (and a fortiori in the generalized Lorenz framework)
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and in particular focused on the problem of 'slight rejection', of which 
the sensitivity of stochastic dominance results to the minimum incomes 
being compared is a particularly acute example. To obtain more, and more 
robust, orderings, we introduced the idea of e-domination, in which one 
uses as a framework a separable, homothetic welfare function, with a 
restricted range of inequality aversion parameters.
The second objective was to apply this methodology to the Palanpur 
data; to demonstrate not only the practical simplicity of this approach but 
also to organize our findings on poverty, inequality and welfare over the 
four survey years. Given the important caveat that we are prepared to 
accept the use of income as our sole proxy for living standards, several 
conclusions can be drawn. Poverty in Palanpur was unambiguously lowest 
during the 1974/75 survey year. This is true not only over almost all 
poverty measures available (including the headcount ratio) but over all 
poverty lines that one could specify. Similarly poverty in 1957/58 was 
unambiguously lower than in 1962/63 for all poverty lines up to two times 
the official poverty line. Dominance of 1957/58 over 1983/84 was not 
observed, however. Nor was it possible to poverty rank 1983/84 and 
1962/63. There will be poverty measures, and poverty lines that will lead 
to different conclusions whenever we compare poverty in these paired survey 
years. The observation that our poverty ordering over the four years is 
only partial is not without interest. It cautions us against accepting 
rankings based on a specific poverty measure or poverty line, because such 
rankings might easily be overturned if we were to choose an alternative 
poverty measure or select a different poverty line.
Income is unambiguously more equally distributed in 1974/75 and in 
1957/58 than in 1962/63. A wide class of inequality measures, including 
the Gini coefficient, would be in agreement with this conclusion. 
However, we would not be able to command such agreement everywhere when 
comparing other survey years. Incomes in the 1983/84 survey year would be 
considered more unequally distributed than the two earlier survey years by 
inequality measures which put much weight on the distribution of incomes
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among the very poor, but more equal among other inequality measures. 
Inequality measures which were extremely sensitive to transfers among the 
rich would find incomes in both 1983/84 and 1957/58 to be more equally 
distributed than in 1974/75 while other measures would conclude the 
reverse.
Welfare evaluations which consider not only the distribution but also 
average incomes, were also unable to achieve a full ordering. While 
1974/75 emerges as clearly dominating the other three survey years, the 
1983/84 survey year cannot dominate the earlier survey years because the 
lowest minimum income was recorded in that year. Because average income 
was marginally lower in 1957/58 than in 1962/63, the dominance of the 
former over the latter, observed when considering poverty and inequality, 
was no longer present when considering welfare.
We next attempted to ascertain to what extent our inability to rank 
distributions was based on 'slight rejections', i.e. whether we were unable 
to achieve a ranking because of the insistence, within the stochastic 
dominance framework, that observers holding highly divergent judgements 
should be able to agree to any ranking obtained. We examined the 
consequences in terms of rankings when we restricted the range of 
judgements we would permit. When we restricted the range of the inequality 
aversion parameter from 0.15 to 3, instead of from zero to infinity, we 
found that a full welfare ranking of the survey years was possible. This 
ranking had 1974/75 at the top, followed by 1983/84, then 1957/58 and 
finally 1962/63.
If we split the four years into two pairs, with the earlier two 
distinguished from the later two by the introduction of new agricultural 
technologies in the mid-1960s, and the expansion of outside employment 
opportunities in the early 1970s, then there is some evidence to support 
the assertion that living standards have risen over the 26 year period. 
This is particularly true when we consider the income distribution as a 
whole. When we focus more specifically on poverty or inequality, it is
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more difficult to convincingly argue that villagers were better off in 
1983/84 than in earlier years.
153
Table 1
Broad Indicators of Economic Change in Palanpur
1957/58
1983/84
1962/63 1974/75
Population
960
528 585 757
Number of Households 100 106 112 143
Village Real Income (Rs) 85,176 94,732 208,001 186,402
Real Income Per Capita (Rs) 161.3 161.9 274.8 194.2
Minimum Income Per Capita (Rs) 21.5 10.3 54.5 -41.0
Maximum Income Per Capita (Rs) 713.1 1188.6 1085.9 494.1
Gini Coefficient for Income 0.336 0.390 0.253 0.307
Price Index (1960/61=1.00) 1.07 0.92 3.78 5.28
Agricultural Wages (1960/61=100) 123 100 123 158
Food Purchasing Power (kg wheat/day) 2.5 2.3 3.1 5.0
Index of Off-farm real wages n. a 100 122 193
Wheat yields, actual kg per bigha 40 40 114 97
Wheat yields, normal kg per bigha 40/50 50 100 150/160
Notes
n.a = not available
The price index is the consumer price index for agricultural 
labourers (CPIAL), which is taken from the Bulletin of Food 
Statistics for the relevant years. See Lai (1976) for the price 
index for 1957/58.
One acre = 6.4 bighas
Normal wheat yields correspond to the expected yield for Palanpur 
ex-ante to the respective year's harvest.
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Cumulative Density Functions for Incomes Below Zmax
1957/58
1962/63
0. B
1974/75
0.4
200 250SO 400 4 50 300O-50
IT)
Income
Real I n d i v i d u a l  I n c o m e  P e r  C a p  I ra C'iSBO R u p e e s )
Figure 4
Poverty—Defecit Curves for Incomes Below Zmax
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Cumulative Density Curves for Incomes
Prob
. 0
9
1 9 5 7 /5 8.8
96;
7
9 8 3 /8 4. 6
.5
.4
.3 9 7 4 /7 5
.2
. 1
0
950 1-130750350150-50
Income
Real I n d T v T d u a l  I n c o m e s  C i G G O  R u p e e s )
Figure 10a
Deficit Curves for Incomes
DEF
10D0
1974/7!
500
200
IT)
Income
R*b I lndrvrduB.1 I ncomaa [1960 Rupaaa^
Figure 10b
Difference in Deficit Curves at Higb Incomes 
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Table 2
Welfare at Different Levels of Inequality Aversion
le of e 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
0 .00 160.843 161.496 274.321 193.718
0.15 86.215 85.552 137.078 101.503
0.30 48.089 47.352 71.053 55.148
0.45 28.350 27.807 38.795 31.607
0.60 18.212 17.860 22.998 19.706
0.75 13.734 13.519 15.943 14.403
0.90 16.329 16.201 17.357 16.583
1.05 -15.676 -15.751 -15.194 -15.409
1.20 -1.899 -1.943 -1.671 -1.807
1.35 -0.531 -0.557 -0.422 -0.489
1.50 -0.184 -0.199 -0.131 -0.164
1.65 -0.071 -0.080 -0.045 -0.061
1.80 -0.029 -0.034 -0.017 -0.024
1.95 -0.012 -0.016 -0.006 —0 .010
2.10 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004
2.25 —0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
2.40 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
2.55 -.0006 -.0010 -.0002 -.0005
2.70 -.0003 —.0006 -.0001 -.0002
2.85 -.0001 -.0003 -.0000 -.0001
e-Dominance Welfare Results
1974/75
1974/75
1983/84
1962/63
1983/84
Dominance
1962/63
Dominance
Dominance
1957/58
Dominance
Dominance
Crossing
Notes
1.
2 .
3.
Welfare is calculated for twenty different values of e varying 
between 0 and 3, increasing by an interval of 0.15.
The formula used for calculating welfare is
W = 1/1-e E
See text for further details.
The only crossing which occurs between 1957/58 and 1962/63 results 
when e=0, i.e. only when average incomes are considered important, 
and no weight is given to the distribution of incomes.
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Chapter 5
Agricultural Labour and Economic Mobility In Palanpur
5.1. Introduction
This chapter builds on the analysis of poverty in Chapter 3 by 
examining in detail the economic mobility of poor households, specifically 
the mobility of agricultural labour households. The interest in 
agricultural labour stems from our finding in Chapter 3 that this 
particular household characteristic was associated with poverty measured 
in terms of income and of apparent prosperity. In this chapter we argue 
that the economic mobility of agricultural labour households is also 
relatively low.
The links between poverty and agricultural labour have been analyzed 
in a wide range of contributions, including those of Visaria (1980), 
Bardhan (1989), Lipton (1983), and Drèze and Mukherjee (1989). The 
literature on economic mobility in rural India has not been quite so large, 
partly due to the paucity of appropriate longitudinal data, but a number 
of studies have emerged in recent years (e.g. Chaudhuri and Ravallion, 
1991, Gaiha, 1986, Gaiha and Deolalikar, 1991, Swaminathan, 1988, Walker 
and Ryan, 1991).
One of the more interesting conclusions which has been emerging from 
these studies is that mobility in income space, either between consecutive 
years or over longer periods tends to be quite high^. This has prompted 
some observers to suggest that the chronically poor in rural India (in the 
sense of sustained poverty over many years for the same household) may be 
substantially fewer in number than previously thought (Gaiha, 1986, and
 ^ However, a study of wealth, as opposed to income, mobility in a 
Tamil Nadu village between 1977 and 1985, found that mobility was not so 
pronounced (Swaminathan, 1988) .
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Gaiha and Deolalikar, 1990).
Studies which specifically consider the economic mobility of 
agricultural labour households have been relatively rare^ . In this paper 
we examine the incidence of poverty and the extent of mobility among such 
households in Palanpur using the detailed household information for the 
four separate survey years between 1957/58 and 1983/84. The analysis 
suggests that income mobility in the village as a whole as well as for 
agricultural labour households is high. However, agricultural labour 
households also tend to be highly represented among the poor in any given 
year and experience little occupational mobility over time^ . The 
divergence between high income mobility of agricultural labour households 
on the one hand, and their apparent poverty can be reconciled by pointing 
to the largely transitory movements which occur in the income space which 
do not reflect long-term changes in living standards. These observations 
suggest that chronic deprivation is common among households involved in 
agricultural labour in rural India^ .
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, we 
describe the labour market in Palanpur and examine the characteristics of 
households involved in casual agricultural labour in the different survey 
years. Section 3 considers both the "poverty incidence" of agricultural 
labour households as well as their "poverty contribution". The treatment
 ^ See however, Epstein (1973), Gough (1987) and Swaminathan (1988) 
for interesting discussions on the occupational immobility of agricultural 
labourers in separate studies of Tamil Nadu villages.
 ^ Walker and Ryan (1991) report for the ICRISAT study of villages in 
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra that not only were agricultural labour 
households highly represented among the poor, but that households were less 
likely to experience income volatility the higher the labour share of 
income, and less susceptible to sudden shortfalls in income the more 
heavily they relied on the labour market as a source of income. However, 
unlike in Palanpur, the poverty contribution of labour households seems to 
be rather low in the ICRISAT villages (table 4.6, pg 97.).
^. Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1991) found that commonly used indicators 
of chronic poverty such as access to land and food share in a particular 
year, did not work well in identifying the chronically poor (as defined by 
average income and consumption over an 8 and 6 year period, respectively) 
in the ICRISAT villages.
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of poverty here differs from that in Chapter 3 in that we do not confine 
our attention solely to a relative notion of poverty. In Section 4 we 
look at income mobility for the village as a whole and point to the 
occupational immobility of agricultural labour households. Section 5 
examines more closely the income mobility of agricultural labour households 
in particular, assessing to what extent relative income movements are 
caused by transitory or permanent factors. Section 6 concludes.
Central to our discussion in this chapter is an appreciation of the 
background against which mobility in Palanpur should be viewed. In 
previous chapters we have described the Palanpur economy in some detail and 
have discussed how it has been changing. We will therefore not repeat this 
discussion here. However, it is crucial to recall that the village 
population has been growing steadily, with households splitting over time. 
New agricultural practices and technologies have had a major impact on 
farming incomes. The effect of varying harvest quality has also had a 
noticeable impact on average income in the different years. The 
distribution of land cultivated has varied over time, although land sales 
were relatively rare. Outside jobs have been increasing in number and 
type, and are of growing importance in the village economy. Income 
inequality has not declined nor increased monotonically over the duration 
of the survey periods. In general incomes in the two earlier survey years 
were more unequally distributed than the later two years, and within each 
pair the later survey year reflected higher income inequality. The highest 
average per capita incomes were observed in the same year in which income 
inequality was lowest (1974/75). For convenient reference Table 1 reviews 
some basic indicators of economic change in the village.
5.2. Agricultural Labour Households and the Labour Market
Casual agricultural labour accounts for the greater part of labour 
contracts within Palanpur. Non-casual employment within the village is 
extremely rare (the main exception concerns ja.jma.ni contracts, where an
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employee performs regular pre-specifled services in return for a fixed 
payment in kind at harvest time, between village artisans and their 
employers). Casual employment in non-agricultural activities (especially 
construction) is more common, but still represents a marginal share of 
total intra-village employment^. For simplicity, the term "agricultural 
labour" will henceforth refer to casual agricultural labour specifically 
(unless otherwise stated).
For a majority of households with some involvement in casual 
agricultural labour (hereafter "agricultural labour households"), 
agricultural labour is not the sole economic activity in which they are 
involved. There may be more than one paid worker in many households. 
Other activities include cultivation, wage employment outside the village, 
non-agricultural employment in the village (e.g. looking after animals or 
helping in a shop), and various forms of informal self-employment (e.g. 
making rope or selling tree leaves as fodder). An important feature of 
agricultural labour is that it acts largely as a "last-resort option", in 
the sense of an employment option which households resort to in order to 
complement their income from other sources when the latter is inadequate. 
This reflects the fact that, on the one hand, agricultural labour is a 
"free-entry" activity which requires little skill, and, on the other hand 
for similar reasons, that real wages earned by agricultural labourers tend 
to be much lower than those applying to skilled or urban employment. This 
view of agricultural labour as a last-resort option has to be qualified to 
the extent that this options is, in fact, not available to households 
without a fit adult male^ .
The involvement of landless households in agricultural labour deserves 
some clarification. If we view this activity as a last-resort option, and
 ^ For a detailed discussion of the labour market in Palanpur, and of 
other studies of labour contracts in rural India, see Drèze and Mukherjee 
(1989), on which this section is partly based.
As explained further in this section, there are severe social 
restrictions on female wage employment in Palanpur.
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remember that landless households find it extremely hard to obtain land on 
lease, we would expect to find many agricultural labour households among 
the landless. In fact, only 11 out of 27 landless households in 1983/84 
were involved in agricultural labour. There are three important reasons 
for this. First, a number of landless households belong to castes which, 
traditionally, have no involvement in agriculture (e.g. the village 
carpenter as well as two households from the highly-educated Kayasth 
caste). Second, some landless households have been able to take advantage 
of employment opportunities outside the village, and gave up agricultural 
labour as a result. Third some of the ' landless' households comprise sons 
who have split from their parents' households but who may retain some 
usufruct of their father's land. In Palanpur, landlessness is by no means 
inevitably associated with low income and a corresponding willingness to 
take up agricultural labour’.
As a rule, casual agricultural labour is hired on a strictly daily 
basis. Contracts are usually agreed upon during the evening preceding the 
day of employment, with the employer approaching the prospective labourers 
and asking them whether they are willing to work for him the next day. 
There are three types of wage-payment systems: daily wage, piece rate, and 
harvest share. Most contracts outside the harvest are based on the daily- 
wage system. The "going wage" for a day's work is generally the same for 
all labourers, and (in money terms) it also tends to be somewhat rigid over 
time despite fluctuations in the level of agricultural activity. As a 
result, involuntary unemployment is common during periods of slack labour 
demand. Often, those who have to go without a job during these periods are 
the less productive labourers.
Women are very rarely employed as wage labourers in Palanpur. Female 
wage employment is regarded as extremely degrading, and only occurs from 
time to time among very poor households from the "lower" castes. Even 
then, a woman would generally work only alongside her husband or (if she
’. See also the related discussion in Chapter 3.
172
is a widow) one of her sons.
We turn now to an examination of the characteristics of agricultural 
labour households in the four survey years. Table 2 presents the caste 
distribution of agricultural households for each year, as well as a number 
of other variables indicating the position of agricultural labour 
households vis-a-vis the average Palanpur household. With the exception 
of one household in 1974/75, there were no Thakur households involved in 
agricultural labour in any of the survey years. As has been mentioned in 
previous chapters some Thakur households are averse to manual labour; 
further, they regard working for another person, particularly within the 
village, as degrading, given their traditional position of dominance in the 
social hierarchy.
In all four survey years Dhimar households (traditionally water- 
carriers) were highly represented among agricultural labour households, as 
were Telis, a Muslim group, traditionally oil-pressers. Jatab households 
were the most numerous among agricultural labour households in all years 
except 1962/63, when for some reason or other Jatabs were apparently 
comparatively successful in either obtaining some land as tenants, or 
supplementing their income in some preferred alternative manner®.
In all four survey years agricultural labour households represented 
no less than 15% of all households and nearly 30% for the last survey year. 
Average per capita household incomes for agricultural households relative 
to the village average ranged from 56% in 1962/63 to 82% in 1983/84, while 
the average value of livestock owned by agricultural labour households 
ranged from 34% of the village average in 1957/58 to 53% in 1974/75. As
®. We have already mentioned elsewhere that in terms of confidence 
in the quality of the data, we rank the four survey years from best to 
poorest as 1983/84, 1974/75, 1957/58 and 1962/63. For example, one
possible reason for the relatively low number of Jatab households 
ostensibly involved in agricultural labour in 1962/63, is that five 
households which were involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58 were not 
surveyed in 1962/63. This could be because they were genuinely not present 
in the village in that year, or because they had somehow been omitted from 
the surveyed households in 1962/63.
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one would expect, agricultural labour households tend to own little land: 
the average landholding of these households in all survey years was below 
half the village average, and as low as 25% of the village average in 
1957/58. In 1983/84, 27% of all agricultural labour households (11 out of 
41) were landless; for the other survey years the proportion was closer to 
one fifth. Average cultivated holding of agricultural labour households 
ranged between 34% of the village average in 1957/58 and 66% in 1974/75. 
In 1983/84 as many as 41% of agricultural labour households were not 
cultivating any land. In the earlier years, this proportion tended to be 
lower (between 19% and 25%).
Wage income as a fraction of total household income for agricultural 
labour households averaged well over 50% in both 1957/58 and 1962/63, but 
below 30% for the last two survey years. Agricultural labour, it appears, 
is increasingly becoming a "secondary" activity for the households 
concerned. This trend reflects both (1) the participation of agricultural 
labour households in the expansion of activities in which Palanpur 
households are involved over the study period, and (2) the "entry" in 
agricultural labour of some households not formerly involved in this 
activity. The fact that, between 1957/58 and 1983/84, the proportion of 
agricultural households has risen only very slightly, from 26% to 28%, 
while the proportion of casual labour income to total income has fallen 
from 54% to 29% for these households, suggests that the first of these two 
factors - the diversification of activities - has been the more important 
one.
5.3. Agricultural Labour and Poverty in Palanpur.
Our examination of the extent of poverty among agricultural labour 
households makes use of two approaches. First, we examine the proportion 
of agricultural labour households belonging to the bottom two quintiles in 
the per-capita income scale in each of the four survey years. This 
approach is based on a "relative" notion of poverty - comparing the levels
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of income for agricultural labour households with those applying to other 
households in the village. The other approach, based on an "absolute" 
notion of poverty, involves specifying a poverty line and considering how 
many agricultural labour households fall below that line in each survey 
year.
The poverty line which we have selected follows the work of Dandekar 
and Rath (1971) who drew a line at Rs 15 per capita per month, at 1960/61 
prices, for rural India. Taking into account the difference in price level 
between Uttar Pradesh and India as a whole, we obtain a poverty line of Rs
11.3 for Uttar Pradesh in 1960/61 (see Bhattacharya and Chatterjee, 1974) . 
On the basis of this poverty line, we find that the proportion of poor 
households in Palanpur was 46% in 1957/58, 49% in 1962/63, 13% in 1974/75 
and 40% in 1983/84. Note that, by construction, the proportion of poor 
households in 1983/84 (40%) is the same whether we take the "relative
poverty" or the "absolute poverty" approach*.
In Table 3 we present calculations of the "poverty incidence" and 
"poverty contribution" of agricultural labour households in Palanpur, on 
the basis of the two poverty criteria discussed earlier, for each survey 
years. "Poverty incidence" and "poverty contribution" respectively refer 
to the proportion of poor agricultural labour households among (1) all 
agricultural labour households, and (2) all poor households. In other 
words, "poverty incidence" refers to the probability that a randomly-chosen 
agricultural labour household will turn out to be poor, while "poverty 
contribution" refers to the proportion of poor households accounted for by 
agricultural labour households.
For comparison purposes. Table 3 also presents similar calculations
* In Chapter 3 we have discussed in some detail various problems 
associated with the measurement of income. While we cannot claim absolute 
precision on our estimates of income for Palanpur households, it is 
unlikely that they involve omissions that undermine our argument. Note 
that Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1991) have recently argued that current 
income is in general a better indicator of chronic poverty than current 
consumption, and that both perform much better than other conventional 
indicators such as landlessness and food share.
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that take Jatab households, rather than agricultural labour households, as 
the reference group. The motivation for the comparison is that membership 
of this caste, like involvement in agricultural labour is a rather good 
"predictor" of poverty^. Indeed, as Table 3 indicates, "poverty 
incidence" among Jatab households was as high as 89% in 1983/84, compared 
with a poverty incidence of 61% among agricultural labour households and 
40% for all households taken together. The "poverty contribution" of Jatab 
households, on the other hand, was somewhat lower (30%) than that of 
agricultural labour households (44%) in 1983/84 (and indeed in each of the 
four survey years), reflecting the larger size of the latter group.
The poverty incidence of agricultural labourers, while lower than for 
Jatab households in 1983/84, was not markedly different from the incidence 
of poverty in the latter group in earlier survey years. Using the "relative 
poverty" approach, the incidence of poverty among agricultural labour 
households never fell below 54%. Using the "absolute poverty" approach, 
the incidence of poverty in the same group was as low as 22% in 1974/75 
(the incidence of poverty among Jatab households was 21% in that year). 
This is not surprising since average per-capita income for the village as 
a whole was at its peak in 1974/75, and the distribution of income was also 
least unequal in that year. For the first two survey years, the incidence 
of absolute poverty among Jatab as well as among agricultural labour 
households was somewhat higher than that of relative poverty, reflecting 
the comparatively low levels of income in those years.
The "poverty contribution" of agricultural labour households was 
largest in 1974/75, when the incidence of absolute poverty was lowest by 
a long margin. In that year, agricultural labour households accounted for 
over one half of all poor households. We have suggested in Chapter 3 that 
current income in a good year is a relatively accurate indicator of poverty
. In Chapter 3 it was found that membership of the Jatab caste was 
among the best predictors of high "poverty risk" among a wide range of 
alternative indicators. This applied for a relative notion of poverty, 
whether poverty was defined in terms of current income, in terms of 
permanent income (averaged over the four survey years), or in terms of an 
apparent prosperity measure.
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- a household with a low income in a good year is likely to be 
disadvantaged in some basic sense. The fact that the poverty contribution 
of agricultural labour households in 1974/75 is quite high therefore lends 
further support to the view such households are among the most vulnerable.
On the basis of the two criteria, involvement in agricultural labour 
is thus found to be quite successful as an indicator of poverty in 
Palanpur, irrespective of year. It should be pointed out however, that 
what makes involvement in agricultural labour a good indicator of poverty 
is not so much the low level of wages and earnings for that occupation per 
se. Indeed, as was discussed in the preceding section, income from 
agricultural labour accounts only for a small fraction of total income for 
many agricultural labour households. Rather, it is arguably the "last 
resort" nature of agricultural labour as an activity which makes it a good 
indicator of the vulnerability of a household.
Whether agricultural labour also indicates sustained deprivation is 
the question we attempt to address in the next section.
5.4. Income Mobility and the Immobility of Agricultural Labour
5.4.1. The Assessment of Mobility
An evaluation of income mobility usually consists of comparing the 
position of a particular household in the income ranking in one period with 
that household's position in a second period^. The extent to which 
households change their ranking over time then indicates the extent to 
which mobility occurs. There is a large literature on different summary 
measures of income mobility (see Swaminathan (1988) for an overview). 
From this literature it emerges that no universally accepted summary
. Although this may be a common approach to the assessment of 
mobility, we may also be willing to regard a society as mobile even if 
rankings do not change at all; if for example the society becomes more 
equal over time.
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measure of mobility is available, nor likely to exist^ .^ We therefore 
prefer to scrutinize transition matrices directly as far as possible, and 
make only limited use of a summary measure.
In the Palanpur study we have four surveys separated by 4 years 
between 1957/58 and 1962/63 and around 10 years between the other survey 
years. As Shorrocks (1978a) has discussed, we should expect greater 
mobility as the interval between observation periods widens because this 
offers increasing opportunity for movement. Therefore we should expect to 
see more mobility in Palanpur on the basis of our data than if we had data 
on adjacent years.
In order to examine income mobility in Palanpur we examine only those 
households who were present in the village during the entire 26 year 
interval. There are three reasons why this "permanent" village population 
does not correspond exactly to the whole village population in any one 
year. First, while in- and out-migration (both temporary and permanent) 
from the village over the surveyed period was not very substantial, there 
were some households who left the village over the interval, and also some 
households who migrated into Palanpur. It would be interesting to examine 
the economic mobility of such households but we do not have the data to 
undertake that task, and thus any household which migrated in or out of 
Palanpur is omitted from the "permanent" village population. Second, there 
are some households which simply ceased to exist at some point, without 
necessarily leaving the village. Such attrition could for example occur 
with the death of a single person, who made up a one-member household. It 
is not always possible to verify what happened to such households if the 
attrition occurred between two survey years, i.e. whether such households 
left the village or whether they simply ceased to exist, and for this 
reason these households are also omitted. Finally, a few households 
omitted or not fully surveyed for one reason or other in a particular
Shorrocks (1978a) takes an axiomatic approach to the measurement 
of mobility when the data are provided in the form of a transition matrix, 
and demonstrates that several basic axioms are not consistent with each 
other.
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survey year, and for this reason we do not have complete information on 
those households for all four survey years.
Eliminating such households from our population reduces our village 
population to 76 households in 1957/58, 84 households in 1962/63, 98
households in 1974/75 and 120 households in 1983/84. The growth in the 
number of households in the village is now due entirely to process of 
households splitting over time. In tables 4 and 5 we present the 
corresponding details on agricultural labour households in this "closed" 
village population as were provided in tables 2 and 3 for the village as 
a whole. In terms of poverty incidence, poverty contribution, and numbers 
of agricultural labour households, this exercise of establishing 
comparability over time of households does not alter much.
5.4.2. Income Mobility in the Village as a Whole
In table 6 we present transition matrices between adjacent survey 
years with the distribution of household per capita income in each survey 
year divided into quintiles, and with the relative frequencies of 
households occurring in each column quintile for a particular row year 
entered in each cell^ .^ These relative frequencies are commonly 
interpreted as representing the probability of occurring in a particular 
cell. The relative frequencies sum to one along each row^ .^ Complete 
immobility would be represented in such transition matrices by I's along 
the diagonal of each matrix, indicating that all households in a particular 
quintile in one year remained in the same quintile in the following year 
(at least not crossing quintiles).
". Note that the impression of mobility obtained when using 
transition matrices is sensitive not only to the income measure and time 
period, as discussed above, but also on the decision taken on aggregating 
households into fractiles. If the income distribution had been divided into 
deciles instead of quintiles, we would expect to see fewer cases of 
households in the same fractile, and therefore more mobility.
. Because of the phenomenon of household splits the transition 
matrices presented here are not 'doubly-stochastic' in the sense of 
relative frequencies summing to one along both the row and column.
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Considering, to begin with, income mobility between 1957/58 and 
1962/63 (Table 6.A) the picture is quite mixed. On the one hand there is 
clearly some rigidity at the top of the scale with as many as 63% of 
households from the top 1957/58 quintile remaining in the top quintile in 
1962/63. On the other hand, there is substantial upward mobility at the 
bottom of the scale with only 17% of households in the bottom quintile in 
1957/58 remaining in the bottom quintile in 1962/63, and 44% in the second 
quintile still in the second quintile in the later year.
On the basis of this transition matrix, we can calculate the value of 
a summary measure of mobility such as the Distance Measure (Mg) . This 
measure takes the extent of "off-diagonalness" or distance from the 
diagonal into account when representing the degree of mobility 
(Swaminathan, 1988) . The value of ^  is equal to zero when all non­
diagonal cells are empty and a value of 1 when mobility becomes perfect, 
i.e. when ones are observed in the cells along the diagonal from the top 
right hand corner to the lower left hand corner (except for the middle 
quintile), i.e. when the greatest distances have been jumped^ ^. It is 
defined as:
n n
MD  = y '  ( i - j ) 2  /maximum value (1)5^ m^ J 
where, when n is odd.
(n-l)
maximum value =2 [ Y] (1-n)^] + ( )^, (2 )
m^ j refers to the probability of occurring in the cell given by row i and 
column j ; n represents the number of fractiles used in the transition
Note that this definition of perfect mobility may not coincide 
with an intuitive notion which would state that perfect mobility occurred 
when the probability of appearing in any cell was the same over all cells 
in the transition matrix. This is one example of the difficulties in 
obtaining agreement between different axioms.
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matrix (in our case 5) . For the transition matrix appearing in Table 6.A, 
Mg takes the value 0.22^ ®.
For the intervals 1962/63 to 1974/75, and 1974/75 to 1983/84, we 
observe an increase in mobility compared to that found between the first 
two survey years (see tables 6.B and 6.C). Between 1962/63 and 1974/75 the 
value of Mg rises to 0.33, and this then falls back to 0.3 0 between the 
last two survey years. The rise in income mobility seems reasonable given 
not only the longer time period but also the fact that considerable 
economic changes occurred after the 1962/63 survey year, namely the 
introduction of new technologies in agriculture and also the substantial 
growth of outside jobs.
One question of interest when faced with the picture of mobility 
obtained in tables 6.A, 6.B and 6.C is to ask to what extent this reflects 
the influence of harvest variations in each survey year. In an attempt to 
evaluate the sensitivity of mobility in Palanpur to the fact that in some 
years incomes from cultivation were boosted due to a good harvest, and in 
another years depressed due to a bad harvest, we tried to correct for these 
factors between the 1974/75 and 1983/84 survey years. On the assumption 
that input costs are applied sometime before the quality of harvest has 
been ascertained, and are therefore invariant to the quality of the 
harvest, we simply scaled down 1974/75 net cultivation revenues and scaled 
up 1983/84 revenues by a selection of different factors (given that 1974/75 
was a good year, and 1983/84 a particularly bad year) and then re-ranked 
households to examine to what degree our impression of mobility was 
affected^. In table 6.D we present the transition matrix which obtained 
when we applied a scaling factor of 30% to both survey years (scaling
This figure for the distance measure can be compared with the 
results obtained by Swaminathan (1988) when assessing wealth mobility in 
a Tamil Nadu village between 1977 and 1985. She found an of 0.094 for 
the household wealth transition matrix (divided into quintiles) and 0.073 
for the per capita wealth matrix (p. 124) , indicating sluggish change in the 
distribution of wealth over the interval.
We are also assuming that prices received by cultivators were also 
invariant to the quality of the harvest (see also Chapter 2).
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1974/75 down and 1983/84 up) . This corresponds to a very substantial 
adjustment to cultivation incomes (probably more than what was actually 
observed), and does reduce the degree of mobility between the two years to 
some extent. The measure of mobility drops to value of 0.27 from the 
previous 0.30. Interestingly, if we examine the relative frequencies along 
the main diagonal of the new transition matrix, we see that among the 
lowest three quintiles there is a substantial increase in the probability 
of households remaining in the same quintile between the two years. Among 
the top two quintiles however, the adjustment does not appear to have 
increased the likelihood of remaining in the same quintile. This suggests 
that the effect on mobility of harvest variation is felt most strongly 
among the poorer households in Palanpur. This point will be explored in 
greater detail when we consider the income mobility of agricultural labour 
households below.
It is clear however, that much of the mobility observed prior to the 
adjustment remains and that we cannot attribute income mobility in Palanpur 
solely to the effect of variations in harvest quality. A similar 
conclusion was reached in Chapter 2 when this simulation exercise carried 
out on measured inequality and resulted in only little change in measured 
inequality (as summarized by the Gini coefficient). Although cultivation 
income was distributed very differently between 1974/75 and 1983/84, this 
was due mainly to differences in the distribution of land cultivated, and 
only partly to variations in the quality of harvest. It is likely that 
mobility was affected in a similar manner.
5.4.3 The Occupational Immobility of Agricultural Labourers
Against this background of income mobility we now evaluate to what 
extent this was matched by the occupational mobility of agricultural 
labourers. In Table 7 we examine the persistence of agricultural labour 
as an occupation for Palanpur households by considering the number of 
households involved in agricultural labour in one year who were found to 
be involved in agricultural labour in subsequent years. Of the 17
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households found to be involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58 (of our 
"permanent" village population), 12 of them were found in this occupation 
in 1962/63. 18 households (out of 27) in 1974/75 and also 18 (out of 34)
in 1983/84 who were involved in agricultural labour had been involved in 
this occupation in 1957/58^. When we consider the household which newly 
entered agricultural labour in 1962/63, we see that it was among 
agricultural labour households in the subsequent years. This is also true 
for seven of the eight households which entered agricultural labour in 
1974/75. With the exception of some decline between the first two survey 
years, there is thus strong evidence that once a households becomes 
involved in agricultural labour, it is not likely to stop being involved 
in subsequent years.
In Table 8a we present probit equations which examine what household 
characteristics affect the probability of observing a household involved 
in agricultural labour. We can see that for all three survey years 
examined (1962/63, 1974/75, and 1983/84) a positive and strongly
significant influence was exercised by a dummy variable taking a value of 
one if the household had been involved in agricultural labour in the 
previous survey year. If we take all other variables at their means (see 
Table 8b) and calculate the probability of a household being involved in 
agriculture first given that it was not involved in this occupation 
previously, and then second given that it was involved in agriculture 
previously, we find that the probability increases by 3 6 percentage points 
in the 1962/63 equation, 58 percentage points in the 1974/75 equation, and 
47 percentage points in the 1983/84 equation^ ®.
For the 1962/63 survey year no other explanatory variables exercised
Note that some of the 17 agricultural labour households in 1957/58 
split over time, and that therefore it is possible for 18 households in 
1974/75 and 1983/84 to be linked directly to 17 households in 1957/58.
This is found by calculating the z value from the probit equation 
when all variables are at their means (Table 8b) , except the dummy variable 
representing the household's previous involvement in agricultural labour 
which takes either a value of one or zero. We can then obtain the 
probabilities from the standard normal table.
183
a strongly significant contribution although the number of adult males and 
the Jatab caste dummy variable were of some significance. By 1974/75 the 
probability of a household being involved in agricultural labour was 
significantly greater if it was of the Jatab caste. In addition, the more 
land a household cultivated in that year the less likely it was to be 
involved in the casual labour market, and the more adult males in the 
household, the greater the probability the household was involved in 
agricultural labour. In 1983/84, the Jatab caste dummy was no longer 
significant, but now the probability of a household being involved in 
agricultural labour became significantly less the greater the education 
level achieved by the most educated member of the household (in years of 
schooling). The more land the household cultivated, the lower the 
probability that a household was involved in agricultural labour, and the 
more adult males in the household the greater that probability. In none 
of the estimated equations did the effect of households splits, nor a dummy 
representing landlessness exercise a significant independent influence.
5.5. The Income Mobility of Agricultural Labour Households
We have seen in previous sections that income mobility in Palanpur as 
a whole has been rather high between the different survey years. We have 
also argued that occupational mobility out of agricultural labour by 
Palanpur households has been rather low. In this section we scrutinize the 
income mobility of agricultural labour households specifically in order to 
better understand the different aspects of mobility which exist as well as 
the type of factors which influence the degree of observed mobility.
In this section our attention will be focused on the income mobility 
of the 17 households involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58. In Table 
7 we indicated that in subsequent survey years, many of these 17 households 
were still involved in agricultural labour. In Table 9 we present 
transition matrices which trace the movements in the income distribution 
of these 17 households over the survey period. Between 1957/58 and
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1962/63, two of the original households split into two, and therefore we 
observe in the first transition matrix that there are 19 households which 
are being followed. We attribute to each of the four split households in 
1962/63, the relative position of their respective originating household 
in 1957/58.
From the transition matrix for the first two survey years (Table 9.A) 
we can observe that even among the 17 agricultural labour households in
1957/58, there was considerable movement in the relative income space.
This does not come as a great surprise for a number of reasons. First, the 
quintiles within which households are located in a particular year, are on 
the basis of per capita income, and any demographic change occurring 
between the two survey years can thus affect in a substantial way a 
household's ranking in per capita income terms. Second, and as we have 
already suggested in Section 4, the impact of harvest quality on 
cultivation income could raise the relative position of households reliant 
on wage income for at least part of their total income. Finally, we argue 
that although occupational mobility of agricultural labour households is 
low, it is not absent. We indicate below that income mobility of 
agricultural labour households who do change occupation is more often in
an upward direction than downward.
Of the 19 households in 1962/63 who stemmed from the original 17, only 
5 households were positioned in the same quintile in the two survey years. 
Note that 8 households had improved their relative position between the two 
survey years, and 6 households dropped in ranking. From Table 1 we can see 
that actual wheat yields in 1957/58 were roughly equal to "normal" or 
expected wheat yields, but that in 1962/63 they were slightly lower. 
Hence, the quality of the harvest in 1962/63 was slightly poorer than in 
the previous survey year. Given that agricultural labour households are 
generally less dependent on crop yields for their income than cultivating 
households (although we must remember that few agricultural labour 
households are entirely dependent on wage earnings for their income), a 
poor harvest which depresses the incomes of cultivators (assuming output
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prices unchanged), will raise the relative position of wage-earning 
households. Some support for this can be found in the fact that more 
agricultural labour households moved up in their relative position between 
1957/58 and 1962/63, than moved down. We will see in comparisons of later 
years more evidence of the influence of harvest quality on the mobility of 
agricultural labour households.
A stronger contribution to the mobility between 1957/58 and 1962/63 
can be seen to have been made by occupational change however. We saw in 
Table 7 that in 1962/63 12 of the original 17 households were still
involved in agricultural labour and we have noted above that a total of 19 
households in 1962/63 stemmed from these 17. Thus, 7 households in 1962/63 
who had been involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58 were no longer 
involved in this activity in that year. From Matrix 9.A we can see that 
6 of the eight upwardly mobile households between these two years were no 
longer involved in agricultural labour in 1962/63, and not one of the 
downwardly mobile households had left this occupation. Thus, while the 
majority of households in 1962/63 were still involved in agricultural 
labour in that year, a minority of households had left this occupation and 
these households accounted for the bulk of the upward mobility of 
agricultural labour households observed between the first two survey years.
A final point of interest is to note that nearly 3 0% of all movement 
observed between 1957/58 and 1962/63 occurred in the bottom 40% of the 
income distribution, and no mobility occurred into or out of the top income 
quintile. Where we are interested in identifying an indicator of long-term 
poverty, we will be more interested in evidence of mobility in or out of 
poverty than among the poor.
In Table 9.B we examine the income mobility of our original group of 
agricultural labour households between 1962/63 and 1974/75. We have 
already discussed in section 4 that cultivation incomes for Palanpur 
farmers in 1974/75 were quite high due to a better than average harvest and 
relatively high output prices. We would therefore expect to see downward 
mobility among agricultural labour households between 1962/63 and 1974/75,
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as a result of the different harvest qualities of the two years. This is 
borne out by the evidence, where of the 23 households in 1974/75 who could 
be traced back to the original 17 households in 1957/58, 14 households
moved down in relative position and only 5 households move up. Of the 14 
households moving down, nearly all (12) were involved in agricultural 
labour. Only 3 agricultural labour households were able to improve their 
position. Once again, more than 25% of the income mobility occurring 
between these two years occurred in the lowest two quintiles of the income 
distribution, and therefore did not represent either mobility into or out 
of poverty (on the relative poverty criterion).
The last transition matrix. Table 9.C, examines the relative movements 
of the original group of 17 agricultural labour households in 1957/57 
between the last two survey years. In 1983/84 there were 28 households 
which could be traced back to the original 17 households, and 18 of these 
households were involved in agricultural labour. Once again we would 
expect to observe an impact on mobility of these households by differences 
in the quality of the harvest between the two survey years. While 1974/75 
was a good year, we have already noted that 1983/84 was a bad year. In 
this case we would expect to see evidence of upward mobility of 
agricultural labour households as these households improved their relative 
position vis-a-vis cultivating households. Between 1974/75 and 1983/84 15 
of the 28 households displayed upward mobility, 7 households were 
downwardly mobile, and 6 remained in the same quintile. More agricultural 
labour households were upwardly mobile between these two years than 
downwardly mobile and this once again supports the contention that harvest 
quality was an important influence on the mobility of agricultural labour 
households (in relative terms). In 1983/84 there were ten households who 
could be traced back to the original 17 agricultural labour households, but 
who were not involved in agricultural labour. Of these ten, six were 
upwardly mobile between 1974/75 and 1983/84, and only one was downwardly 
mobile. As in the transition matrix between 1957/58 and 1962/63, this 
suggests that upward income mobility (independent of the effect of harvest 
quality) is frequently associated with occupational mobility out of
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agricultural labour. Finally, we note that between 1974/75 and 1983/84 
more than 30% of all movement occurred between the bottom two quintiles and 
thus among the relatively poor.
Our discussion above points to two important aspects of mobility which 
should be kept in mind. First, if we wish to examine the degree to which 
a particular household characteristic is associated with long-term poverty, 
then the mobility which occurs within the group of poor households, may not 
be of immediate relevance. A summary measure of mobility (based on 
fractiles and a transition matrix) could easily fail to distinguish this 
type of mobility from movements into and out of poverty. The second, and 
more difficult to handle, aspect of mobility is the fact that some 
movements in the relative position of households are due to transitory, or 
random, factors whilst others represent fundamental changes in long-term 
living standards. The effect of an event such as harvest failure may 
temporarily improve the relative position of an agricultural labour 
household without representing a long-term improvement in its economic 
prospects. On the other hand, obtaining regular outside employment may 
indicate that the household has fundamentally improved its position.
The success of our argument linking long-term poverty with 
agricultural labour households requires a demonstration that the rather 
high income mobility of this group is essentially transitory and does not 
represent much fundamental change. This task is attempted in the section 
below.
5.5.1. Income Mobility; Long-term Versus Transitory Movements
In order to evaluate the income mobility of agricultural labour 
households we make use of an approach introduced in Shorrocks (1978b). 
This approach explicitly links the measurement of income mobility to that 
of income inequality. Shorrocks argues that conventional inequality 
measurement usually looks at income observations that were calculated over 
a particular period of time (in Palanpur we have annual income for the four
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survey years) . The fact that income is a flow variable adds an important 
consideration to the construction of a mobility index based on incomes, 
namely, the length of the interval during which the flow variable is 
observed. As this interval is extended from say, monthly income to annual 
income, variations in monthly income (due perhaps to seasonal change) 
become subsumed within annual income. In a similar way, if we were to 
aggregate annual incomes into lifetime incomes, intra-generational 
movements would be lost. Aggregating incomes thus tends to improve the 
relative position of those who find themselves temporarily at the bottom 
of the income distribution, and the converse applies to those temporarily 
at the top.
Shorrocks argues that the existence of mobility causes inequality to 
decline as the accounting period grows and the extent to which inequality 
declines will be directly related to the frequency and magnitude of 
relative income variation. He shows that for a wide class of inequality 
measures, inequality must fall as the accounting period increases. For any 
inequality measure which is a strictly convex function of mean-normalized 
incomes, Shorrocks proves that measured inequality of cumulated incomes 
over m periods, will be less than or equal to the weighted sum of measured 
inequality during the sub-periods (where the weights are given by the ratio 
of sub-period mean income to the m-period mean income). Shorrocks 
introduces a rigidity index, which is the ratio of cumulated income 
inequality to this weighted sum.
” m (3)
k=l
and where there are m periods, designated k, with I [Y (tg, t^,) ] representing 
inequality of incomes cumulated over all m periods. The weights, w^ , are 
given by
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where the |i,'s are the means. The rigidity index R will take a value of 1 
if the relative incomes within each of the sub-periods are identical and 
therefore the cumulated income inequality measure is the same as the 
weighted sum of the sub-period inequality measures. R will approach zero 
as cumulated income inequality approaches zero, i.e. as incomes are exactly 
equalized over the whole time interval of m periods. Shorrocks proposes 
a measure of mobility based on the rigidity index, M=l-R.
It is possible to construct rigidity curves which map out the extent 
to which the rigidity index falls as the time periods are increased. When 
m=l, the rigidity index is always equal to one as cumulated income 
inequality is the same as the sub-period inequality. As m increases, from 
1 to 2 and so on until, with the Palanpur data, m=4, we expect to see R 
fall as income mobility leads to equalizing long-term incomes. For our 
purposes, the crucial point is that where there are large variations in 
transitory incomes from year to year, we should expect to see R,, fall over 
the first few cumulated periods, but then quickly even out as relative 
incomes rapidly approach their permanent values and there is then no 
further equalization. Where there is more mobility in permanent incomes, 
the rigidity curve will continue to decline as the aggregation period is 
extended. In a simple example Shorrocks (1978c) shows that if all income 
variation across individuals and over time is due to random fluctuations, 
and there is a fixed, unchanging permanent income component, the rigidity 
curve would flatten out noticeably within as few as 3 or 4 periods.
This approach offers an opportunity to examine the extent to which 
mobility of agricultural labour households in Palanpur is transitory as 
opposed to permanent. However, before we proceed it is important to stress 
that the approach outlined above was basically conceived in the context of 
a number of adjacent intervals during which incomes are calculated and 
which can be easily combined to create a new interval with a longer
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accounting period. This applies readily in the case where we have sub­
period intervals consisting of months or quarters, and which can be summed 
to create a year-long accounting period. Alternatively if we have adjacent 
annual incomes (as is available for panel-data sets such as the Michigan 
data on income dynamics in the U.S., or the ICRISAT study in India), then 
summing these annual incomes to construct a longer-term or 'permanent' 
income measure seems meaningful. In the Palanpur context however, our 
annual incomes are separated by many years for which no data was collected. 
While we would expect 'noise' in our income measures (thus 'transitory' 
mobility effects) to explain some of the changes in income rankings which 
are observed as we move from one year to the next, it is clear that the 
long period of time between the surveys would also permit a comparatively 
large role to other factors such as demographic change within the 
household, household partitions, etc. Thus, while applying the approach 
outlined above to the Palanpur data does not raise any specific problems 
of implementation, the interpretation of 'transitory' and 'permanent' 
mobility in this case is rather more difficult. These considerations 
should serve to stress that our findings here remain suggestive at best.
We proceed by dividing the Palanpur population into two groups: one 
made up of those households who consist of or stem from the 17 agricultural 
labour households in 1957/58; the second consisting of all other 
households. We then draw rigidity curves for the two groups to seek 
evidence that the curves for the agricultural labour households become 
flat. It is crucial to stress that this procedure involves us in examining 
inequality within the two groups and thus arguably misses out the mobility 
of agricultural labour households vis-a-vis the other households. This 
could potentially mislead. Suppose for example, that incomes of 
agricultural labour households are identical over all periods (and 
therefore the rigidity index for these households becomes 1) . However, the 
average income of agricultural labour households changes relative to the 
average income of other households. Then we will mistakenly conclude that 
there is no mobility when in fact all agricultural labour households are
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changing their relative position in the income distribution as a whole^°.
Before turning to an examination of the rigidity curves, one more 
issue must be considered. So far we have only mentioned that the 
inequality measure implemented in this exercise must be a strictly convex 
function of mean-normalized incomes^]. However, there exists a very wide 
range of measures which satisfy this requirement and therefore some form 
of selection criterion must be established. We have already mentioned in 
Chapter 4 that different summary measures of inequality attribute different 
weighting to different parts of the income distribution (often implicitly). 
We must therefore exercise some care in our choice of inequality measure. 
In Table 10 we present calculations of the rigidity index for agricultural 
labour households, non-agricultural labour households and the village as 
a whole, using three inequality measures. Two of the measures are from the 
General Entropy class of inequality measures. This class consists of a 
single-parameter family of inequality measures, whose members are all mean 
independent, additively decomposable, and strictly convex functions of 
relative incomes (see Cowell, 1980 and Shorrocks, 1980) . In Table 10 we 
have selected two values for the choice parameter c; zero and 2 
respectively. With c=0 the measure becomes the Theil L measure of 
inequality, which is very sensitive to inequality among the poor. With c=2
This point may be pursued further. Suppose we were able to 
decompose the income mobility of agricultural labour households into two 
components: one indicating the extent of mobility within the group of
agricultural labour households and the other reflecting the mobility of 
agricultural labour households as a group vis-a-vis all other households. 
In our proposed analysis the focus is on the first component, and we assess 
to what extent this mobility can be considered transitory. In order to 
assert that the conclusions we reach on the basis of this within-group 
mobility apply to total income mobility, we need to evaluate to what extent 
the neglected between-group component offsets the within-group component. 
Because the incidence of poverty among agricultural labour households is 
quite high, this group as a whole may not have not enjoyed much long-term 
improvement in its relative position vis-a-vis the rest of the village. 
Hence it seems plausible that permanent mobility in the between-group 
component has not been significant.
. In fact, convexity will be sufficient in almost all respects 
except that in this case zero mobility (or a rigidity of 1) can be 
associated with some small changes in relative incomes between sub-periods. 
For the Gini coefficient (a convex, but not strictly convex function), 
mobility will be zero even if relative incomes change, as long as rankings 
do not change.
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the measure is the squared coefficient of variation which attaches a 
greater weight to the top-end of the income distribution. Finally, we 
calculate the Gini coefficient which focuses on the middle of the income 
distribution. As we have shown that agricultural labour households are 
highly represented among the poor, our preferred inequality measure for the 
examination of mobility is the Theil L measure.
In Figures 1,2, and 3 we draw the rigidity curves using our three 
inequality measures in turn (Theil L, squared coefficient of variation, and 
Gini coefficient) . In each graph we show the rigidity curves for the 
agricultural labour households, other households, and finally for the 
village as a whole. In Figure 1 it is striking that after we have 
cumulated the incomes of agricultural labour households over the first 
three survey years, the rigidity index remains virtually unchanged when we 
add the fourth survey year. This suggests that relative cumulated incomes 
have approached their permanent values and there is no further equalization 
to be expected from increasing the length of period m. While mobility 
within this group is higher than for the 'other' group (the rigidity curve 
lies below the curve for the 'others') it appears that for the 'other' 
group a lengthening of the interval m would lead to a further equalization, 
and hence the mobility enjoyed by this group is more likely to be 
sustained.
This notion is also supported further when we examine the curves drawn 
using other inequality measures. When c=2 there remains strong evidence 
that agricultural labour mobility is mainly transitory, and that the 
'other' group of households enjoys greater long-term mobility (their curve 
continues to slope downward, although also less steeply). When we consider 
the rigidity curves drawn using the Gini coefficient, the evidence that 
mobility of agricultural labour households is transitory is less clear. 
However, Shorrocks (1978c) has argued that the Gini coefficient may be 
particularly inappropriate for this type of exercise as the main effect of 
cumulating incomes is to average out incomes that are temporarily high or 
low, and thus the strongest egalitarian trend obtained by cumulating
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incomes over sub-periods intervals will be found in the tails of the income 
distribution.
5.6. Concluding Comments
Over the 25-year period for which data on Palanpur are available, 
there have been many different types of change which have had a profound 
impact on the village economy. Population growth has been substantial with 
nearly a doubling in the number of people between the first and last survey 
year. Many households have split over time with married sons setting up 
households independently of their parents. New agricultural technologies 
and intensified cultivation practices have led to large gains in land 
productivity and have resulted in agricultural income growth. Patterns of 
cultivated landholdings have altered from year to year with no clearly 
discernable trend towards concentration or equalized holdings. However, 
the pattern occurring in a particular year significantly affects the 
distribution of agricultural income resulting in that year. Year to year 
fluctuations in the quality of the harvest directly affect agricultural 
incomes and there is also evidence that with changing agricultural 
practices the interaction between harvest quality and farming skills is 
changing. A process of inter-sectoral transfer, as villagers have 
increasingly found employment outside the village, has provided a growing 
additional source of income to the village. The distribution of these 
incomes from outside jobs has had an important influence on the 
distribution of total incomes within the village.
It is very difficult to separate the impacts on living standards of 
all these simultaneous changes. It is clear that the changes described 
above have not affected all households in Palanpur to the same degree. 
Moreover, even among households affected by a similar aspect of change (for 
example cultivating households adopting new agricultural technologies) the 
direction and extent to which they have been affected may be completely 
different. It comes therefore as no surprise that there is much evidence
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of changing relative positions of households in Palanpur. This economic 
mobility is reflected most strikingly in the changing relative incomes of 
households in the village as we compare survey years.
This chapter has not attempted a detailed assessment of the economic 
mobility observed in Palanpur. It has concentrated instead on identifying 
and describing a particular group within the village which has not 
participated in the wider economic mobility. These agricultural labour 
households run a high risk of poverty. Evidence of limited mobility for 
households in this group therefore suggests that an important proportion 
of the poor in Palanpur suffer from sustained poverty.
We have defined the group of agricultural labour households as 
consisting of all households who report at least one member with some 
involvement in casual agricultural wage labour during the course of a 
particular survey year. This does not mean that household income is 
comprised totally of wage income earned by the household member involved 
in this activity. In fact, only for a minority of households does 
agricultural wage income make up even the bulk of household income. Most 
households, certainly in the later survey years, earn the bulk of their 
income from other activities, ranging from cultivation to self-employment 
within the village to regular employment outside the village. A central 
feature of agricultural wage labour, however, is that it is regarded as 
very unappealing. Involvement in agricultural labour of a particular 
household member hence ensures that it is in some distress. This is the 
reason, it is argued, that households involved in agricultural labour are 
consistently found among the poor. The fact that the number of households 
involved in agricultural labour make up a sizeable proportion of the 
village total also ensures that the poor among these households represent 
a large proportion of all poor households.
An important observation for Palanpur is that most households with 
involvement in agricultural labour in one year tend also to be involved in 
this activity in subsequent survey years. Hence, occupational mobility is
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very low for agricultural labour households (where we define agricultural 
labour as an occupation if there is some, however small, agricultural 
labour income in the household). It is likely that households which are 
compelled to become involved in this activity have exhausted their other 
options. In addition, it is plausible that the low earnings associated 
with agricultural labour (due to low wages as well as low participation
rates) prevent the accumulation of surpluses which would assist households
in finding alternative occupations.
While the high poverty incidence of agricultural labour households and 
the low occupational mobility of this group suggests chronic poverty for 
many such households, the evidence of high income mobility for agricultural 
labour households does seem to point in the opposite direction. An 
important consideration here is the degree to which we are satisfied with 
our income measure. Current income in a particular survey year will 
inevitably be an imperfect measure of long term living standards. If it 
can be shown that most of the observed income mobility of agricultural 
labour households is in fact the consequence of transitory events which 
enter into our income measure, then our confidence in suggesting that these 
households suffer from chronic poverty will be restored.
In this chapter we explored an approach to the question of transitory
versus long-term mobility, which considers mobility as composed of two 
components. One component is the income position of agricultural labour 
households taken as a group as compared with the rest of the village. If 
the average income of all agricultural labour households rises or falls 
vis-a-vis average income for the rest of the village, then there will be 
some mobility of agricultural labour households which can attributed to 
this relative mean change. The second component abstracts away from 
relative movements between agricultural labour households and other 
households and focuses instead on changes in the relative positions of 
agricultural labour households among this group.
We have found little evidence of any long-term mobility in the sense
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of sustained changes in the relative position of agricultural labour 
households vis-a-vis other households. We have indicated that during years 
of poor harvest quality the relative position of all agricultural labour 
households tended to be boosted in the village ranking because households 
specializing in cultivation had depressed cultivation incomes in those 
years. To the extent that agricultural labour households earned at least 
part of their income from sources unaffected by the quality of the harvest 
(i.e. their wage income), their total incomes were buffered from such 
events. Similarly, during years when the quality of harvest was good, 
there is strong evidence that agricultural labour households as a group 
fell in the village income ranking. In so far that harvest quality is a 
random event with some years good and others bad, there is evidence that 
changes in the relative position of agricultural labour households as a 
group have been for a large part transitory. If instead the harvest 
quality had shown a declining trend over time (due perhaps to environmental 
degradation) and output prices did not alter to offset this, we might have 
seen agricultural labour households as a group enjoying a more sustained 
rise in relative incomes.
In the analysis of income mobility among the group of agricultural 
labour households, an approach was implemented which examined how income 
inequality of this group changed as household incomes over successive years 
were cumulated. The idea behind this approach is that if income mobility 
is largely transitory, cumulated relative incomes will soon approach long­
term relative incomes as years are successively added together (although 
admittedly, this seems most plausible if the years are adjacent to each 
other). For agricultural labour households' incomes this indeed was the 
pattern observed, and stood in contrast to the pattern observed for other 
households. Within the two groups, much of the income mobility of 
agricultural labourers appeared to be transitory while there is a 
suggestion that the intra-group mobility among other households was longer- 
term. Of course, because only relatively few survey years could be 
compared, and these are separated by periods of many years, any conclusions 
arising from this particular analysis should only be regarded as suggestive
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at best.
As our arguments have centred on the long-term poverty of agricultural 
labour households, one important sub-group among the poor has been 
neglected in this study. This consists of those poor households without 
a fit adult male and for whom the option of agricultural wage labour is 
therefore not applicable. We have indicated that in Palanpur, the ability 
of women to engage in agricultural wage labour is extremely limited and 
virtually nonexistent for those women who do not have any household member 
alongside whom they could work as labourers.
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TABLE 1
BROAD INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE IN PALANPUR
Indicator 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Population 528 585 757 960
Number of Households 100 106 112 143
Village Real Income(Rs) 86,166 94,712 208,024 186,402
Real Income Per Capita 161.3 161.9 274.8 194.1
Income Inequality (Gini) 0.336 0.390 0.253 0.307
Price Index (1960/1=100) 107 92 378 528
Agricultural Daily Wages 
in Real Terms (1962/3=100) 123 100 123 158
Food Purchasing Power 
(kg. of wheat per day) 2.5 2.25 3.1 5.0
Index of Real Wages for 
Regular Outside Jobs n. a 100 122 193
Wheat yields, actual kg. 
per bigha 40 40 114 97
Wheat yields, normal kg. 
per bigha 40-50 50 100 150-160
Notes :
1. The price index is the consumer price index for agricultural labourers 
(CPIAL), which is taken from the Bulletin of Food Statistics for the 
relevant years. See Lai (1976) for the price index for 1957/58.
2. An acre=6.4 bighas.
3. "Normal" yields correspond to the expected yield for Palanpur without 
advanced knowledge of each year's harvest.
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TABLE 2
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS, 1957-84
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Caste
Thakur 0
Murao 1
Dhimar 7
Gadaria 0
Dhobi 0
Teli 5
Passi 4
Jatab 9
Other 0
Total Number 26
Total in Village 100
Average per capita income 67%
(as a % of village average)
Average per capita income 66%
(as a % of village average)^
Average Landholding 25%
(as a % of village average)
0
3 
6 
0 
0
4 
1 
2 
0
16
106
56%
53%
27%
1
2
6
0
0
7
3
11
2
32
111
72%
61%
46%
0
3
8
2
2
9
6
11
0
41
143
82%
50%
38%
Average Cultivated Holding 34%
(as a % of village average)
Average value of Livestock 34%
(as a % of village average)
Wage income as a percentage 
of total household income
35%
46%
66%
53%
56%
52%
Village 15%
Agricultural Labour 54% 
Households
Number of Landless 6
Number of Non-Cultivators 6
9%
60%
3
3
3%
17%
5
8
11%
29%
11
17
Note: 1. For agricultural labour households earning at least 20% of total 
income from wage labour.
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TABLE 3
"POVERTY INCIDENCE" AND "POVERTY CONTRIBUTION”: 
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS AND JATAB HOUSEHOLDS
Agricultural Labour Households 
Poverty Criterion 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
1. Relative Poverty (Bottom 40%)
i) Poverty Incidence 54% 75% 78% 61%
ii) Poverty Contribution 35% 29% 57% 44%
2. Absolute Poverty (Below Poverty Line)
i) Poverty Incidence 62% 75% 22% 61%
ii) Poverty Contribution 36% 23% 54% 44%
Jatab Households 
Poverty Criterion 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
1. Relative Poverty (Bottom 40%)
i) Poverty Incidence 56% 54% 78% 89%
ii) Poverty Contribution 23% 17% 25% 30%
2. Absolute Poverty (Below Poverty Line)
i) Poverty Incidence 63% 62% 21% 89%
ii) Poverty Contribution 22% 15% 23% 30%
Notes :
1. "Poverty Incidence" corresponds to the proportion of households with 
the stated characteristic classified as poor (according to either poverty 
criterion).
2. "Poverty Contribution" corresponds to the proportion of poor households 
with the stated characteristic.
3. The poverty line utilized for the absolute poverty criterion is Rs.
11.3 per person per month in 1960/61 rupees. This is an Uttar Pradesh- 
specific figure derived from the Rs. 15 poverty line proposed by Dandekar 
and Rath (1971) for India as a whole. Relative prices between Uttar 
Pradesh and India were taken from Bhattacharya and Chatterjee (1974) .
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TABLE 4
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS, 1957-84 
("CLOSED" VILLAGE)
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
Caste
Thakur
Murao
Dhimar
Gadaria
Dhobi
Teli
Passi
Jatab
Other
Total Number 
Total In Village
Average per capita income
(as a % of village average)
Average per capita income
(as a % of village average)^
0
0
4 
0 
0
5 
2
6 
0
17
76
60%
59%
Average Landholding 25%
(as a % of village average)
Average Cultivated Holding 37%
(as a % of village average)
Average value of Livestock 3 5%
(as a % of village average)
Wage income as a percentage 
of total household income
Village 11%
Agricultural Labour 49% 
Households
Number of Landless 3
Number of Non-Cultivators 2
0
0
6
0
0
4
1
2
0
13
84
54%
54%
23%
35%
48%
9%
63%
3
2
0
0
6
0
0
7
3
11
0
27
98
71%
62%
46%
69%
57%
3%
17%
5
6
0
2
7 
2 
0
8 
4
11
0
34
120
73%
49%
37%
52%
45%
11%
30%
8
12
Note: 1. For agricultural labour households earning at least 20% of total 
income from wage labour.
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TABLE 5
"POVERTY INCIDENCE" AND "POVERTY CONTRIBUTION": 
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS AND JATAB HOUSEHOLDS 
("CLOSED" VILLAGE)
Agricultural Labour Households 
Poverty Criterion 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
1. Relative Poverty (Bottom 40%)
i) Poverty Incidence 59% 85% 81% 62%
ii) Poverty Contribution 33% 32% 56% 44%
2. Absolute Poverty (Below Poverty Line)
i) Poverty Incidence 71% 85% 22% 59%
ii) Poverty Contribution 3 6% 25% 60% 43%
Jatab Households 
Poverty Criterion 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
1. Relative Poverty (Bottom 40%)
i) Poverty Incidence 62% 46% 79% 89%
ii) Poverty Contribution 27% 18% 28% 35%
2. Absolute Poverty (Below Poverty Line)
i) Poverty Incidence 69% 62% 21% 89%
ii) Poverty Contribution 27% 18% 30% 37%
Notes:
1. "Poverty Incidence" corresponds to the proportion of households with 
the stated characteristic classified as poor (according to either poverty 
criterion).
2. "Poverty Contribution" corresponds to the proportion of poor households 
with the stated characteristic.
3. The poverty line utilized for the absolute poverty criterion is Rs.
11.3 per person per month in 1960/61 rupees. This is an Uttar Pradesh- 
specific figure derived from the Rs. 15 poverty line proposed by Dandekar 
and Rath (1971) for India as a whole. Relative prices between Uttar 
Pradesh and India were taken from Bhattacharya and Chatterjee (1974).
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TABLE 6
INCOME MOBILITY IN PALANPUR
A. 1957/58 against 1962/63^
Quintile 1 
1
1 1 2 1 
1 1
3 1 
1
4 5 1 Total 
1 Households
1
1 1 1
0.17
1 1 
1 0.28 1 
1 1
1
0.28 1 0.22 0.06
1
1 18 (16)
1
2 1 0.31 1 0.44 1 
1 1
0.19 1 0.06 0 1 16 (15)
1
3 1 
1
0.20 1 0.13 1 
1 1
1
0.20 1 0.33 0.13
1
1 15 (15)
1
4 1 0.21 1 0.11 1 
1 1
0.32 1 0.21 0.16 1 19 (15)
1
5 1 0.13 1 0.06 1
1
0 1 0.19 0.63 1 16 (15)
1
Total 1 
Households|
17
1 1 
1 17 1 
1 1
1
17 1 
1
17 16
1
1 84 
1
(76)
B. 1962/63 against 1974/75"
Quintile I 
1
1 1 2 1 
1 1
3 1 
1
4 5 1 Total 
1 Households
1
1 1 0.18
1 1 
1 0.24 1
1
0.12 1 0.24 0.24
1
1 17 (17)
1
2 1 0.28 1 0.39 1 0.06 1 0.17 0.11 1 18 (17)
1
3 1 0.26 1 0.11 1
1
0.26 1 0.21 0.16 1 19 (17)
1
4 1 0.15 1 0.25 1 0.35 1 0.20 0.05 1 20 (17)
1
5 1 0.17 1 0.08 1
1
0.21 1 0.17 0.38 1 24 (16)
1
Total 1 
Households I
20
1 1 
1 20 1 
1 1
1
20 1 
1
19 19
1
1 98 
1
(84)
Notes:
1. The relative frequency of households appearing in the respective 
quintiles is entered in each cell. These can also be interpreted as the 
respective probabilities of housholds moving from one quintile to another 
between the comparison periods.
2. The population in these mobility tables consists of the "closed" 
village population which includes only those households present in all four 
survey years. The household totals in the "closed" village population are 
76, 84, 98 and 120 households in 1957/58, 1962/63, 1974/75 and 1983/84, 
respectively.
3 . In brackets are the household totals which correspond to the row year.
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TABLE 6 (cont'd)
INCOME MOBILITY IN PALANPUR
C. 1974/75 against 1983/84<
Quintile 1 
1
1 1 2 1 
1 1
3 1 
1
4 5 1 Total 
1 Households
1
1 1 0.16
1 1 
1 0.20 1
1
0.36 1 0.28 0
1
1 25 (20)
1
2 1 0.42 1 0.23 1 0.04 1 0.08 0.23 1 26 (20)
1
3 1 0.08 1 0.20 1 0.20 1 0.20 0.32 1 25 (20)
1
4 1 0.27 1 0.23 1 0.23 1 0.14 0.14 1 22 (19)
1
5 1 0.05 1 0.14 1 0.18 1 0.32 0.32
1
1 22 (19)
1
Total 1 
Households I
24
1 1 
1 24 1 
1 1
1
24 1 
1
24 24
1
1 120 
1
(98)
D. 1974/75 against 1983/84^ 
(Adjusted Income)
Quintile I 
1
1 1 2 1 
1 1
3 1 
1
4 5 1 Total 
1 Households
1
1 1 
1
0.25
1 1 
1 0.29 1 
1 1
1
0.13 1 
1
0.33 0
1
1 24 (20)
1
2 1 0.31 1 0.27 1 0.12 1 
1
0.08 0.23 1 26 (20)
1
3 1 0.13 1 0.25 1 
1 1
0.29 1 
1
0.21 0.13 1 24 
1
(20)
1
4 1 0.25 1 0.04 1
1
0.25 1 0.13 0.33 1 24 (19)
1
5 1 0.05 1 0.14 1
1
0.23 1 0.27 0.32 1 22 (19)
1
Total 1 
Households I
24
1 1 
1 24 1 
1 1
1
24 1 
1
24 24
1
1 120 
1
(98)
Notes :
1. The relative frequency of households appearing in the respective 
quintiles is entered in each cell. These can also be interpreted as the 
respective probabilities of housholds moving from one quintile to another 
between the comparison periods.
2. The population in these mobility tables consists of the "closed" village 
population which includes only those households present in all four survey 
years. The household totals in the "closed" village population are 76, 84, 
98 and 120 households in 1957/58, 1962/63, 1974/75 and 1983/84,
respectively.
3. In Table D revenues accruing from cultivation are scaled up by 30% in 
1983/84 and scaled down by 30% in 1974/75. Costs were left unchanged on the 
assumption that they had been incurred before the quality of the harvest 
had become apparent. See text for further details.
4. In brackets are the household totals which correspond to the row year.
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TABLE 7
1
1
THE PERSISTENCE OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR
1957/58 1 1962/63 
1
1 1974/75 
I
1 1983/84 
1
1
1957/58 1 17
1
1 12 (10)
1
1 18 (14) 
1
1
1 18 (12)
1962/63 1 0
1
1 1 1 1 (1) 1 1 (1)
1974/75 1 
1
0
1
1 0
1
1 8 
1
1 7 (5)
1983/84 1 
1
0
I
1 0 
1
1
1 0 
1
1
1 8 
1
1
Total 1 17
1
1 13
1
1 27
1
1 34
Notes :
1. The entry in each cell indicates the number of agricultural labour
households in the year corresponding to that column who had also been
involved in agricultural labour in the year corresponding to that row. For 
example, the entry in the third column and first row, indicates that 18 
households involved in agricultural labour in 1974/75 had also been 
involved in agricultiural labour in 1957/58. Note that it does not mean 
that the 18 households had also been involved in agricultural labour in 
1962/63.
2. In brackets is the number of agricultural labour households in the row 
year from whom the corresponding column year households stemmed. Thus the 
18 households in 1974/75 who could be traced back to agricultural labour
households in 1957/58 stemmed from 14 out of the 17 agricultural labour
households in 1957/58.
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TABLE 8a
PROBIT ANALYSIS OP THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS
Dependent Variable: 0-1 Variable taking the value 1 if a household is
involved in agricultural labour.
Explanatory
Variable 1962/63
Model
1974/75 1983/84
(84 obs. ) (98 obs. ) (120 obs. )
Household Split 
1957/58-1962/63 
1962/63-1974/75 
1974/75-1983/84
-0.32 (0.64)
0.17 (0.70)
-0.22 (0.53)
Education
1964/65
1974/75
1983/84
-0.04 (0.77)
-0.43 (0.19)
-0.08 (0.04)
Agricultural 
Labour Before 2.45 (0.00) 1.71 (0.00) 1.42 (0.00)
Land Cultivated 
1962/63 
1974/74 
1983/84
-0.05 (0.18)
-0.03 (0.03)
-0.02 (0.03)
Landless -0.70 (0.43) -0.15 (0.83) -0.25 (0.60)
Adult Males 
1962/63 
1974/75 
1983/84
0.47 (0.11)
0.45 (0.02)
0.23 (0.08)
Jatab -1.25 (0.12) 1.95 (0.00) -0.02 (0.97)
Intercept -1.79 (0.03) -1.37 (0.00) -0.80 (0.03)
Notes :
1. In brackets is the probability that the parameter estimate is equal to 
zero.
2- The population in the probit analysis corresponds to the "closed" 
village population which omits any household not present in all four of the 
survey years. The household totals corresponding to this population are 
76, 84, 98, 120 for 1957/58, 1962/63, 1974/75 and 1983/84 respectively.
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TABLE 8b
MEAN VALUES OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Explanatory Variable Mean
Household Splits (dummy)
1957/58-1983/84 0.17
1962/63-1974/75 0.31
1974/75-1983/84 0.31
Education^
1962/63 2.24
1974/75 0.81
1983/84 4.72
Agricultural Labour 
Before (dummy)
1962/63 0.24
1974/75 0.16
1983/84 0.32
Landless (dummy)
1962/63 0.08
1974/75 0.08
1983/84 0.13
Land Cultivated
1962/63 29.83
1974/75 24.04
1983/84 20.88
Jatab (dummy)
1962/63 0.15
1974/75 0.14
1983/84 0.16
Adult Males
1962/63 1.85
1974/75 2.04
1983/84 2.08
Note
1. The education variable for 1962/63, and 1983/84 corresponds to the 
years of schooling completed by the most educated member of a households. 
For the 1974/75 survey year, the education variable takes a value of 0,1, 
or 2 indicating illiteracy, primary education, or secondary/higher 
education respectively, for the most educated member of the household.
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TABLE 9
INCOME MOBILITY OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS^
A. 1957/58 against 1962/63
Quintile 1 2 1 
1
3 1 
1
4 1 
1
5 1 Total 
1 Households
1 2(1)
1
2(2) 1
1
3(0) 1
1
2(0) 1 0
1
1 9(3)
2 2(2) 1(1) 1 1
1
0 1 1(0) 1 0 1 2(3)
3 2(2) 1(1) 1 1 1(1) 1
1
0 1 0 1 4(4)
4 0
1
0 1 1(1) 1 1(1) 1 0 1 2(2)
5 0
1
0 1
1
0 1
1
0 1 0
1
1 0
Total
Households
6(5)
1
4(4) 1 
1
1
5(2) 1 
1
1
4(1) 1 
1
0
1
1 19(12) 
1
B. 1962/63 against 1974/75
Quintile 1 2 1 
1
3 1 
1
4 1 
1
5 1 Total 
1 Households
1 2(2)
1
3(3) 1
1
0 1
1
1(0) 1 
1
0
1
1 6(5) 
1
2 2(2) 1(0) 1 1(0) 1 1
1
0 1 0 1 4(2)
3 6(5) 1(1) 1
1
0 1 0 1 0 1 7(6)
4 2(2) 1(1) 1 1 2(1) 1 1 1(1) 1 1
0 1 6(5) 
1
5 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Total
Households
12(11)
1
6(5) 1 
1
1
3(1) 1 
1
1
2(1) 1 
1
0
1
1 23(18) 
1
Notes :
1. The population in these transition matrices consists of those households 
which were involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58 and which were also 
present in all four of the survey years. The number of households which 
appear in the respective quintiles is entered in each cell. Note that the 
number of households is increasing over time as some of the original 17 
households split between two survey years. In addition, not all of the 
households involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58 were involved in 
this activity in every survey (see note 2 below).
2. In brackets is entered the number of those households which were 
involved in agricultural labour during the 1957/58 survey year.
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TABLE 9 Cont.
INCOME MOBILITY OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS^
C. 1974/75 against 1983/84
Quintile 1 2 3 4 1 5 1 Total 
1 Households
1 4(2) 3(2) 4(3) 3(1) 1 1(1)
1
I 15(9)
2 4(3) 1(1) 0 3(2) 1 0 1 8(6) 1
3 1(1) 0 1(0) 0 1 1(0) 1 3(1)
4 1(1) 1(1) 0 0 1 0 1 2(2)
5 0 0 0 0 1 0
1
1 0
Total
Households
10(7) 5(4) 5(3) 6(3) 1 2(1)
1
1 28(18) 
1
Notes :
1. The population in these transition matrices consists of those households 
which were involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58 and which were also 
present in all four of the survey years. The number of households which 
appear in the respective quintiles is entered in each cell. Note that the 
number of households is increasing over time as some of the original 17 
households split between two survey years. In addition, not all of the 
households involved in agricultural labour in 1957/58 were involved in 
this activity in every survey (see note 2 below).
2. In brackets is entered the number of those households which were 
involved in agricultural labour during the 1957/58 survey year.
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TABLE 10
Stability of Real Per Capita Incomes by Two Occupational Groups: 
Values of the Rigidity Index (R) For Three Inequality Measures^
Inequality
Index Period
Agricultural
Labour
Households
Other
Households
General Entropy
Co 1957/58
1957/58-1962/63
1957/58-1974/75
1957/58-1983/84
C2 1957/58
1957/58-1962/63
1957/58-1974/75
1957/58-1983/84
Gini Coefficent
1957/58
1957/58-1962/63
1957/58-1974/75
1957/58-1983/84
1.00
0.49
0.29
0.28
1.00
0.53
0.38
0.35
1.00
0.76
0.66
0.58
1.00
0.81
0.47
0.41
1.00
0.72
0.49
0.42
1.00
0.88
0.73
0.63
Notes :
1. The Rigidity Index (R) is defined as
R =
Jc-1
Whole
Village
1.00
0.68
0.53
0.38
1.00
0.74
0.54
0.44
1.00
0.88
0.78
0.68
where m is the maximum number of accounting periods which can be cumulated, 
I[Y] is an inequality measure and
H ( tj,)
Further details can be found in the text and Shorrocks (1978).
2. The General Entropy measure with a parameter value of 0 corresponds to 
the Theil L measure which is particularly sensitive to the lower part of 
the income distribution. With a parameter value of 2, the General Entropy 
measure becomes the coefficient of variation which is sensitive to the 
upper part of the income distribution. Finally, the Gini coefficient is 
particularly sensitive to income movements around the middle of the 
distribution.
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Figure 1
Rigidity Curves For Agricultural Labour and Other Households
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Figure 2
Rigidity Curves For Agricultural Labour and Other Households
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Chapter 6
The Credit Market in Palanpur; A Comparison of 1974/75 and 1983/84^
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter we examine in some detail the operation of the credit 
market in Palanpur. Credit is clearly an important part of the rural 
economy. The linkages between credit transactions and other economic 
decisions and outcomes are numerous and wide-ranging. Growth of
agricultural output in the face of fixed quantities of land depends on a 
farmer's ability to finance capital investments, or to adopt new
technologies. In addition, savings behaviour and consumption smoothing 
over the agricultural year, the emergence of specific terms in tenancy and 
labour contracts, decisions on fertility, the operation of the land and 
other markets, the distribution of income, and the functioning of various 
social institutions such as weddings, may all be influenced by, and
influence, borrowing and lending.
If we consider the poor in particular the operation of the credit 
market is important from several distinct perspectives. Credit (on 
acceptable terms) can be of crucial importance in enabling the poor to deal 
with the consequences of their poverty. For example, the ability to borrow 
for consumption purposes may tangibly reduce the risk of nutritional 
shortfalls. Credit may also assist the poor to escape their poverty. This
appears to have been a guiding principle behind the establishment of the 
Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) in India^ . Finally, even if 
the poor are not able to directly gain access to credit, the benefits from 
credit going to the rich may still reach them. For example, if credit 
makes possible the intensification of agriculture, the poor may benefit
.^ I would like to extend my thanks to Dr. Joanna Gomulka for advice 
on the implementation of the double-hurdle model and also for permission 
to use her model to estimate the equations presented here. Assistance with 
running the model was gratefully received from David Coady.
^. See Drèze (1990) for a critical evaluation of the operation of 
IRDP in several parts of India, including Palanpur.
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from a more active labour market, and/or higher wages.
In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying the 
linkages between credit and these numerous facets of the rural economy. 
However, in most developing countries there is a shortage of empirical 
material on the subject and this means that our understanding of the credit 
market leaves much to be desired. This is particularly so where we 
consider the evolution of credit markets over time. Furthermore, 
evaluating the success of policies intended to improve the functioning of 
the credit market requires an appreciation of the way the market responds 
to such interventions. This in turn also provides indicators for the 
design of new policies. In this chapter, the evolving credit market in 
Palanpur is described. The study has as primary focus a comparison of the 
operation of the credit market in two years: 1974/75 and 1983/84. Although 
we have data covering many aspects of the economy from the two earlier 
surveys of Palanpur, the credit data in those surveys is not very detailed 
and as a result will not be the focus of attention in this study.
The 1974/75 credit market in Palanpur was first described briefly in 
Bliss and Stern (1982)^ . The operation of the credit market in 1983/84 
was described in some detail by Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (1991). This 
chapter extends the analysis in Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma to specifically 
consider the manner in which the credit market in 1983/84 has changed 
relative to 1974/75. Throughout the chapter we will pay particular 
attention to the position of the poor in the Palanpur credit market.
An examination of the changing operation of the credit market in 
Palanpur between the two survey years must be related to the substantial
^. Bliss and Stern (1982) make a few comparisons of credit market 
operations in Palanpur in 1957/58 with the 1974/75 survey year. They found 
that after taking into account population growth and inflation, 
institutional sources of credit (essentially the government sponsored 
Cooperative Credit Society, or Seed Store, in Palanpur) were providing 
roughly twenty-five per cent more real credit per head in 1974/75 than in 
1957/58. Also by 1974/75 the Seed Store had abandoned an earlier attempt 
to be a general supplier of seed to its members, and lent only one variety 
of wheat seed during that survey year.
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change occurring elsewhere in the village economy during this period. We 
have seen in earlier chapters the importance of population growth, 
intensification of agricultural practices as well as variation in harvest 
quality, changing patterns of landholding and operational holdings, 
changing inequality of incomes, and the expansion of off-farm employment 
(for convenience Table 1 presents a brief review of the basic indicators 
for 1974/75 and 1983/84 by caste). Such processes can result in important 
changes in the demand for and supply of credit, and can also reflect some 
of the consequences of the specific operation of the credit market in the 
village.
The data analysis in this chapter is almost exclusively of information 
on the stock of debt outstanding at the time of interview in the respective 
survey years. The interviews on indebtedness during the 1974/75 survey 
year formed part of the general household survey conducted for 112 of the 
118 households in the village in November 1974. This undertaking was 
completed by the end of November, 1974. In the 1983/84 survey year, a 
specific questionnaire on indebtedness had been prepared and most 
interviews took place during the months of May and June, 1984. By the end 
of August, 1984, all households in the village had been interviewed.
Information on debt outstanding is only an imperfect indicator of the 
number and importance of credit market transactions which occur during a 
particular period. Occasionally, it can become quite misleading. For 
example, we will see below that the large amount of debt outstanding to one 
particular public sector source, and the increase in the stock of this debt 
between the two survey years, cannot be realistically regarded as a flow 
of new credit. Similarly, the amount of debt outstanding at a particular 
moment in time may fail to capture the importance of those credit 
transactions which are turned over rapidly. In the example of one lender 
specializing in loans of wheat over one particular season, failure to 
collect information on debt outstanding during this season would lead to 
the mistaken impression that this lender is not an active participant in 
the credit market. Information on lending is patchy for Palanpur,
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particularly lending within the private sector. It is therefore not 
analysed in any detail in this chapter. In general, credit data are among 
the most difficult types of data to collect. As a consequence they are not 
as complete as information collected on other aspects of the Palanpur 
economy. This is more the case for the credit data collected in the 
1974/75 survey year. For example, extensive data on the identity of 
regular moneylenders in the village in 1974/75 was not collected, nor was 
it possible to determine the date when debts had been incurred. 
Nevertheless, extensive double-checking and verification was carried out 
and was feasible because during both surveys the investigators lived in the 
village for such an extended period of time. It is therefore likely that 
the data do carry substantial and useful information.
In the next section we will briefly discuss some aspects of rural 
financial markets which have been described in the literature, and which 
are relevant to our examination of the Palanpur credit market. In section 
3 we present an overview of changes in levels of indebtedness between the 
two years. Section 4 considers the evolving role of the public sector in 
the Palanpur credit market. Section 5 turns to the informal credit market 
within the village. Informal credit transactions between the village and 
outside sources are examined in Section 6. In Section 7 we look at the 
debt burden of Palanpur households and examine the relationship between 
indebtedness and caste, income and landholdings during the two survey 
years. Section 8 considers in a more formal manner the characteristics of 
borrowers from different segments of the market and also examines the 
determinants of debt levels. Section 9 presents a concluding discussion.
6.2. Rural Financial Markets: Some Issues
The credit market in rural areas has an important role to play in 
affecting living standards of households. First, the market can fulfil an 
important intertemporal function whereby households wishing to make 
productive investments may be able to temporarily expand their expenditures 
over and above their current revenues and savings. These productive
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investments can affect future incomes of households and in this way living 
standards may be raised substantially and in a permanent way.
Second, the credit market may affect living standards by providing 
a buffer whereby households facing a temporary downturn in their fortunes 
(this can be due to a whole host of reasons including bad health, harvest 
quality, mistakes, accidents, etc.) are able to avoid having to resort to 
distress sales of assets, or even more drastically, constrained 
consumption. With access to loans such households might also avoid 
reinforcement mechanisms which could threaten to make a temporary downturn 
become a continuous spiral. On the other hand, where the downturn reveals 
itself to be long-term as opposed to temporary, debts incurred may come to 
contribute to a further vulnerability of affected households. The need 
to service debts and rising borrowing costs could pose an additional burden 
on households which may be facing considerable hardship already. There is 
therefore some tension in how one views the provision of credit, or at 
least certain types of credit, for the purpose of consumption-smoothing.
One perspective with which one can assess the operation of credit 
markets involves asking whether credit is going to both types of borrowers. 
We are particularly concerned in this thesis to detect evidence of 
vulnerability, and are therefore interested to see whether those who are 
likely to need credit to tide over temporary shortfalls are restricted in 
their access to the market. This requires some information on the purpose 
for which debt is incurred. Ascertaining this purpose can be difficult in 
both principle and practice, because of the fungibility of funds. It is 
possible for example, that a household may declare the purpose of a 
particular loan to be for investment, but this loan may also permit that 
household to divert resources which would otherwise be used in investment 
to, for example, consumption or the purchase of consumer durables.
We are also interested to see whether credit going to different people 
has different costs attached to it and to examine why this might be. Costs 
of credit comprise two components. The first component consists of the
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interest rate at which credit is being extended. While this component does 
not raise any great conceptual difficulties, some details must be 
considered. The time period over which interest rates are being calculated 
must be determined, and where comparisons of interest rates are being made 
care should be taken that the time periods are also comparable. An 
assessment of the interest rate cost of credit to borrowers should take 
into account price changes, and this may require conversion from nominal 
to real rates of interest. Finally, a distinction must be made between 
simple and compounding rates of interest. With simple rates, the interest 
payable on a loan is a fixed proportion of the principal outstanding and 
if the principal has been overdue for several periods, the interest payable 
is the same fixed proportion times the periods for which it is due. With 
compound interest rates, unpaid interest is added to the principal 
outstanding. Interest payable here is a proportion of the combined (and 
changing) amount which is owed. In this chapter interest rates have been 
converted into annual terms even though the common practice in the village 
is to refer to monthly rates. Inflation during and immediately prior to 
the 1974/75 survey was considerably higher than for the 1983/84 survey. 
As nominal interest rates have generally risen between the two survey 
years, this means that real rates have risen even more. Interest charged 
is almost everywhere at a simple rate. Care will be taken to indicate 
where interest rates can be regarded as compound.
The second component of the cost of credit involves transactions 
costs. Where loans are quickly dispersed, small and of short duration, 
transactions costs may be a more important factor than interest rates in 
the total cost of a loan to the borrower. Transactions costs to the 
borrower include travel expenses, time spent on waiting and on repeated 
visits, filling out complicated forms, non-interest charges and 
inflexibility in repayment terms. It has been argued that despite higher 
interest rates, informal credit sources may be attractive to borrowers 
because they impose fewer of these additional costs. Village moneylenders 
are nearby, require no documentation, make decisions immediately and are 
flexible about repayment terms. Transactions costs are also borne by
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lenders, however, and it has often been observed that attempts to lower 
borrower transactions costs have resulted in increased burdens being placed 
on the lender (see Howes, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 1991, for an overview of 
credit market operations in developing countries from the transactions 
costs perspective).
Risk and consequences of default is a third important perspective on 
credit markets deserving attention. Default risk can become a serious 
problem particularly when there are strong asymmetries in information 
between the borrower and lender. A lender knows that borrowers differ in 
the likelihood that they will default, and it is costly to determine the 
extent of that risk for each borrower. In addition it is costly to ensure 
that borrowers take those actions which make repayment most likely. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to compel repayment. These various types of 
default risk have been invoked in the literature on interest rate 
determination to explain the high interest rates commonly observed in 
informal rural financial markets (Bottomley, 1975). Because a substantial 
proportion of borrowers may default on their loans, moneylenders have to 
charge high interest rates so that the returns they earn on the loans which 
are repaid offset the losses made on those defaulted. This argument has 
come under close scrutiny in more recent contributions where it has been 
pointed out that adverse selection and moral hazard may actually increase 
the risk of default as the lender raises the interest rate (see Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). The adverse selection effect relates to the situation 
that as interest rates rise, the only borrowers who are willing to incur 
the debt are those who perceive their probability of repaying the loan to 
be low. The moral hazard effect refers to the possibility that as the 
interest rate rises this induces projects to be undertaken which have a 
lower probability of success but higher payoffs when successful*. These 
informational asymmetries may play a central role in explaining why credit 
rationing is such a widely observed phenomenon, not only in developing
* Note, the degree to which adverse selection and moral hazard will 
be influential will depend on the consequences faced by borrowers who 
default.
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countries, but also in the developed country context. Under extreme 
circumstances, moral hazard and adverse selection could actually lead to 
demand for and supply of credit failing to coincide at any priced.
It has been suggested in recent work that informational asymmetries 
and enforcement problems have led to the emergence of other devices in 
rural credit markets which attempt to limit the adverse consequences of 
such problems. This has prompted investigators to view the operation of 
rural financial markets in terms of the existence of such devices and how 
they work (see Bell, 1988, Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986, and Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 1990, for useful surveys following this approach). Two which 
have received much attention are interlinked transactions and collateral.
An interlinked transaction may be seen as one in which the two parties 
trade in at least two markets on the condition that the terms of all such 
trades are jointly determined. In the context of the credit market such 
interlinked transactions are often thought to take the form of trade-credit 
interlinkages. Lenders who serve as traders for a borrower will possess 
some knowledge about his ability to generate income and will be in a more 
favourable position to enforce a loan. Although incentive problems may not 
be entirely resolved, the severity of the tradeoff between interest rates 
and default risk will be less for lenders who have greater access to 
information and to mechanisms to enforce their claims. In Palanpur, trade- 
credit inter linkages do not seem to play a major role, but individual 
initiatives towards interlinkage do occur from time to time. For example, 
a moneylender might lease out a piece of land to a tenant in order to allow 
him to repay his debt. The quantitative significance of such interlinked 
transactions in Palanpur is very limited.
The requirement that a borrower provide the lender with collateral of 
a value equal or greater than the loan taken out transfers the risk 
associated with lending from the lender to the borrower and obviates the
.^ This possibility was originally explored in the context of the 
second-hand car market by Akerlof (1974).
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need to assess the creditworthiness of a borrower. In many rural financial 
markets, collateral requirements take the form of land titles. Borrowers 
offering jewelry and other assets as collateral have also been observed. 
Informal lenders are frequently thought to have access to detailed local 
knowledge which gives them an advantage over outside institutions in 
assessing credit risks. They may be prepared to accept 'social collateral' 
such as reputation to ensure repayment. We have seen in chapter 2 that the 
land market in Palanpur is not active. This is also reflected in the 
observation that land titles are not offered as collateral on informal 
loans. In Palanpur 'social collateral' is the most commonly observed form, 
although borrowing from goldsmiths in nearby towns, which involves 
collateral of gold or silver, does occur.
A final aspect of rural financial markets which should be emphasized 
is that rural credit markets in developing countries are often observed to 
be highly segmented. Typically this takes the form of a dual structure 
where a highly regulated and nationally integrated institutional market 
charging uniform and relatively low rates of interest coexists with an 
informal market that charges a widely dispersed set of relatively high 
rates. At the time of the Palanpur surveys all commercial banks operating 
in rural India were in the public sector, and for this reason all 
institutional sources of credit in Palanpur may be regarded as public 
sector sources. In this chapter, "formal", "public" or "institutional" 
will be used interchangeably to describe lending from specialized 
government credit agencies as well as the commercial banking sector, while 
"informal" or "private" will correspond to the non-government sector. 
Segmentation of the credit market in Palanpur goes beyond simply the 
formal/informal dichotomy. Essentially four broad credit market segments 
can be identified, between which the cost of credit varies but within which 
that cost tends to be relatively uniform. The first segment consists of 
public sector or institutional credit. The other three are all within the 
informal sector of the credit market and consist of 1) high-interest credit 
from village moneylenders, 2) commercial credit from urban goldsmiths and 
pawnbrokers, and 3) interest-free credit from friends and relatives.
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Nominal interest rates vary widely between these four sources but non-price 
factors tend to limit arbitrage. The different credit market segments 
operating in Palanpur can influence living standards in very different 
ways. In addition, there have been changes over time in the way that this 
influence is exercised.
3. Overview; Changes in Indebtedness Between the Two Survey Years
Indebtedness in Palanpur between 1974/75 and 1983/84 increased almost 
threefold in real terms®. Table 2 shows 1974/75 total debt in the village 
amounting to Rs 153,193. This represented 14% of total village income in 
that year. Most of the debt owed by Palanpur households was in cash terms 
and the value of debt in kind (wheat) outstanding represented only 11% of 
all debt. By 1983/84 the total amount of debt outstanding had risen to Rs 
429,863. With a total village income roughly 10% lower in 1983/84 than in 
1974/75, indebtedness as a percentage of total village income increased 
from 14% to 44% between the two years^. Cash debts, as a percentage of 
all debts, rose from 89% to 96%.
In 1974/75, there were 31 households which had no debts outstanding 
at all. This number had risen to 36 in 1983/84. As a percentage of all 
households, indebted households represented about 69% and 75% of all 
households in the village in 1974/75 and 1983/84 respectively.
While the data for 1974/75 allow us only to consider total debt 
outstanding, we are able to distinguish debt incurred specifically during 
the 1983/84 survey from the total debt outstanding at the time of interview 
in that year. From this we can see that while total indebtedness in
®. All 1974/75 money values in this paper are expressed in 1983/84 
rupees. The deflator is the one introduced in chapter 2 where taking 
1960/61=100 the price index for 1974/75 is 378 and 1983/84 is 528.
In Section 7 we will be considering in greater detail the 
distribution of debts outstanding relative to per capita income levels, as 
well as land ownership and caste.
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1983/84 had risen to nearly Rs 43 0,000, the total amount borrowed (in gross 
terms) during 1983/84 amounted to about Rs 56,000 (see the bottom of Table
2). Therefore, the rise in village indebtedness between 1974/75 and 
1983/84 reflects the accumulation of debt over an extended period of time. 
Only a fraction of the total debt outstanding in 1983/84 had actually been 
incurred during that year. This serves to remind us that the stock of 
outstanding debt in a particular year should not be taken to reflect the 
flow of credit in that year. Note that of the Rs 56, 000 of debt 
outstanding which had been incurred during 1983/84 only, slightly more than 
half came from private sector sources.
In 1974/75, debts outstanding to public lending institutions totalled 
Rs 115,663. This represented 76% of all outstanding debt in that year. 
Outstanding debt from this source in 1983/84 amounted Rs 339,607, or 79% 
of all outstanding debt. Despite a nearly 300% increase in indebtedness 
to the formal sector, it is interesting that indebtedness to the private 
sector appears to have risen at roughly the same pace. An important 
difference, however, lies in the composition of private credit in the two 
years. While in 1974/75 all outstanding private debt was to sources within 
the village, in 1983/84 nearly one and a half times as much debt was owed 
to sources outside the village than within the village.
The range of interest rates reported on debt outstanding widened 
considerably between the two survey years (Table 3). The interest rates 
on cash loans recorded in this table are simple nominal rates written here 
in annual terms, although the practice within the village is to refer to 
monthly rates. In 1974/75 debts were recorded at rates of interest ranging 
between 0 and 50%, with the bulk of public sector debt outstanding at 13% 
and most private sector debt at 25% and 36%. Wheat, valued at Rs 11,169, 
was owed to the public sector at an interest rate of 25% in kind over the 
rabi (winter) season. In 1983/84, interest rates ranged between 0 and 300% 
for cash loans, and between 25% in kind from the formal sector and 50% in 
kind from the private sector for wheat loans. Debt outstanding to the 
formal sector was predominantly at 12% interest per annum, while debt to
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the private sector was mainly at a rate of 3 6% and 60% per annum. While 
the (official) cost of credit from the formal sector did not rise between 
the two survey years, the cost of interest-bearing loans from the private 
sector rose substantially over this period. However, between 1974/75 and 
1983/84 there was also an important increase in interest free debt. In 
1974/75 a total of Rs 1,956 were owed interest-free to private sources. 
In the later survey year this had increased more than 11 times to Rs 
21,826. We have already mentioned that inaccuracies and omissions are more 
likely to occur with credit data than with other data collected in a 
village such as Palanpur. This problem may be particularly acute in the 
case of data on interest free credit. Most of these transactions are 
between friends and relatives who might be reluctant to divulge information 
on such transactions, or who might not regard them as part of the credit 
market. Although the data for 1983/84 are somewhat more detailed, it is 
very unlikely that the spectacular increase in interest free credit should 
be attributed entirely to omissions in data collection during the 1974/75 
survey. There is therefore evidence of an important new development in the 
Palanpur credit market.
In this chapter our discussion of interest rates will be focussed on 
nominal interest rates. However, it is clear that in the presence of 
inflation real interest rates may be very different from nominal rates. 
Inflation in the 1974/75 survey year and the year immediately preceding it 
was 24.7% and 29.5% respectively, on the basis of the General Index of the 
Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL) in Uttar Pradesh. 
This means that loans carrying nominal interest charges of 24% or less had 
zero or negative real interest rates at the time of that survey year. 
During the 1983/84 survey year and the year immediately preceding it, 
inflation was running at 7.4% and 9.4% respectively. The lower inflation 
at the time of the later survey meant that real interest rates were much 
closer to the nominal interest rates being charged. Taking into account 
inflation thus heightens our impression of rising interest rates over time 
between the two survey years.
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In suitmary, levels of indebtedness rose sharply between 1974/75 and 
1983/84. Outstanding debt to both the public sector and the private sector 
rose by roughly the same amount so that the relative share of the credit 
market of these two sources of credit changed only fractionally. 
Indebtedness as a proportion of village income rose significantly to over 
40% in 1983/84. In Tables 4 and 5, a rough breakdown of credit sources in 
the two years are presented, detailing the main features of each credit 
source. Significant changes occurred in the private sector source of 
credit with a large increase in reported debts outstanding at zero 
interest, the emergence of outside sources of credit and a rise in typical 
interest rates on interest-bearing debt owed to the private sector. In 
Table 6 the most common rates of interest charged by the different sources 
are detailed in a breakdown of outstanding debt by credit source.
In the following two sections we take up a more detailed discussion 
of public and private sources of credit in turn.
4. Public Institutions
In both 1974/75 and 1983/84, the most important source of credit, as 
suggested by outstanding debts, was the formal sector. This sector 
consisted, in 1974/75, of the Farmers' Service Society (FSS) and Seed Store 
operating within Palanpur, and the Land Development Bank and to a very 
minor degree the Cane Society operating outside the village. By 1983/84, 
an additional source of formal sector credit had emerged - two branches of 
the Prathma bank in the nearby towns of Nagalia and Jargaon®. In Table 
7, we see that in 1974/75 the FSS and Seed Store taken together had Rs 
89,462 in outstanding loans to Palanpur villagers. This rose to Rs 244,795 
for the two institutions in 1983/84. In 1974/75, there were wheat loans
®. See D'Mello (1980) for a survey of Indian institutions which have 
been established to provide credit to small farmers in rural areas. Note 
that the IRDP programme was not introduced in Palanpur until after the 
1983/84 survey, and it is therefore not examined in this chapter. Details 
of its operation can be found in Drèze (1990).
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valued at Rs 16,327 outstanding to the public sector (see Table 5). These 
were loans issued at a rate of interest of 25% in kind over the rabi season 
by the Seed Store. Comparing this with the loans outstanding to the Seed 
Store in 1983/84, we see that outstanding wheat debts to public 
institutions declined in real terms to a value of Rs. 9,450.
Borrowing from the Seed Store is attractive to poorer cultivating 
households. The validity of this assertion will be examined further below 
but it may be useful to mention here the three main reasons why it seems 
a reasonable one. First, although the seed borrowed is ostensibly to be 
used for sowing purposes, it is generally of inferior quality so that it 
can only be used for consumption. This was especially the case in the 
later survey year; in 1974/75 some farmers were still sowing with the seeds 
from the Seed Store, but by 1983/84 their quality was widely regarded as 
having deteriorated, beyond practical usefulness. Second, price movements 
of wheat over the season when loans were taken out (quite apart from the 
underlying rate of price change), are usually such that the real interest 
rate (when rupees are taken as numeraire) can be much lower than implied 
by 25% interest in kind over the season. Third, borrowing from the Seed 
Store is said to involve less corruption, fraud, humiliation and travel 
than other public sector sources (see below). In general its accounting 
procedures are simple and well understood. These three factors combine to 
make Seed Store loans important to poorer households in Palanpur, and the 
observation that the size of this sector's operations declined between the 
two survey years is therefore of some significance.
What has grown tremendously between the two surveys is the debt 
outstanding to the FSS. This debt totalled Rs 78,293 in 1974/75 and Rs 
228,648 in 1983/84. As discussed in detail in Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma 
(1990), fraud and corruption are important features of the FSS's 
operations; associated both with the allocation of loans and, more 
strikingly, with the process of repayment. A sophisticated system, known 
as "transfer-entry", has evolved whereby borrowers who experience some 
difficulty with the repayment of their debt when due, are able to postpone
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repayment at the cost of a very rapid escalation of the principal as well 
as (higher and compounding) interest rates. Essentially, a farmer unable 
to clear his debt, must pay the interest due plus a "collection charge" 
expressed as a percentage of his principal in order to be able to defer 
repayment of the loan. If he is unable to pay the interest plus 
"collection charge", both are added to the unpaid principal and entered as 
a new loan to the farmer. The "collection charge" is pocketed by the 
official administering the loan. In this way, what are initially small 
outstanding debts can soon become unmanageably large. A nearly three-fold 
increase in debt outstanding to the FSS between 1974/75 and 1983/84 
suggests that a significant factor in the greater presence of the formal 
sector in the village credit market since 1974/75 might be the result of 
the "transfer-entry" mechanism. The dramatic rise in debt burden that 
borrowing from the FSS may entail is illustrated in Table 8 which provides 
details of credit transactions between the FSS and households of the Jatab 
caste (among the poorest households in Palanpur) as reported in 1983/84. 
While it is not possible to systematically control for the occurrence of 
'transfer entry', we can assert that as far as FSS credit is concerned, any 
notion of a massive expansion of new credit extended between the two survey 
years is likely to be rather illusory. Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
expansion in indebtedness is not illusory.
Real outstanding debt to the Land Development Bank (LDB) stood at Rs 
24,727 in 1974/75 and was virtually unchanged at Rs 24,738 in 1983/84. The 
LDB is a government-owned rural bank which is mainly oriented to the 
promotion of agriculture and related activities. It tends to issue longer 
term loans of greater amounts than the FSS or Seed Store. Interest rates 
on outstanding loans from the LDB ranged between 7-12% in 1974/75 and 
remained largely unchanged in 1983/84. Loans from this source were said 
by villagers in 1983/84 to entail fewer transactions costs than FSS loans, 
although in 1983/84 some stories of corruption were encountered.
In 1983/84 two branches of the Prathma bank, another government-owned 
rural bank oriented towards the promotion of agriculture and related
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activities, had loans valued at Rs 70,074 outstanding to villagers in 
Palanpur. In 1974/75 there were no loans outstanding to this source and 
thus these loans represent a net increase in formal sector lending to 
Palanpur villagers. As with the LDB, interest rates on outstanding loans 
to the Prathma bank branches were low relative to rates in the informal 
sector and transactions costs associated with these loans were not regarded 
as being as high as those associated with the FSS. However, corruption and 
irregularities were not unheard of with respect to this source. Moreover, 
it was suggested by bank officials during the 1983/84 survey year that 
lending to Palanpur villagers might stop due to low recovery rates. The 
extent to which these banks will represent a sustained increase in 
government lending to villagers is therefore unclear.
In Table 9 the distribution of institutional debt by income class is 
considered. Accompanying the decline in the value of wheat loans 
outstanding to the Seed Store between 1974/75 and 1983/84 is the fall in 
the number of households with debts outstanding to this institution. As 
mentioned above, by the later survey year no farmer was willing to use Seed 
Store wheat for cultivation purposes. Consequently, the number of
households indebted to this source in all but the poorest income class, 
those most likely to seek consumption loans, had diminished. However, in 
light of lower average per capita incomes in the 1983/84 survey year and 
presumably no less need for consumption loans, the fact that the number of 
households borrowing from the Seed Store did not increase might point to 
the presence of rationed credit from this source.
In 1974/75 only 2% of all non-Seed Store institutional loans went to 
households in the poorest quintile of per-capita income (Table 9). In 
1983/84, only 10% of households with institutional debts outstanding from 
sources other than the Seed Store or FSS, were in the bottom quintile. In 
both years, the access of the poor to non-wheat loans from institutional 
sources appears to have been rather limited, and no significant improvement 
in this respect is discernable between the two survey years. A closer 
examination of the debt burden of the households in Palanpur is presented
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in section 7, and more formal analysis of the characteristics of borrowers 
from the Seed Store, FSS and other formal sector sources is carried out in 
section 8.
5. The Informal Credit Market Within the Village
Despite a nearly three-fold increase in levels of indebtedness to 
formal sector sources between the two survey years, mainly those operating 
within the village, the real value of debts outstanding to private lenders 
within the village in the two years grew marginally from Rs 37,530 in 
1974/75 to Rs 38,259 in 1983/84 (Table 2). As a percentage of village 
income in the respective years, debts outstanding to private sources in the 
village were never greater than 4% in either survey year. Despite the 
appearance of constancy there was a significant amount of change in the 
operation of this part of the credit market in Palanpur between the two 
survey years. This is clearly seen in the wider range of interest rates 
on outstanding loans between villagers in the later survey year. It is 
also reflected in the absence of any 'daur' loans of wheat outstanding in 
1974/75 while in 1983/84 such wheat loans, valued at Rs 5,695 were 
outstanding to Palanpur lenders (Table 5).
In 1974/7 5 private lending occurred at a relatively narrow range of 
interest rates. Of the debt with information on interest charges, Rs 1,956 
out of a total of Rs 37,530 were outstanding at zero interest. The 
remaining Rs 35,574 of outstanding debt carried interest rates ranging 
between 24% and 50% (Table 3). With the exception of loans in kind from 
the Seed Store, formal sector credit involved substantially lower interest 
charges. However, as has already been remarked, one must also take into 
account the possibility of higher transactions costs associated with a 
number of formal sector sources. By 1983/84 the average, as well as range 
of, interest rate on loans within the village had increased significantly. 
Although interest-free loans outstanding had risen to Rs 21,826 (Table 6), 
in fact only Rs 3,496 of these had come from within the village. The
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emergence of a significant outside source of interest-free credit is 
discussed in more detail below. Of the Rs 34,763 of outstanding debts 
within the village at a positive rate of interest in 1983/84, only Rs 2,944 
were at an interest charge below 37% per annum (Table 6). Interest rates 
on gambling loans, calculated as a simple annual rate, were sometimes as 
high as 300% in 1983/84 (although these loans were generally very short 
term, sometimes as short as one week or even a few days) . In the later 
survey year, a new village-standard interest rate of 60% had emerged on 
loans from private sources within the village. This is higher than the 
highest interest rate recorded in 1974/75, and indicates that there has 
been an increase in the cost of credit from the moneylenders within the 
village. Examining rates of interest on outstanding debts in 1983/84 
provides further support for this claim as loans taken out earlier carry 
lower interest charges than more recent loans (see Drèze, Lanjouw and 
Sharma, 1991) . It is possible that the expansion in the number of credit 
sources available (both formal and informal sources outside the village), 
particularly to well-off and well-connected villagers, is a factor 
accounting for a rising interest rate on loans from moneylenders within the 
village. How this might be possible is briefly described below.
Suppose that a moneylender is unable to assess precisely the riskiness 
involved in lending to a particular borrower, i.e. he does not possess 
complete knowledge of the circumstances of the borrower. This is somewhat 
of a departure from the typical portrayal of a village moneylender found 
in much of the literature. There, it is widely argued that the moneylender 
possesses near-perfect knowledge of the borrower's circumstances, and it 
is precisely this which makes him more successful in lending in rural areas 
than other lending sources. However, in Palanpur even regular moneylenders 
are not specialized in this occupation and therefore devote only a fraction 
of their time to this activity*. It is reasonable to assume that they are
*. Hill (1986) argues that historically in India moneylenders have 
rarely been fully specialized in credit market transactions. Typically, 
they have been involved in cultivation as well. In addition, living in a 
village may provide you with only partial knowledge of other people (this 
is true whether the village is in the UK, India, or elsewhere) . The 
portrayal in much of the economic literature of moneylenders in this manner
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therefore unable to acquire such detailed knowledge of their borrowers as 
to be able to make a perfect assessment of their credit worthiness. 
Moreover, with the widening links between Palanpur villagers and the 
outside economy, it is likely that accurately evaluating the circumstances 
of borrowers has become more difficult. Hence, let us assume that lenders 
are only able to distinguish different groups of borrowers, each group with 
a different probability of default. Suppose further, partly for the 
reasons given above and partly because of the existence of social norms in 
the village, that moneylenders are compelled to charge a standard interest 
rate to borrowers, i.e. they are unable to vary the rate which they charge 
to groups of borrowers with differing credit worthiness. Village-standard 
terms for different contracts has been observed in tenancy contracts in 
Palanpur as well as in the labour market, where a village wage rate has 
been found to be remarkably sticky, despite involuntary unemployment during 
some periods, and excess demand at other times (see Drèze and Sharma (1990) 
and Drèze and Mukherjee (1987)).
The problem facing lenders is essentially one of assessing the credit 
worthiness of potential borrowers and within this framework the lender's 
risk hypothesis described by Bottomley (1975) has been widely applied^. 
We have already mentioned that more recent theoretical efforts have been 
devoted to demonstrating how, in the presence of adverse selection and 
moral hazard, expected profits of lenders may not monotonically rise with 
the interest rate charged (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, a useful survey is in 
Bell, 1988). These studies have stressed that the credit worthiness of the 
pool of borrowers may deteriorate with rising interest rates as only more 
risky projects are undertaken, or that rising interest rates can induce 
behaviour on the part of borrowers which is not in the interest of the 
lender. As a consequence it may be possible for an equilibrium to exist 
which entails credit rationing.
may therefore be somewhat artificial. See also Aleem (1990) and Bell 
(1990) .
A clear and useful exposition of this theory can be found in Basu
(1984) .
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That credit rationing exists in Palanpur is highly probable, but we 
will not focus here on that aspect of the credit market. We therefore make 
the assumption that considerations of adverse selection and moral hazard, 
while potentially important, are not exercising a significant influence 
over the range of interest rates which we will be examining. Suppose our 
moneylender finds that, on average, a fraction of his loans are not repaid. 
For the lender the probability of default, q, on any loan of size L, by any 
one borrower, is assumed to be distributed with mean g*, over all potential 
borrowers in a particular group and their characteristics. The expected 
probability of default is thus equal to q*, which is also the average 
default rate over a particular pool of borrowers. The moneylender's best 
estimate of the probability of default on a particular loan is equal to the 
average probability of default of the pool of potential borrowers and he 
must charge an interest rate so as to receive a positive expected return. 
If the lender gives a loan of Rs L at an interest rate i, his expected 
earning (assuming that no interest is paid on what is defaulted) is
(1+i)(l-q*)L-L. (1)
The effective interest rate, r, (which should be equal to the return on the 
moneylender's funds in some alternative use) is obtained by dividing this 
by L:
r = i(l-g*) - g*. (2)
If access to new sources of low-cost credit is not distributed equally over 
the whole village, so that wealthier villagers, or villagers with higher 
social status, are increasingly able to satisfy their credit needs outside 
this village, then this can lead to a rise in . Essentially, the 
changing pool of borrowers from the moneylender are perceived to be more 
likely to default on average because a growing number of the more reliable 
borrowers are borrowing elsewhere. The distribution of g has shifted in 
the direction of a higher probability of default. From (2) above, it is 
easy to see that in order to maintain the effective interest rate as q*
. The fact that formal sector loans do not go to the poor in rural 
India has been widely noted, see Adams (1980), D'Mello (1980), Gupta and 
Shroff (1987). Even within a targeted programme such as the IRDP scheme 
it has been argued that the poor have not been the sole, or even major 
beneficiaries, see Drèze (1990).
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rises, i must rise^ .^
In 1974/75 informal sector loans of wheat outstanding within the 
village had a total value of Rs 838. In 1983/84, such loans outstanding 
had increased to a total value of Rs 5,695 (Table 5). These loans are 
usually taken out for consumption purposes before the rabi harvest and then 
repaid after the harvest. In 1983/84 such debts involved an interest of 
50 per cent in kind over the season, and are known as daur loans. As with 
in-kind loans from the Seed Store, these forms of credit are particularly 
attractive to poor villagers because of their well-established and 
understood terms and the usually favourable movements, to the borrower, of 
the price of wheat over the season in which it is borrowed. It is possible 
that the rabi season immediately prior to the 1974/75 survey coincided with 
a good agricultural year, and that there was little need for villagers to 
borrow wheat to supplement low stocks during the survey year. Certainly, 
the fact that average income was much higher, and poverty lower, in 1974/75 
than in 1983/84 does lend some support to this suggestion. The institution 
of daur loans appears to be well established in Palanpur, and India as a 
whole (as discussed in Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1991) and is unlikely to 
have been introduced for the first time in the village between 1974/75 and 
1983/84. It is more likely that for one reason or other it was simply not 
necessary in 1974/75.
From the 1974/75 data we are unable to consistently identify which 
individuals were involved in moneylending on a regular basis in that year, 
nor can we identify the occasional village lenders. It is therefore not 
possible to check whether the four regular moneylenders operating in the 
village in 1983/84 (as identified in Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1991) were
. In a study of the ICRISAT villages in Maharashtra, Walker and 
Ryan (1990) observe very similar developments in the village informal 
financial markets as have been described for Palanpur. The penetration of 
subsidized institutional credit has led to moneylenders loosing their best 
clients. New moneylenders have emerged who make loans characterized by 
very short stipulated repayment periods and a high interest rate structure. 
These new moneylenders are only resorted to by people who do not have 
access to institutional credit, and the quality (in terms of repayment 
capacity) of the pool of applicants coming to moneylenders has declined.
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already present in the earlier survey, nor whether 'occasional' lenders in 
1974/75 had established themselves further and become more involved in this 
activity by 1983/84. Nonetheless, a number of observations relating to 
village moneylending can be made. First, between the two survey years the 
real value of debts outstanding to regular moneylenders was virtually 
unchanged. We see in Table 10 that in 1974/75, debts outstanding to 
regular village moneylenders totalled Rs 18,370. Of this total, one debt 
valued at Rs 140 was interest-free. In 1983/84, a total of Rs 18,332 was 
outstanding to regular village moneylenders, including Rs. 2,050 interest- 
free. Second, outstanding debts to occasional moneylenders within the 
village, taken as total private lending within the village net of regular 
lenders' interest-free and other loans, increased from Rs.14,040 in 1974/75 
to Rs.16,431 in 1983/84.
Alongside unchanged outstanding debt to regular village moneylenders 
and a slight rise in debt outstanding to occasional lenders, it is of some 
interest to see what changes have occurred in the profile of clients to 
moneylenders. Tables 11, 12 and 13 present a breakdown of the number of 
debts outstanding to village moneylenders on the basis of borrowers' caste, 
landownership class and quintile of per capita income. In 1974/75 the 
greatest number of loans outstanding to village money lenders were held by 
Jatabs (Table 11). More than half of all Jatab households had some debt 
outstanding to village moneylenders in the earlier survey year. By 1983/84 
this proportion had declined to 37%. It is interesting that while all of 
the Jatab loans in 1983/84 outstanding to village moneylenders were daur 
loans, in 1974/75 they were paying relatively high interest rates on cash 
loans^^. While in both survey years relatively many Murao households were 
indebted to village moneylenders, they represented less than a quarter of 
all households in that caste in either of the two years. On the whole, as 
a percentage of households in their respective castes, Jatabs, Passis, 
Dhimars and Telis were the most frequent borrowers from village
. One question of interest, which it was not possible to 
investigate in any detail, is the possibility that in 1983/84 cash loans 
to scheduled castes were threatened or perceived to be so by 'amnesties' 
for lower castes offered by electioneering politicians.
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moneylenders. This corresponds with the notion that clients of village 
moneylenders are more likely to be poor (or lower in status) , as wealthier 
households would be more likely to borrow from other sources. This would 
be expected to be more obvious in the later survey year, when the number 
of alternative sources had expanded greatly.
Pursuing this point further by looking at the breakdown of clients of 
moneylenders on the basis of an important wealth indicator (Table 12), we 
see that the heaviest borrowers from village moneylenders in 1974/75 were 
households with small landholdings (between 0 and 15 bighas). Landless 
households were the most under represented of all households in borrowing 
from this source. In 1983/84, a much greater uniformity over landholding 
classes was observed, although the largest landholders were not borrowing 
from this source at all. The percentage of marginal landholders with debts 
to village moneylenders (between 0-5 bighas) declined slightly from 42% to 
37% over the two surveys, but by the later survey this group had become the 
most likely of all landowning classes to be indebted to village 
moneylenders. The number of landless households increased from 10 to 27 
between 1974/75 and 1983/84, and the percentage of households in this class 
borrowing from village moneylenders increased from 10% to 22%.
Finally, in Table 13 we consider the distribution of clients of 
village moneylenders on the basis of quintiles of per capita income in the 
respective years. Note that income in any one year is likely to be an 
imperfect indicator of long-run living standards, and that 1983/84 income 
is particularly deficient as an indicator because of the poor harvest in 
that year (see Chapter 2) . In 1974/75, nearly half of the poorest 
households (in the bottom two quintiles) had outstanding debts to village 
moneylenders. Only one fifth of households in the richest two quintiles 
had outstanding debts to this source. In 1983/84 the percentage of the 
bottom two quintiles who had borrowed from village moneylenders was 25% (15 
out of a total of 59 households) while the percentage of the top two 
quintiles had risen to 23%. When we consider quintiles of the population 
in 1983/84 based in terms of "apparent prosperity" (introduced in chapter
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3) , then the percentage of the poorest two quintiles borrowing from village 
moneylenders rises to 3 0% and the percentage of the rich households 
borrowing from this source declines from 23% to 16%. In both years, less 
affluent households were more highly represented among borrowers from 
village moneylenders than the well-off.
The overall picture regarding village moneylending, rising interest 
rates aside, is one of relatively little change between the two survey 
years. Occasional lending increased slightly in importance while regular 
lending continued at roughly the same scale. While daur lending was not 
observed in 1974/75, it did play a role in 1983/84. The general profile 
of clients of village moneylenders did not change in any substantial sense 
- generally, the prediction that the poor are more likely to borrow from 
village lenders is borne out by the evidence. However, it is clear that 
the poor are not the only ones to borrow from this source, and this may be 
related to the particular attractions of borrowing from village 
moneylenders. Loans from village moneylenders are appealing because they 
can be taken out at short notice, and repayment arrangements may be more 
flexible than on loans from other sources. Also, in contrast to borrowing 
from urban moneylenders (see below), social reputation is used in lieu of 
collateral. Borrowing needs prompted for example, by sudden illness within 
a household, or the need to hold a wedding feast, may be best served by 
village moneylenders - despite their higher interest costs. Such motives 
for borrowing have not changed much over time and can affect both the poor 
and better off. Where the poor have restricted access to other sources of 
credit, they will be more highly represented among clients of village 
lenders. However, moneylenders are likely to extend credit only to those 
villagers they are confident are able to repay the loans. An attempt to 
disentangle the determinants of access to moneylender credit from the 
determinants of the quantity borrowed given access is presented in section 
8.
6. Outside Sources of Informal Credit
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While the proportion of regular moneylender debt in total village 
informal debt remained at around 50% in both 1974/75 and 1983/84 (see 
Tables 10 and 2), the importance of village moneylender debt in the 
informal credit market as a whole declined sharply. This is due to the 
emergence of two important new sources of informal credit to the village 
between the two survey years. Interest-free credit from sources outside 
the village and the emergence of interest-bearing credit from urban 
moneylenders were the principle sources of the net increase in the total 
real amount of debt outstanding to informal creditors from Rs. 37,530 in 
1974/75 to Rs. 90,256 in 1983/84. Debt to the informal sector therefore 
grew almost as quickly as to the formal sector between the two survey 
years. Insofar that such debts were not likely to have accumulated for 
reasons such as the "transfer-entry" mechanism, and are generally turned 
over more quickly than loans from the formal sector, they may actually have 
grown more quickly in a real sense than credit from the formal sector. 
This observation has recently been supported by Bell (1990) who 
demonstrates, using data at various levels of aggregation, that the 
expansion of rural credit from formal institutions in India has not led to 
the demise of informal lending. In his analysis he stresses that the 
growing commercialization of Indian agriculture has encouraged the rise of 
trader-moneylending. While such interlinked transactions are rare in 
Palanpur, the phenomenon of outside lending coming from commercial centres 
nearby has been witnessed. Town moneylending has rapidly become a major 
source of informal credit to those able to meet the collateral requirements 
of moneylending goldsmiths and jewellers^.
The rise in debt outstanding at zero interest between the two survey 
years was dramatic. While in the earlier survey year interest-free credit 
accounted for only 5% of all debt outstanding to private sources, by 
1983/84 this had risen to nearly one-quarter. In 1974/75, Rs 1,956 were
The emergence of inter-linked credit transactions between farmers 
and traders, described by Bell and Srinivasan (1985), Bell (1990) and 
Hariss (1982,1983) for various parts of India has not been observed in 
Palanpur however. Nor, as argued by Hariss (1982), do the pawnbroking 
activities of urban moneylenders clearly benefit the poor (see below).
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outstanding interest-free to other villagers in Palanpur. By the later 
survey year, a total of Rs 21,826 were outstanding to friends and 
relatives, of which Rs 3,496 were outstanding to other Palanpur villagers, 
and Rs 18,330 were outstanding to friends or relatives outside the village. 
While we have already mentioned that this aspect of the data may be more 
likely to suffer from under-reporting in any given year, there is no 
compelling reason to believe that data inadequacies fully explain the 
observed increase in interest-free lending during the interval between 
1974/75 and 1983/84.
The Rs 1,956 in outstanding debts at zero interest in 1974/75 had come 
from friends and relatives inside the village. By 1983/84, such debts to 
friends and relatives within the village had increased to Rs 3,496. In 
Table 14 we see that just under two-thirds of the interest-free lending 
occurring within the village in 1983/84 came from regular moneylenders. 
Most of these moneylender loans went to villagers who were not related to 
the lender. The biggest expansion in interest-free lending, however, seems 
to have come from outside sources. In contrast to the pattern of interest- 
free lending within the village, in 1983/84 these outside sources of 
interest-free credit were for the most part relatives of the Palanpur 
borrowers (94% of all debts from outside the village at zero interest came 
from relatives)^. Why there should be such an expansion of borrowing 
from relatives outside the village is a question of interest which merits 
further investigation, and may be related to the general expansion of links 
between the village and the outside world. It is possible, of course, that 
the increase in debts to friends and relatives does not represent so much 
an expansion of credit to the village as a shift away from what would 
previously have been gifts or grants. A further point of interest, taken 
up below, is that in 1974/75 no Jatabs had any interest-free debts, and in 
1983/84 only Rs. 50 were owed at zero interest by Jatabs. Insofar that 
households of this caste are highly represented among the poor, this
Note that although the interest rate on these loans is zero, there 
are reasons to argue that they might entail transactions costs which would 
make such loans less attractive than might appear at first glance (see 
Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma for further discussion).
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indicates that the poor may not have participated in the growing importance 
and number of interest-free debts^ ®.
By 1983/84, town money-lenders and pawnbrokers had emerged as a major 
new source of informal credit. While in 1974/75 there were no recorded 
debts outstanding to private sources outside the village, in the later 
survey year Rs 25,960 were owed to pawnbrokers in the nearby towns of 
Chandausi and Bilari (see Table 15). Interest rates on outstanding debt 
from this source were generally lower than on loans from village
moneylenders. In 1983/84, more than three-fourths of outstanding debt of 
urban moneylenders was at a rate of interest lower than 37%, while only 15% 
of cash loans from village money-lenders were at a rate of interest below 
37% (Table 6).
A major feature of urban moneylender sector of the Palanpur credit 
market is the importance of collateral. Of all the sources of credit 
available to Palanpur borrowers, only jewellers in Chandausi and Bilari 
explicitly demanded collateral before making any loans. The standard
collateral accepted by these moneylenders was in the form of gold or silver
jewelry^ .^ The value of this collateral invariably exceeded the value of
the loan, thus transferring any risk associated with the credit transaction 
onto the borrower. This feature of the urban credit market clearly 
restricts borrowers to those who are able to guarantee repayment of the 
loan, and as a result excludes many of the poor in a village such as 
Palanpur. Why any relatively well-off villager, who is probably not
. Interest-free lending in Palanpur does not appear to play the 
same role as was described by Platteau and Abraham (1987) and Abraham 
(1989) for two small-scale fishing villages in Kerala. There, such 
transactions were found to play an important insurance role in the face of 
dramatic income fluctuations related to the daily catch. The success of 
this system was found to depend crucially on the fact that within the 
village households faced very low covariate risk. A typical characteristic 
of the risk faced by households in an agricultural setting (as in Palanpur) 
is that it is highly correlated across households.
. The use of jewelry and gold as important pieces of collateral in 
credit market transactions has also been observed by Swaminathan (1988) in 
a study of a village in rural Tamil Nadu. Sarap (1988) finds gold to be 
the main form of collateral to be used by rich household in a study of 
informal credit markets in western Orissa.
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excluded from borrowing from either the formal sector or urban money­
lender, should prefer to pay the relatively higher interest rates charged 
by the urban lenders, is probably best seen in light of the numerous 
transactions costs associated with formal sector loans. These could 
substantially raise the effective cost of credit to the point that this 
source was no longer attractive^. In addition, there might be some 
attraction to borrowers of maintaining a degree of privacy in their 
financial matters - something which borrowing from the FSS or Seed Store, 
located within Palanpur, would not guarantee.
In Table 15 we see that the most important borrowers from urban 
moneylenders were Muraos, Passis and one Teli household. Muraos had 8 
loans outstanding valued at Rs. 8,940, Passi households had three loans 
outstanding valued at Rs. 5,900 and one Teli household had 3 loans
outstanding valued at Rs. 6,375. While Muraos are not ranked highest in 
terms of status in the village, their average income per capita was highest 
in the village in both survey years. The Passis, although far from highly 
ranked in terms of status, were the next most affluent in terms of average 
income. This confirms that the heaviest borrowers from urban moneylenders 
were households who were among the better off castes in Palanpur, and that 
the poor in the village were not likely to have availed themselves much 
from the expansion of credit from this source between 1974/75 and 1983/84. 
We might also argue that precisely because Muraos and Passis, although 
wealthy, are not ranked highest in terms of status, these households face 
relatively high transactions costs when borrowing from the formal sector 
and are therefore attracted to the alternative of borrowing from the urban 
sector. Similarly households from the Thakur caste, who have high status 
notwithstanding a decline in their relative economic position, may find it 
more attractive to continue borrowing from formal sector sources. This 
might go some way in explaining why the value of outstanding debts to urban 
moneylenders held by Thakurs amounted to less than 4% of the total
Bouman and Houtman (1988) describe in detail many of the 
advantages to borrowers with acceptable assets of choosing pawnbrokers over 
formal sources of credit in developing countries.
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outstanding debt of Rs. 25,460 to this source (Table 15).
7. The Burden of Debt and Household Characteristics
In this section we consider changes in debt holdings of Palanpur 
households between the survey years. We have seen that the credit market 
in Palanpur is segmented, with different sources of credit entailing quite 
different costs. We have argued that access to the various sources differs 
between households. For cash loans from public institutions, status, 
contacts and an ability to satisfy bureaucratic procedural requirements may 
be important. These are less likely to be of significance for wheat loans 
from the Seed Store. Urban loans require an ability to offer collateral. 
Interest-free loans from outside the village generally come from relatives 
and are unlikely to be available to households whose relations outside the 
village are poor. Loans from moneylenders within the village have become 
more expensive. Any judgement as to the success of the credit market in 
Palanpur in meeting credit needs will have to consider the degree to which 
households are able to satisfy these needs, as well as how high the burden 
of debt and its costs are becoming to villagers. In this section we 
examine the distribution of debts to formal and private sources by caste, 
per capita income, and landholding, on the basis of simple cross­
tabulations. This provides us with an indication of different households' 
abilities to sustain their debts.
In Table 16 we consider per capita debt outstanding from different 
sources for households of the different castes in Palanpur. In 1974/75, 
the most indebted castes, in per capita terms, were Gadarias, Thakurs and 
Passis. Average debt per capita in the village as a whole was Rs 202. The 
castes with the lowest per capita debts were the Dhobis, Telis and Jatabs. 
Per capita debt was only about one-tenth of per capita income for Muraos 
in that year. With the exception of the 'other' caste group who had no 
debts outstanding in 1974/75, the proportion of per capita debt to per 
capita income was lowest for Telis (8%), Dhobis (9%) and Muraos (11%). It 
is interesting to note that Muraos, who were among the most actively
243
involved in the adoption of changing agricultural technologies between the 
19 62/63 survey and 1974/75, had not become very indebted to achieve this. 
As a proportion of per capita income, the per capita debt burden of Dhimars 
and Gadarias were the highest in 1974/75, at 23% and 24% respectively.
In 1974/75, institutional credit (combining the LDB, Cane Society, and 
FSS/Seed Store) was the most important source of credit for all castes 
except Jatabs, who owed 57% of their debts to private lenders, and Dhobis 
who owed 67% of theirs to the private sector. That the Jatabs and Dhobis, 
with the lowest per capita incomes in 1974/75, were highly represented 
among borrowers from the highest cost source of credit suggests that they 
might have been excluded from the lower cost formal sector.
By 1983/84, the debt burden of some castes had increased enormously. 
The most indebted castes in per capita terms were the Dhimars, Gadarias, 
Passis, and Jatabs. The debt burdens of these castes were extremely high 
as a percentage of per capita income - 60% for Gadarias, 67% for Jatabs, 
68% for Passis, and 95% for Dhimars^. At the other extreme, Muraos had 
only marginally increased their per capita indebtedness from Rs. 200 to Rs. 
23 0 between the two survey years, representing an increase in debts 
relative to income from 11% to 18%. Both Thakurs and Jatabs roughly 
doubled their per capita debts between the two years, and given lower 
average real incomes in 1983/84, their debt burden as a proportion of 
income increased substantially. Thakur indebtedness as a percentage of per 
capita income rose from 15% in 1974/75 to 42% in 1983/84. While 
institutional credit became more important relative to private credit for 
most castes, this rise in importance was generally modest, for example in 
the case of Muraos, institutional credit represented 71% of total debt in 
1983/84 relative to 69% in 1974/75, and for Thakurs 94% in 1983/84 relative 
to 85% in the earlier survey. However, the proportion of total debt owed 
by Jatabs to institutional sources rose from 43% in 1974/75 to 87% in
We have not discussed so far the possibility that households may 
have no intention of repaying some of their outstanding debt, particularly 
to formal sources. D'Mello (1980) stresses the serious weakness of Indian 
co-operative institutions in recovering loans advanced.
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1983/84. We have already seen how quickly debts to the FSS can accumulate 
once the borrower has resorted to use of the "transfer mechanism". In 
Table 8 we provided details of the way in which a number of Jatab 
households had increased their indebtedness to the FSS as a result of such 
practices. While at first glance, an important increase in indebtedness 
to (supposedly) low cost formal sector sources by Jatabs could be 
interpreted as a relaxation of their credit constraints, this may in fact 
be far from actually the case. Between 1974/75 and 1983/84, Jatab debts 
outstanding to private lenders declined from Rs. 7,893 to 4,375. This may 
be due to lower demand for such loans as a result of rising interest rates 
on moneylender loans, or an increased reluctance on the part of lenders to 
lend to this caste. The combined influence of these developments suggests 
that far from being better served in the credit market by 1983/84, the 
position of Jatabs in meeting their credit needs may well have become 
considerably more difficult.
In Table 17 we focus on the distribution of debt to different sources 
on the basis of per capita income quintiles. In 1974/75 per capita 
indebtedness was lowest among households in the bottom quintile, and 
highest in the quintile just adjacent. On the whole, per capita debts were 
distributed rather equally between quintiles, and as a result the ratio of 
per capita debt to per capita income declined from around 23% for each of 
the bottom two quintiles to under 10% for the top two quintiles. The 
poorest two quintiles had the largest total outstanding debt to private 
lenders. More than half of all debt outstanding to this sector was held 
by the poorest 40% of households in Palanpur. Given that this form of 
credit generally entailed higher interest rates (see Table 4) , this 
suggests that the poor in 1974/75 did not enjoy the same access to the 
relatively lower cost credit from the formal sector.
By 1983/84, per capita debts for all but the second quintile had risen 
sharply. As per capita incomes in the latter survey year were lower than 
in 1974/75, the debt burden of households as a percentage of income had 
also risen markedly. The poorest quintile in 1983/84 had an average per
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capita debt nearly 40% higher than average per capita income in that year. 
This represented a nearly six-fold increase in debt burden compared with 
1974/75. For the other quintiles, the rise in debt burden ranged between 
nearly doubling (the second quintile) to almost quadrupling (third 
quintile). While the poorest quintile owed 60% of its debts to the formal 
sector in 1974/75, this had risen to 71% by 1983/84. Interestingly, the 
poorest quintile in 1983/84 owed 10% of its debts at no interest charge to 
friends and relatives. This seems somewhat at odds with the earlier claim 
that the better off in Palanpur were more likely to have relatives outside 
the village who were in a position to lend money. However, it has already 
been mentioned that current income in 1983/84 is a rather imperfect 
indicator of long run living standards due to the very poor harvest in that 
year which sharply depressed agricultural incomes. As a result, a number 
of households with good land and other assets were included in this 
quintile. It is possible that for this reason the poorest were able to 
receive interest free credit from friends and relatives. A similar 
argument can be invoked to account for the 12% of outstanding debts owed 
by the poorest quintile to urban money-lenders (recall that such loans 
require collateral valued at more than the loan).
In Table 18 the distribution of debts outstanding to different sources 
is related to the distribution of land holdings. Land is a major indicator 
of wealth in Palanpur, as well as an important productive asset. Where we 
have argued that access to credit may be related to wealth and influence, 
land might be a good proxy of this wealth and we may expect households with 
large landholdings to have greater levels of indebtedness. Moreover, in 
so far that large landholdings are correlated with cultivated holdings we 
may expect a greater demand for credit, for productive assets and working 
capital, among households with large land holdings.
In 1974/75, average per capita debts among the landless were one 
seventh of those held by even marginal farmers. This average of Rs. 24 
represented just over 2% of average per capita income for this group. For 
the other landholding classes, average per capita indebtedness ranged
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between 10% and 25% of per capita income. In absolute terms average per 
capita debts of small farmers (with 5 to 15 bighas of land) were the 
highest at Rs. 249 while the largest landholders (with more than 50 bighas) 
had average per capita debts of Rs. 239. Marginal farmers were most
heavily indebted to private lenders, with 43% of their debts outstanding 
to this source. Land cultivated in 1974/75 was more equally distributed 
than land owned, with small farmers leasing in land from the larger 
landowners (see Chapter 2). This was because during the earlier survey 
year, many of the large landowners were Thakur households who were not 
anxious to cultivate for themselves. This is likely to account, at least 
in part, for the relatively high levels of indebtedness of small farmers 
both in absolute terms and in per capita terms.
By 1983/84 landless households had substantially increased in number 
as a consequence of rising population and the increased incidence of sons 
splitting away from their parents' households before land had been divided. 
Although landlessness was found to increase the probability of a household 
being among the poor, not all landless households were poor in that year 
(see Chapter 3). Those who had regular off-farm employment generally 
enjoyed a relatively high living standard, while landless households with 
agricultural labour as main occupation were very likely to be poor. Unlike 
the early survey year, land cultivated in 1983/84 was distributed more 
unequally than land owned. Larger land owners were leasing in land, often 
from small farmers. By the later survey year, many of the large landowners 
were Murao households - not because they had purchased land in the period 
between the two surveys (the land market in Palanpur is very inactive) , but 
because their households had been less prone to split over time. Compared 
with other households in Palanpur, the incidence of joint cultivation among 
Muraos was relatively common.
In contrast to 1974/75, total debts and per capita indebtedness was 
the lowest among the largest landowners in 1983/84, and landless households 
had increased their average per capita debt from Rs. 24 to Rs. 410 - an 
increase from 2% to 48% of average per capita income. The highest per
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capita debts, and debt burden as a percentage of income, were among the 
fifth landowning class (with 30-50 bighas of land) who owed an average of 
74% of per capita income in that survey year. The distribution of debts 
between sources and land holding class in 1983/84 do not indicate any 
strong patterns, although the relatively high levels of debt outstanding 
to friends and relatives at no interest among the landless, may be 
attributed to the fact that the landless in 1983/84 were a rather 
heterogeneous group which included both very poor casual labourers as well 
as relatively affluent households with regular employment in nearby towns. 
The two smallest landowning classes were most dependent on credit from 
village moneylenders, while the largest landowning class had 20% of its 
debts outstanding to friends and relatives.
8. Econometric Analysis
In this section we report results from econometric analysis of data 
on debt collected for Palanpur in 1974/75 and 1983/84. We examine in turn 
each of the 4 credit market segments discussed in earlier sections (but 
also consider separately the three major formal sector sources). Thus we 
consider, respectively for each year, outstanding debts to the Seed Store, 
the FSS, other formal sector sources, village moneylenders, urban 
moneylenders and interest free credit sources. We wish to single out 
particular household characteristics which are likely to influence the 
amount that such households will borrow in a particular segment of the 
market. It is of interest to consider how the determinants of outstanding 
debt in the different segments of the market may have changed in importance 
over time, as well as how different characteristics might exercise varying 
influence in different market segments.
A problem in the modelling of debt outstanding to particular sources 
arises out of the zero entries observed. We are interested in a model 
which is able not only to portray the positive entries but which can also 
account for the zero entries. A model which is widely used for analysis 
of this kind is the Tobit which has positive entries determined by a
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regression model with zeros occurring when the random term and right-hand 
side variables are such as to give negative predicted entries for 
outstanding debt. The random term is assumed to be normally distributed.
The Tobit model is a well understood econometric model which has been 
widely applied to cross-section data. We will not describe it in great 
detail here (for details regarding its theoretical underpinnings, 
usefulness to economists, and also extensions, see for example Tobin, 1958, 
Atkinson, Gomulka and Stern, 1984, Maddala, 1983, and Pudney, 1989). As 
part of our investigation of the determination of zeros, we will compare 
the Tobit and probit models. If the Tobit is the true model then, 
asymptotically, the corresponding probit, where we give the dependent 
variable the value 1 for entries which are strictly positive and zero 
otherwise, should give the same estimated (relative) coefficients (see 
Atkinson, Gomulka and Stern, 1984). Where the Tobit is not the true model, 
then divergences may arise even in the limit and this may suggest that the 
investigation of alternative models is warranted.
There are other ways in which a model could describe the generation 
of positive entries, the mechanism whereby zero entries are generated and 
the probability distribution for the random terms. An alternative to the 
Tobit examined in this chapter is the "double-hurdle" model described 
initially by Gragg (1971). We will be interested in this section to 
determine for which year, and for which segments, the double-hurdle is a 
more appropriate model and where we can judge the Tobit to be satisfactory.
The double-hurdle model has not been as widely applied, certainly in 
the context of developing countries, and it may therefore be of some use 
to briefly describe its structure and how it is used. The estimating 
procedure applicable to double-hurdle models was first discussed by Gragg 
(1971) and has been more recently described by Atkinson, Gomulka and Stern 
(1984, 1989) and Pudney (1989). A more restricted version of the double­
hurdle model was developed by Deaton and Irish (1981). In the context of 
this study, the basic idea in a double hurdle model is that there are two
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particular reasons for which zero's arise in data on outstanding debt. 
First, a household may be excluded from a particular source of credit and 
therefore unable to borrow any amount from this source. Or alternatively 
there may be certain characteristics of the household (e.g. caste, 
religion, etc.) which lead to the household choosing never to borrow from 
a particular source. Zero's which are entered in the outstanding debt of 
such households may therefore arise for quite different reasons than zeros 
arising from the fact that a 'potentially borrowing' household may simply 
choose not to borrow from a source at certain levels of price being 
charged, incomes, or other variables. The double-hurdle model sets out two 
hurdles, the first to identify those households which will under no 
circumstances have an outstanding debt to the particular source, and the 
second hurdle to examine what characteristics influence the debt 
outstanding of those households which can and may in principle borrow from 
this source. Household characteristics which are significant in the first 
hurdle may also be important in the second hurdle.
Formally, the double hurdle model can be defined as follows. A 
household will be among 'potential borrowers' if Uh>0 where,
Uh = Zj + Tlh
where attributes Z^ , Z2,...,Zj are those which correspond to the first
hurdle, and that, as a potential borrowing household, the amount of 
actually borrowed is Max[0,yy,] , where
Yh = Pk^h:k +
and the set of variables X^ , Xg, ...,X^  does not necessarily exclude any of 
the attributes Zj. In the specifications undertaken in this paper it is 
assumed that the disturbance terms and are normally distributed and 
are independent, with a covariance matrix
I 1 0 1
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I 0 a^ J .
Our observations of amount borrowed, then indicate that
Yh* = Yh if Yh>0 and Uh>0 
= 0 otherwise.
In selecting which specification best describes the data, note that the 
Tobit is a special case - and is thus nested within - the double hurdle 
model. This would occur if the mean of the disturbance term T|h approached 
infinity. In this event u^  would be greater than zero for all households 
and thus the Tobit model with 
Yh* = max[0, + 6%]
would result. Also, if we were to estimate the special case of the double 
hurdle model where no Z variables were included we would obtain the p-Tobit 
model similar to the one examined in Deaton and Irish (1981). For the
Tobit model the log-likelihood can be written
L = N log 1/a - N/2 log (2%) - - PkXh:k)Vo^  + Z log [l-0(pkXh:k/G) ]
where N refers to the number of positive observations, Z is the sum over
zero observations and Z is the sum over positive observations. 0
corresponds to the distribution function of the standard normal. The 
likelihood function is modified in the double hurdle model to take into 
account the influence of the first hurdle:
L = N + log 1/a - N/2 log (2tc) - ^(Yh - pAzk) + N log 0(OjZh;j)
+ Z log [1 - 0(ajZh:j)0(PkXh:k)] .
In this chapter we have not attempted to describe, within a general 
framework, the amount of debt that different households will hold from a 
particular market segment. It is clear that a full theoretical model of 
this kind would contain many ingredients and would need to provide for 
numerous interactions. The econometric models estimated below may be seen
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as reduced form models which have not been formally derived from a 
structural model, but whose specifications contain elements which have been 
suggested from the analysis in earlier sections of this chapter as well as 
previous chapters. Some of the elements of the Palanpur credit market, 
which should be kept in mind, are briefly mentioned below.
Households may enter the Palanpur credit market for different 
purposes. In some cases, debts are incurred to undertake productive 
investments (e.g. a pumpset or the purchase of a draught animal). Other 
households borrow for 'consumption-smoothing' purposes in the face of 
shortfalls. Some segments of the credit market have been established to 
provide credit specifically for investment, not consumption, purposes. It 
is often difficult to distinguish between these purposes, because of the 
fungibility of funds. However, the different purposes for which credit is 
to be used suggest that different types of households, with possibly very 
different characteristics, may wish to borrow from a particular source.
We have argued that there is good reason to believe that rationing is 
widespread in the Palanpur credit market. Valuations of risk will make 
lenders willing to lend to some households and not others, and possibly 
only at some specific times. This rationing will vary in form between 
segments and affect various groups in different ways. Collateral, whether 
explicit (as in the case of borrowing from pawnshops) or implicit (as in 
reputation) can play an important role. In different segments of the 
credit market transactions costs will vary in type and these may not affect 
all households in the village equally, even within one particular market 
segment.
Lenders may also want to consider a borrower's portfolio of debts 
to other sources before deciding whether to lend to that particular 
household. Such factors would suggest treating borrowing from one source 
as an explanatory variable in another source. Borrowing from a particular 
segment may, in a full account however, be modelled as a part of a joint 
decision where a household decides on its borrowing from different segments
252
at the same time.
Tables 19 and 20 provide a list of explanatory variables which have 
been used in the econometric estimation. It should be noted at this point 
that a major factor involved in choosing the particular specifications 
reported here is the presence of heteroskedasticity. While problems of 
heteroskedasticity are not so pressing in ordinary regression models 
(unbiasedness and consistency remain, although estimates are inefficient), 
with the type of models examined here the maximum likelihood estimator is 
generally inconsistent (Pudney, 1989) . In the results presented below, an 
LM test is performed to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
Tobit models, and the double hurdle model reports robust t-statistics. The 
models presented below are generally those which appear to suffer least 
from heteroskedasticity, although in some segments of the credit market, 
for one or other survey year, it was not possible to obtain a meaningful 
specification which did not suffer from heteroskedasticity^. In such 
cases, the results are still presented but clearly less weight can be given 
to them.
In an effort to limit unnecessary repetition and restrict discussion 
of results which are of only marginal interest, this section will not 
necessarily scrutinize the results for each segment and each year 
exhaustively. We will confine ourselves to only brief comments on the 
results obtained for segments where convergence problems, severe 
heteroskedasticy and/or lack of degrees of freedom make it difficult to 
make comments of general interest.
6.8.1 Borrowing from the Seed Store
Note that in the face of heteroskedasticity a common practice is 
to transform the model into log form, and this frequently reduces or 
eliminates the problem. Experimentation along these lines was attempted 
with the credit data, but on the whole this did not appear to significantly 
reduce heteroskedasticity (in fact, in some cases it severely aggravated 
the problem) . Note also that taking logs in a Tobit model can be 
problematic because of the presence of zeroes.
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Table 21 presents Tobit models of borrowing from the seed store in 
1983/84. We see that in the preferred Tobit model (model 1), four 
explanatory variables were found to influence the debt outstanding of a 
household borrowing wheat from the Seed Store^^. A comparison of values 
of the log likelihood function when these four variables are included with 
the value of the log likelihood function when only a constant term is 
included shows that the log likelihood function increases from -258.84 to 
-245.02. This indicates that the model does provide a significant
improvement over a simple constant term. The Likelihood Ratio (LR)
statistic (2*log(Lu/Lr) for model 1 is 27.64 and the critical value for 
(at a 5% level of significance and with 4 degrees of freedom) is 9.49.
From model 1 in Table 21 we see that if households had borrowed from 
the FSS during the 1983/84 survey year, then this positively and 
significantly increased the amount of debt outstanding to the Seed Store. 
We have already seen that the Seed Store and FSS are two related agencies 
operating in Palanpur. The (official) eligibility criteria for the two 
sources are also closely related^ .^
If a household was not cultivating during the 1983/84 survey year then 
this significantly reduced the amount which such a household would hold in 
outstanding debt to the Seed Store. Although the seed provided in kind 
from the Seed Store in 1983/84 was not considered useful for sowing
purposes, it remains that this source had been established to lend to
cultivating households (and this was also reflected to some extent in the 
eligibility conditions). Many non-cultiVating households in 1983/84 had 
outside employment. Their regular outside incomes may have reduced the
. We will be discussing below what is involved in this designation 
of the 'preferred' model.
. Officially, villagers had to purchase shares in the FSS/Seed 
Store Credit Union and the number of shares that they could own was related 
to their landholdings. The amount of credit available is then related to 
size of shareholdings and landholdings. For details see Bliss and Stern 
(1982) . Note that this is according to the official rules and not 
necessarily how credit is always distributed in practice. Note also, that 
Seed Store debts which became overdue could become entered as FSS debts, 
and then become subject to the practice of "transfer-entry".
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need to borrow from a source which in 1983/84 appeared to be issuing loans 
mainly to people with consumption needs. Furthermore, non-cultivating 
households may not have been well placed to be able to repay a loan in kind 
from the Seed Store.
If a household could be described as following modern agricultural 
practices, then this reduced the amount which such a household would have 
borrowed from the Seed Store. This dummy variable takes a value of one if 
the household owned a pumpset, tubewell or boring, and zero if it did not. 
As we have mentioned. Seed Store loans were probably most attractive to 
poorer households in Palanpur who were interested in consumption loans and 
seed issued by the Seed Store was not of good quality. It seems reasonable 
therefore that farmers following modern practices and who owned various 
productive assets would be less inclined to borrow from this source.
Finally, if a household was among the richest quintile in the village 
(in terms of apparent prosperity) then this would reduce the amount of 
outstanding debt to the Seed Store. This relationship does not appear to 
be as statistically significant as for the other three variables, but this 
may due to some multicollinearity between this variable and the modern 
agricultural practices dummy^^.
Note that model 1 in Table 21 decisively rejects the null of 
homoskedasticity and that the parameter estimates reported for this model 
are therefore not consistent^. In model 2 of Table 21, we have taken
. Recall in chapter 3 that the apparent prosperity index tended to 
rank many of the large and active farming households highly, even though 
in income terms for that year, these households had not done so well.
. The LM test for the presence of heteroskedasticity in a Tobit 
model is discussed in Pudney (1989), following Lee and Maddala (1985) . The 
model takes the form of a quadratic
Ç t =  tto + t t i V u  + OzYzt + • • . + (XmYmt
where = (Yt ~ P'Xt)/0^  - 1 when yt>0,
Ô" = (l/T)Et lit'
Vit = for i>] i, j=2, . . . ,k 1 = 1,2, . . . ,m and m=(l/2)k(k-l) ,
and
t^ = btX,(Êt) when yt=0
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logs of the dependent variable of rupees outstanding to the Seed Store as 
well as of the explanatory variable, rupees borrowed from the FSS. While 
model 2 rejects more decisively than model 1 the null that a simple model 
with a constant is preferred, in terms of the LM test the model performs 
even more poorly than model 1. It is for this reason that model 1 was 
chosen as the preferred model. It should be noted that a fair amount of 
experimentation with different specifications was conducted but that 
problems with heterskedasticity in this segment persisted.
To see whether the Tobit model could be considered a satisfactory way 
of describing the process of borrowing from this segment in the 1983/84 
survey year, we compare the estimates in model 1 of Table 21 with probit 
estimates for the same specification (but with the dependent variable 
taking a value of one for all strictly positive entries) . If the Tobit 
model is a correct specification, then the relative values of the estimated 
coefficients should approach those in the probit model having the same set 
of explanatory variables. In Table 22 we see that after normalizing such 
that the ratio for the constant is exactly unity, the ratios for some of 
the coefficients appear to vary substantially from one. This suggests that 
an alternative approach may be warranted, and we will consider the success 
of the double hurdle model for this sector in what follows. However, 
before we turn to this alternative model, we will examine the Tobit model 
for the same segment of the credit market in Palanpur during the 1974/75 
survey year.
In Table 23 the only explanatory variable in the Tobit model which was 
found to exercise a statistically significant influence on the amount of 
debt outstanding to the Seed Store in 1974/75 was the amount of outstanding 
debt incurred from the FSS. In this year, the signs of estimated 
parameters for the non-cultivating dummy and for modern agricultural
where b^  = 3'Xt/ô
and A,(bt) =())(bt) / [l-<ï>(bt) J , the inverse Mills ratio or hazard rate. This 
is an estimate of E(p.^ /0^  fx=0)-1 for the censored observations.
Under the assumption of homoscedasticity, TR^  - (m).
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practices dummy were the same as in 1983/84 but the parameter estimates 
were not significant. The parameter estimate on the dummy indicating 
whether a household in 1974/75 was among the richest 20% (in current income 
terms) changed sign, but was also insignificant. It is useful to recall 
that in 1974/75, seed from the Seed Store was still occasionally used for 
sowing purposes and therefore did not represent only a source of credit for 
consumption purposes. LR tests on the models in Table 23 indicate that the 
models performed significantly better than a model with a simple constant 
term In Table 23 we also see that the Tobit model for 1974/75 failed to 
reject the null of homoskedasticity, and as a result the parameter 
estimates here are consistent.
In Table 24 we compare the relative estimates obtained for the Tobit 
model 1 in Table 23 with the estimates obtained with the probit model on 
the same specification. As was found for the Tobit model for the Seed 
Store segment in 1983/84, we see that after normalizing such that the ratio 
for the constant is exactly unity, the ratios for all of the coefficients 
tend to be rather far from one. For this year too, it appears that looking 
for an alternative model may not be unwarranted.
The double hurdle model for 1983/84 in Table 25 reveals an interesting 
observation that both prosperity and non-cultivation make a household less 
likely to be a potential borrower from the Seed Store (possibly for the 
reasons suggested above), but that if such a prosperous or non-cultivating 
household is a potential borrower from the Seed Store, it will then borrow 
more from this source. Looking at the two hurdles simultaneously thus 
presents us with a picture which is strikingly different from that obtained 
by looking at the Tobit model only. It is possible that prosperous as well 
as non-cultivating households would find repayment of large debts less 
difficult (we have mentioned that many of the non-cultivating households 
in 1983/84 enjoyed high incomes from regular employment outside the 
village). Moreover, as most non-cultivating households are not entitled 
to borrow from the Seed Store, if they do succeed in borrowing from this 
source it may be due to their ability to wield influence, and this may also
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contribute to the amount they were able to borrow. Note however that the 
prosperity variable, while positive in the second hurdle, is not 
significant as reflected by its robust t-statistic.
Rupees outstanding to the FSS were not seen to affect so much the 
likelihood of being among potential borrowers from the Seed Store, but 
rather to positively affect the amount that the household would borrow from 
the Seed Store, if it was among the potential borrowers. It is possible 
that debts to the FSS reflect in some sense a commitment to cultivation in 
1983/84 (for example, borrowing cash to buy fertilizer etc.) and that such 
households may prefer to utilize their seed stocks for sowing purposes, and 
then to borrow seed from the Seed Store for consumption purposes.
The double-hurdle model for 1974/75 indicates once again that in that 
year only debt outstanding to the FSS contributed to the explanation of 
debt outstanding to the Seed Store. In that year, unlike 1983/84, 
outstanding debt to the FSS appeared to contribute both to the question of 
whether a household was a potential borrower from the Seed Store, as well 
as the question of how much the household would borrow, if it was among 
such potential borrowers.
The values of the log likelihood functions for the two models in Table 
25 are considerably higher than the values observed in the Tobit models for 
the respective years. In Table 21, the log likelihood function for model 
1 took a vale of -245.02. The likelihood function for the double hurdle 
model for 1983/84 was -210.87, a considerable improvement. Similarly, the 
double hurdle model for 1974/75 obtained a value of the likelihood function 
of -350.00 compared with a value of -420.68 for model 1 in Table 23.
We have discussed elsewhere that the question of whether a household 
would borrow from the Seed Store or not is probably less related to the 
issue of rationing as opposed to one of whether a household chooses to 
borrow from this source. This finds some confirmation in the data, 
particularly for the later survey year, where rich and non-cultivating
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households are found to be less likely to be counted among potential 
borrowers from the Seed Store, and yet arguably such households are not 
rationed in any way from borrowing from this source.
8.2 Borrowing from the FSS
Examining the data on outstanding debt to the FSS requires care 
because of difficulties associated with the practice of "transfer entry" 
which could indicate the very rapid accumulation of debt to some households 
while not necessarily reflecting much new credit actually going to such 
households. It is difficult to assess the importance of the transfer entry 
component in a given household's outstanding debt. If social status is 
inversely related to the extent to which transfer entry is applied it 
possible that among the poor this component will be particularly important 
while among the rich will be less so.
In Table 26 we present results from the Tobit model for this segment 
in 1983/84. In the preferred model (model 2) we see that agricultural 
labour households who own some land have more debt outstanding to the FSS 
and that this relationship is quite significant statistically. We have 
seen in previous chapters on mobility and poverty that a household's 
involvement in agricultural labour is a useful indicator of chronic 
poverty. Poverty probably indicates at least latent demand for credit, but 
given lenders' concern for repayment those households regarded as 
chronically poor may well be thought unable to repay a loan. It is 
possible that the access of at least one sub-group of such households 
(those agricultural labour households which own some land) to credit 
suggests that within the group of agricultural labour households lenders 
consider that those with land are more likely to be poor because of 
temporary shortfall in income and have some means to lift themselves out 
of this condition. However, keeping the "transfer entry" practice in mind, 
it may also be that it is the poorest households among those officially 
entitled to borrow from the FSS (some landholding is required for access) 
who are most likely to run into repayment problems and then rapidly
259
accumulate large outstanding debts through fraudulent practices on the part 
of the FSS administrators.
In Table 26 we see further that the more income a household earns from 
cultivation, and the greater its income from regular employment outside of 
agriculture, the greater the outstanding debt to the FSS of that household. 
These two variables lend support to the argument that the FSS is a source 
of credit which benefits the better-off households in the village. 
Certainly the various transactions costs associated with borrowing from the 
FSS are thought to be more severe for poor households than for households 
which are ranked highly in the village in terms of income or status. This 
would reinforce the notion of the FSS being of greatest benefit to the 
well-off.
Interestingly, the murao dummy is negatively associated (albeit not 
in a strongly significant sense) with outstanding debt to the FSS in 
1983/84. We have argued that Muraos are among the best farmers in the 
village with the largest landholdings. They certainly earned the highest 
cultivation incomes in Palanpur. Hence it is striking that the parameters 
on the cultivation income variable and the murao dummy variable should be 
significant and have opposite signs. This finding also indicates that 
while Muraos have been active in the adoption of new technologies, they do 
not appear to have done this by incurring large outstanding debts to the 
FSS.
Model 2 in Table 26 rejects the null that a model with a simple 
constant term would have been adequate to describe debts to the FSS. While 
a LR test carried out between model 1 and model 2 fails to reject the null 
that a specification without the Murao dummy is sufficient, we have chosen 
to select model 2 as our preferred model because of the particular interest 
of this variable. Given that we will also consider an alternative model 
to the Tobit (see below) we wish to retain this variable to see whether it 
makes any further contribution. Note, both model 1 and model 2 fail to 
reject the null of homoscedasticity and thus provide consistent parameter
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estimates.
In Table 27 we compare the Tobit model with a probit model of the same 
specification. As in the case of the Seed Store segment of the market, we 
see that the relative (normalized) parameter estimates are not uniformly 
close to one. In particular, the relative estimates for the Murao dummy 
variable are far from one. Although we have seen that this dummy variable 
is not strongly significant, and therefore we may not be so concerned about 
this deviation, it does suggest that examining an alternative model is not 
unwarranted. We will examine results from the double-hurdle model for this 
segment below, but will first briefly look at this segment of the credit 
market in 1974/75.
In Table 28, the significance of the landed agricultural labour 
household variable which we observed for 1983/84 remains. The two income 
variables which were found to be positively and significantly related to 
debts outstanding to the FSS were not significant in 1974/75. In fact, 
even the sign on income from regular off-farm employment changed. We have 
seen in chapter 2 that in 1974/75 the correlation between regular job 
income and total income was not strongly positive, unlike in the later 
survey year. Hence, this income component does not reflect well the total 
income position within the village. The murao dummy in model 2 is still 
negative, but once again is not strongly significant. While debt to the 
FSS does not seem to be so strongly linked with economic status as in 
1983/84, the particular reluctance of Muraos to be indebted to this source 
is observed for both years. Model 2 in Table 28, as in Table 26, cannot 
reject the model without the murao dummy variable. Both models fail to 
reject the null of homoscedasticity and therefore provide consistent 
parameter estimates.
In Table 29 we compare the Tobit model with a probit model on the 
specification. For the 1974/75 survey year, these two models deviate quite 
sharply, indicating that an alternative to the Tobit is warranted.
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Table 3 0 presents results for the double hurdle model on the FSS 
segment for both 1974/75 and 1983/84. In the double hurdle model for 
1983/84, the dummy for landed agricultural labour is significant only in 
the first hurdle (implying that these households did not necessarily have 
such high outstanding debts to this source). Two variables which were 
found to influence the amount of debt outstanding to the FSS were household 
income from cultivation and income from regular off-farm employment. This 
indicates that FSS loans went mainly to large cultivating households, and 
to those households which enjoyed stable and high incomes from outside 
sources. For this year, the common observation that institutional credit 
goes mainly to the better off in rural areas finds support, while the 
poorest among eligible borrowers are the most inclined to borrow.
In the double hurdle model for 1974/75, landed agricultural labour 
households are less likely to be among potential borrowers (a negative and 
significant parameter estimate is obtained for this household 
characteristic in the first hurdle) , but are found to borrow more if they 
do succeed in borrowing. This is also the only variable found to exercise 
significant explanatory power in the model for 1974/75. It is difficult 
to account for this observation but one could speculate that at the time
of the earlier survey the FSS was concentrating its lending on the more
affluent households but that if a landed agricultural labour household was 
able to obtain credit from this source its high demand would result in a 
relatively large loan being made.
For both years the log likelihood functions for the double hurdle 
models represent a big improvement over the Tobit models examined. For the 
1983/84 survey year, the log likelihood function increased from -592.1 
(Table 26) to -545.98. For the 1974/75 survey year, the function increased 
from -603.1 to -544.25.
8.3 Borrowing from Other Formal Sector Sources
In Table 31 we present results from the Tobit model on borrowings from
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formal sector sources other than the Seed Store and FSS for 1983/84. The 
Tobit models reject the null of homoscedasticity and are therefore not 
consistent. However, model 1 was chosen as the preferred model because it 
appeared to suffer least from this problem. The two variables which had 
greatest influence on the size of debt to this source in model 1 are a 
Murao dummy and the number of agricultural machines held by a household. 
If a household was of the Murao caste it held significantly less 
outstanding debts to this source. However, the more machines owned by a 
household the more outstanding debt to this source would be observed. Once 
again, these results are striking because in Palanpur the Muraos are among 
those owning the greatest number of productive assets. It is therefore 
interesting that the data are able to make a sharp distinction between 
these two groups such that the parameter estimates of these two variables 
have opposite signs and are statistically significant. It seems that in 
1983/84, Muraos were able to finance their investment in agricultural 
machinery without having to borrow from either the FSS or other formal 
sector sources.
In Table 32 we compare the results obtained from the Tobit model above 
with a probit model on the same specification. We can see that for this 
segment of the credit market the normalized ratios of the parameter 
estimates are not far from one, and therefore there is some indication that 
the Tobit model may not be inappropriate here. Given though, that the Tobit 
model appeared to suffer from heteroskedasticity problems, it was still 
attempted to examine the double hurdle model. However, this model failed 
to converge for this segment (for both the 1983/84 and the 1974/75 survey 
year) and is therefore not presented here.
In Table 33 we see that in the Tobit model for borrowings from other 
formal sector in 1974/75 problems with heteroskedasticy also remain, and 
the parameter estimates are therefore not consistent. In addition, in this 
year, the various models examined were not able to provide significant 
additional explanatory power over and above a simple constant term. (Note 
however, that there are only 7 non-zero entries in this segment in
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1974/75). In Table 34 we experiment with various specifications in a 
probit model for this segment and find that the only variable which 
exercises significant explanatory power is a dummy variable representing 
whether a household follows modern agricultural practices. Model 1 in 
Table 34 suggests that the probability of holding outstanding debts to 
other formal sector sources is greater if the household cultivates in a 
capital intensive manner. This is not surprising as the loans from this 
source in 1974/75 were generally for the stated purpose of purchasing a 
pumpset or some other productive asset.
8.4 Borrowing from Urban Moneylenders in 1983/84
Table 34 presents results from Tobit models for debts outstanding to 
urban moneylenders in 1983/84. The preferred Tobit model on the likelihood 
of borrowing from urban moneylenders has as explanatory variables a dummy 
for Murao households and a dummy variable for agricultural labour 
households with land. Murao households held significantly greater 
outstanding debts to this source, and possible reasons for this have 
already been discussed in previous sections. An additional explanatory 
contribution (although not strongly significant) was made by the landed 
agricultural labour household dummy, taking the opposite sign. This 
finding emphasizes that such households, who are likely to be suffering 
from some short-fall in income (hence their involvement in this 'last 
resort' occupation) and who are likely to have at least some latent demand 
for credit, do not borrow from this source. This may also suggest that 
urban moneylenders' collateral requirements are quite specific and do not 
include land. Note that all of the models presented in Table 35 reject the 
null of homoscedasticity and the parameter estimates are therefore not 
consistent.
In Table 36, we see that a comparison of results from the Tobit model 
and the probit yields relative parameter estimates which are quite close 
to 1. This suggests that the Tobit model may not be a bad way to portray 
debts outstanding to urban moneylenders. While it was attempted
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nonetheless to examine an alternative model, the double hurdle model for 
this segment failed to converge, and can therefore not be presented.
8.5 Borrowing from Village Moneylenders
In Table 37 the Tobit models for 1983/84 indicate that the most 
significant explanatory variables on the amount of outstanding debt to 
village moneylenders are land cultivated, landed agricultural labour 
households, rupees borrowed from the FSS, and productive assets (either 
livestock owned, or machinery). On the basis of standard error and failure 
to reject homoscedasticity, model 5 performs better than model 4, and is 
therefore preferred. Prosperity is negatively related to the amount 
borrowed, but this contribution is not strongly significant in a 
statistical sense when other explanatory variables are included. On the 
whole, the amount of outstanding debt appears to be closely linked to 
ability to repay once we have controlled for the fact that the most 
affluent in the village are less likely to borrow from this source.
In Table 38 we compare the preferred Tobit model with a probit. 
Relative parameter estimates (after normalization) are in some cases quite 
close to one, although in particular for the prosperity variable and rupees 
outstanding to the FSS, the ratio is rather far from one. The 
consideration of an alternative model may not be unwarranted.
In the Tobits for 1974/75, homoscedasticity is rejected by all models. 
In addition, only some of the variables found to contribute explanatory 
power in 1983/84 were also exercising a similar influence in the earlier 
survey year. In model 5, the explanatory variable representing income rank 
was significantly and negatively related to the amount of outstanding debt 
held by households to village moneylenders. Land cultivated and machines 
owned made a somewhat less significant contribution but the direction of 
influence remained the same as in 1983/84. In the case of the landless 
agricultural labour dummy variable the sign in 1974/75 was the opposite 
from what was observed in 1983/84. While in the later survey years such
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households tended to have greater outstanding debts to this source, in 
1974/7 5 the opposite appeared to be the case (although this relationship 
is not strongly significant). This represents an interesting change of 
operation in this segment, and may suggest that over time rationing of poor 
households from alternative sources has become more pervasive such that 
they are compelled to resort to borrowing in this high-cost segment.
In Table 40 we see that the Tobit model does not appear to be a wholly 
satisfactory way in which to describe outstanding debts to village 
moneylenders in 1974/75. As with the 1983/84 data, examination of an 
alternative model seems to be warranted.
Two alternate specifications for the double hurdle model are reported 
for the two years as problems of heteroskedasticity in some specifications 
reduced the robust t-statistics of some variables to the point that they 
lost statistical significance. In Table 41 none of the double hurdle model 
parameter estimates (based on model 5 in Table 37) for 1983/84 are 
significant, although for 1974/75 this specification does yield some 
significant variables. Interestingly, in 1974/75 prosperity is seen to 
have a negative, and weakly significant impact in the first hurdle 
representing whether households are potential borrowers from village 
moneylenders. In the second hurdle the sign on this variable becomes 
positive although it is not significant. This might suggest that while 
richer households were less likely to consider borrowing from this source, 
if they did they would be able to borrow more than other households. 
Certainly, a proxy for ability to repay a loan such as land cultivated is 
positive and strongly significant in this second hurdle. Rupees 
outstanding to the FSS are also found to contribute positively in a 
strongly significant manner to the amount that households are indebted to 
village moneylenders. It is perhaps reasonable for village moneylenders 
to consider access to other sources of credit as some form of guarantee 
that they will receive repayment of their loans. This would plausibly be 
the case if they felt that they would receive priority in repayments from
266
borrowers^.
In the specification reported in Table 42, the double hurdle model for 
the 1983/84 data indicates that the importance of prosperity is more 
significant in the second hurdle than in the first, although the sign of
this variable does change in the two hurdles as found in Table 41. In
addition, landed agricultural labour households are more indebted to 
village moneylenders, as are households with larger operational 
landholdings. The insignificance of the variable for outstanding debt to 
the FSS may be related to the fact that in 1983/84 debt outstanding to the 
FSS is less clearly linked to ability to repay a moneylender loan (due to 
the transfer entry mechanism). As the value of livestock owned by a 
household rises, it will tend to borrow less from village moneylenders. 
For the 1974/75 data, the specification in Table 42 yields roughly the same 
insights as found in Table 41.
8.6 Interest-Free Borrowing in 1983/84
The final segment of the credit market to be considered is debt 
outstanding to interest free sources. In Table 43 we consider results for 
Tobit models for this segment in 1983/84. As we have seen that this is 
essentially a new development compared to 1974/75 we present only results 
for the later survey year. All of the models reported reject the null of 
homoscedasticity and are therefore not consistent. Model 2 is taken as the 
preferred model as it registers the greatest improvement in the value of 
the log likelihood function over the model with a constant term only. The 
variables which exercise the greatest influence on outstanding debts to
this source include a dummy variable for those households with regular
outside employment, and a dummy for those households among the bottom 20%
. This point has been made by several authors. Taylor and Walker 
(1991) found that in the Akola villages of the ICRISAT study 10% of 
borrowers in the formal sector used their first loans entirely to repay 
moneylenders. Similarly, Bell, Srinivasan and Udry (1991) stress that if 
the moneylender is in a position to exercise first claim on the returns 
produced by borrower's activities, the institutional loan will improve the 
moneylender's expected returns from his loan.
267
in terms of apparent prosperity (although not in a strongly significant 
way) . Both these variables increase the amount a household of debt a 
household will hold to friends and relatives. The more a household owes 
to village moneylenders, the more they will also owe to friends and 
relatives a zero interest.
In Table 44 we compare model 2 of the Tobits with a probit of the same 
specification and while some of the relative parameter estimates are close 
to one, the variable representing outstanding debts to village moneylenders 
does not perform so well in this respect. We therefore examine the double 
hurdle model as an alternative to the Tobit model.
In the double hurdle model in Table 45 we see that the household 
characteristic of a regular outside job dummy was not significant in the 
first hurdle. In the second hurdle we see that the regular outside 
employment dummy positively influenced the amount that a household would 
borrow from friends and relatives. Additional significant explanatory 
power was exercised in the second hurdle by the amount outstanding to 
village moneylenders. It may be that households in some form of distress 
would borrow as much as possible from interest free sources and would also 
turn to the high-cost village moneylenders where necessary. This finding 
also suggests that interest free-credit was mainly available to households 
who also had access to village moneylenders, i.e. who would be judged by 
village moneylenders as being capable of repayment.
The double hurdle model for this segment does not yield much 
improvement in the value of the log likelihood function over the Tobit 
model. In Table 43 we see that the value of the log likelihood function 
for the specification considered was -218.9. This improved only to -198.67 
with the double hurdle model (Table 45) and this model therefore performs 
only slightly better than the Tobit model in describing outstanding debts 
in this segment.
9. Conclusions
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In a recent contribution to the World Bank Economic Review, Aleem 
(1990) drew attention to six key characteristics widely observed in credit 
markets in developing countries. These included: segmentation in market 
structure; lack of specialization by informal market intermediaries; 
interlinkages of loan and commodity contracts in informal markets; 
dominance of non-institutional money markets; limited access of smaller 
borrowers to institutional credit; and the absence of security in loan 
contracts given by informal lenders. As we review our observations on the 
Palanpur credit market it is useful to examine how well the Palanpur credit 
market fits these 'stylized facts'. We have seen that in Palanpur the 
credit market is strongly segmented with the terms and conditions for loans 
in the different segments clearly distinguishable from each other. In 
Palanpur, there is little evidence that within a particular sector interest 
rates vary dramatically across borrowers. It would be interesting to 
discover whether this is also true in general.
In the informal sector in Palanpur we have seen that no moneylender 
is completely specialized in this activity, and therefore the credit market 
in Palanpur also fits this stylized fact quite closely. However, with 
respect to the next characteristic, Palanpur does appear to differ from 
what is claimed to be typically observed^ ®. There is no evidence of loan 
and commodity interlinkages in Palanpur. Bell (1990) has suggested that 
we should expect to find loan-commodity interlinkages in the more 
commercialized parts of India, but in this respect too, Palanpur offers a 
contrasting picture. There is a high degree of commercialization in the 
region in which Palanpur is located, and certainly agriculture in this 
region has undergone dramatic technological change since the 1960s, yet 
there is no evidence of traders lending to farmers at all.
In Palanpur it is not certain that the non-institutional money market 
is the dominating sector, at least on the basis of debt outstanding. 
However, given the problems in describing flows of credit when we are
Although we have pointed to other village studies in India which 
also fail to meet this 'stylized fact'.
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compelled to examine stocks such as debt, plus strong evidence that 
outstanding debt to the most important formal sector source is overstated, 
the fourth 'stylized fact' is not implausible in Palanpur. The final two 
characteristic of credit markets in developing countries also find support 
in the evidence for Palanpur (although the poor did have some access to 
institutional credit, and one segment in the informal credit market did 
have collateral requirements) . On the basis of the six 'key'
characteristics listed above, the Palanpur market does not appear to be 
markedly dissimilar from many credit markets elsewhere in the developing 
world.
We now turn to a brief review of the broad changes in the credit 
market in Palanpur between 1974/75 and 1983/84. Between these two survey 
years the credit market in Palanpur reflected important aspects of change 
as well as others of remarkable stability. The importance of credit, 
measured as debts outstanding at a particular time, appears to have risen 
dramatically. This is not only the consequence of a rapid increase in the 
availability of credit from formal sources. In fact debts outstanding to 
the private sector have risen nearly as fast as those to the formal sector. 
Debts to the formal sector, and to the FSS in particular, have risen not 
only because of a rise in lending by these institutions, but also because 
of the rapid accumulation of debts as a result of fraudulent practices 
associated with the repayment and rolling over of debts. This suggests 
that while some increase in lending from this sector did take place between 
the two surveys, it was not as dramatic as the simple examination of 
figures on outstanding debts would indicate.
Private sector lending within Palanpur did not increase between 
1974/75 and 1983/84 in real terms. Significantly, however, it did not 
decline either and there is little evidence of a displacement of village 
moneylending by the expansion of formal sector credit sources. Interest 
rates on loans from village moneylenders rose over the period studied. 
This may be the consequence of expanding borrowing opportunities elsewhere 
for the better off, leading to higher default risk for the village
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moneylenders.
Two new sources of private sector credit emerged between 1974/75 and 
1983/84. First, interest free credit from friends and relatives, 
frequently outside relations linked by marriage to villagers, emerged as 
a significant new source of credit. The importance of interest-free credit 
within the village remained minor, and rarely did related households within 
the village lend to one another. The second new source of private sector 
credit was the emergence of urban moneylenders who were willing to lend 
money at interest rates between those charged by formal sector sources and 
village moneylenders. These lenders were pawnshop owners in nearby towns 
who demanded gold and silver jewelry with a greater value than the loan as 
security.
From the econometric analysis in the various segments of the village 
credit market, the different attractions and accessibility of different 
households to the segments becomes more apparent. A major difficulty in 
econometrical examining data on outstanding debt is the treatment of zeros. 
It is possible that these have been generated because some households 
simply choose not to borrow from a particular source, given the price of 
the loans. Alternatively, they may reflect the fact that some households 
with certain characteristics may never borrow from that source (either 
because they are never able to, or they never want to) . The double hurdle 
model, a more general formulation in which the standard Tobit model is 
nested, allows us to examine this possibility explicitly. From this it 
became apparent that prosperous and non-cultivating households were less 
likely to want to borrow loans in kind from the Seed Store, but if they 
chose to borrow from this source, they were able to borrow more than other 
households. Similarly, while landed agricultural labour households were 
more likely to turn to the FSS for loans, the rich in Palanpur (both 
cultivating households as well as households with outside jobs) were able 
to borrow the most from this source. The double hurdle model for the 
village moneylender segment confirmed that prosperous households were less 
likely to borrow from this high-cost source. On the other hand the model
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also lent support to the idea that moneylenders would lend more to 
households which were well-off and which were able to borrow from 
institutional sources (thereby less likely to default). Further results 
from the econometrics revealed the high incidence among households of the 
Murao caste in the urban moneylender segment (as well as their reluctance 
to be indebted to institutional sources - despite their success in adopting 
new agricultural technologies), and the importance of outside employment 
and access to village moneylenders for households able to borrow at zero 
interest from friends and relatives.
Between 1974/75 and 1983/84 the burden of debt of households in 
Palanpur increased drastically. For the village as a whole, per capita 
indebtedness roughly doubled, but this masks considerable variation between 
the castes. The richest caste in Palanpur registered the smallest increase 
in per capita debts. Although the poorest caste roughly doubled its per 
capita indebtedness, some of the middle-ranked castes registered a near 
quadrupling of per capita debts. Per capita debt as a proportion of per 
capita income became particularly high for Jatabs, Dhimars and Passis.
Per capita debts were only loosely rising with income ranking in the 
village within any one year. In 1974/75, as a percentage of per capita 
income, per capita debt of the poorest quintile was less than 25% and this 
declined to around one tenth for the richest quintile. By 1983/84 a 
dramatic increase in the debt burden of all fractiles was observed, 
particularly for the poorest quintile. On the basis of landholdings, 
outstanding per capita debt as a percentage of per capita income increased 
dramatically for all but the largest landholding classes, and particularly 
for the landless class. Only the largest landholding class saw their 
proportion of per capita debt to per capita income decline from 10% to 6%. 
While the landless had outstanding debts of Rs 93 0 to the public sector in 
1974/75, this amount had risen to 37,942 in 1983/84.
In light of this evidence it may be of interest to review the 
position of the poor in the Palanpur credit market. Does the sharply
272
rising debt burden of the poor indicate that the credit market is providing
\
an effective cushion against hardship? We have discussed in some detail 
at various points in this chapter the operation of the "transfer-entry" 
mechanism for loans from the FSS. We have seen that this phenomenon can 
result in the very rapid accumulation of outstanding debt for affected 
households, and that it need not represent any new lending by this 
particular institution. It is very likely that those households most 
disadvantaged in the village through low status, inability to pay bribes, 
lack of education, etc., are also the most vulnerable to this type of 
systematic abuse. We have argued that the Seed Store represents a source 
of lending which can potentially benefit the poor because the amounts are 
small, it has easily understood terms which are relatively low (at least 
if we take rupees as the numerary) , and it is less likely to be monopolized 
by the rich who have little use for loans in kind^^. However, between 
1974/75 and 1983/84 lending from this segment diminished, and therefore in 
this respect too, the poor in Palanpur may have become worse off.
Between 1974/75 and 1983/84 interest rates on loans from village 
moneylenders have tended to rise. It has been argued that this could well 
be a consequence of the expansion of institutional lending into the region. 
If new lending from the low-cost institutional sources does not go to the 
poor, then they will be facing higher interest rates on credit from village 
moneylenders (in so far that moneylenders will actually lend to them) and 
once again the poor can be seen to have become worse off. Finally we have 
seen that the two new sources of credit in the informal sector of Palanpur 
are also not tapped by the poor in the village. Borrowing from urban 
moneylenders requires collateral in the form of jewelry, and borrowing from 
friends and relatives pre-supposes the existence of friends and relatives 
with surpluses to lend. Despite the degree of change we observe in 
comparing outstanding debts between the two survey years, we are unable to
. Of course they could borrow seed in kind, sell it on the market, 
put the money to the use they wish, then at repayment time purchase the 
seed needed to repay on the market. However, it is not probable that many 
of the more affluent households felt that such a round about manner of 
borrowing was really worthwhile.
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point to any evidence that the poor have increased access to credit in the 
later survey year relative to 1974/75.
274
Table 1
COMPARISON OF BASIC INDICATORS FOR 1974/75 AND 1983/84 BY CASTE
Caste 1974/75 1983/84
No. of 
households
No. of 
individuals
Per
Capita
Income*
Av. land
Holding
(bighas)
Av. land 
Cultivated 
(bighas)
No. of 
households
No. of 
individuals
Av. Per
Capita
Income
Av. land
Holding
(bighas)
Av. ; 
Cultii 
(high
Thakur 25 174 1757 30 26 30 217 1119 25 19
Murao 27 178 1812 37 29 27 217 1265 40 41
Dhimar 8 59 1103 11 19 13 74 1026 5 12
Gadaria 10 68 1247 18 18 12 83 1112 16 15
Dhobi 3 22 934 19 18 4 27 921 5 15
Teli 12 71 1064 7 18 16 92 784 6 12
Passi 8 61 1508 13 13 15 85 1202 9 7
Jatab 14 97 994 14 21 19 118 436 11 12
Other 4 27 1117 5 1 7 47 1023 2 3
VILLAGE 111 757 1444 23 22 143 960 1025 18 19
Gini Coefficient 0.253» 0.47 0.43 0.307» 0.57 0.60
LT)
r-
CN
* Ail 1974/75 income figures are expressed in 1983/84 rupees.
** The Gini coefficient for per capita income is calculated for individual incomes, not household per capita income. For land 
ownership and land cultivated, the figures are for household landholdings.
Source
Table 2
VILLAGE DEBT BY SOURCE IN 1974/75*
Amount Due by Palanpur Households^
Cash Wheat® Total
(RS) (RS) (Rs)
Public Lending 99,335 16,327 115,663
institutions (73) (95) (76)
Private Sources 36,692 838 37,530
inside Palanpur (27) (5) (24)
ALL SOURCES 136,027 17,166 153,193
• All cash figures are expressed in 1983 rupees (see text.
® Percentage distribution in brackets.
® Wheat has been valued at Rs 1.30 per kg (prior to deflatj
the post-harvest price in 1974/75.
TOTAL VILLAGE DEBT BY SOURCE IN 1983/84
Source Amount Due by Palanpur Households"
Cash Wheat^ Total
(RS) (Rs) (Rs)
Public Lending 330,157 9,450 339,607
institutions (80) (62) (79)
Private Sources 32,564 5,695 38,259
inside Palanpur (8) (38) (9)
Private Sources 51,997 0 51,997
outside Palanpur (13) (0) (12)
ALL SOURCES 414,718 15,145 429,863
(100) (100) (100)
* Percentage distribution in brackets.
* Wheat has been valued at Rs 1.35 per kg, the post-harvest price in 
1983/84.
Source
VILLAGE DEBT INCURRED DURING 1983/84 ONLY BY SOURCE 
Amount Due by Palanpur Households*
Cash Wheat^ Total
(RS) (RS) (RS)
Public Lending 18,221 9,450 27,671
institutions (43) (71) (49)
Private Sources 8,253 3,795 12,048
inside Palanpur (19) (29) (22)
Private Sources 16,225 0 16,225
outside Palanpur (38) (0) (29)
ALL SOURCES 42,729 13,245 55,974
(100) (100) (100)
* Percentage distribution in brackets.
 ^ Wheat has been valued at Rs 1.35 per kg, the post-harvest price in 
1983/84.
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Table 3
VILLAGE DEBT BY RATE OF INTEREST IN 1974/75*
Rate of Amount due bv Palanpur households
interest at the stated rate of interest (Rs)
(% per year) To public To Private Unknown Total
institutions lenders
0 0 1,956 0 1,956
1 1,473 0 0 1,473
7 5,588 0 0 5,588
10 5,867 0 0 5,867
11 6,985 0 0 6,985
13 78,293 0 0 78,293
24 0 4,680 0 4,680
25 0 15,646 0 15,646
36 0 10,547 0 10,547
50 0 1,537 0 1,537
25% in kind^ 11,169 0 0 11,169
unknown® 6,287 0 3,164 9,452
TOTAL 115,663 37,530 3,164 153,193
“ All debt is in cash figures expressed in 1983/84 rupees (see text, footnote 1).
* Wheat loans obtainable at the beginning of the rabi season. and to be repaid
after the rabi harvest with 25% interest in kind.
® Due either to the interest rate being unspecified by the lender or to the
borrower being unaware of the terms of the loan, or to incomplete responses.
VILLAGE DEBT BY RATE OF INTEREST IN 1983/84
Rate of Amount due bv Palanpur households
interest at the state rate of interest (Rs)
(% per year) To public To Private Total
institutions lenders
0 0 21,826 21,826
9 28,169 0 28,169
11 2,255 0 2,255
12 286,195 300 286,495
13 2,847 0 2,847
15 324 0 324
16 1,769 0 1,769
17 1,159 0 1,159
18 1,000 0 1,000
19 0 300 300
20 0 4,000 4,000
24 0 300 300
25 0 1,250 1,250
30 0 4,490 4,490
36 0 16,764 16,764
37 0 1,400 1,400
40 0 7,701 7,701
42 0 2,229 2,229
60 0 10,081 10,081
120 0 520 520
180 0 598 598
240 0 2,857 2,857
300 0 78 78
25% in kind" 9,450 0 9,450
50% in kind** 0 5,695 5,695
usufruct® 0 1,660 1,660
unknown^ 6,439 8,207 14,646
TOTAL 339,607 90,256 429,863
* Wheat loans obtainable at the beginning of the rabi season. and to be repaid
after the rabi harvest with 25% interest in kind.
* Wheat loans available at any time before the rabi harvest. and to be repaid
after the rabi harvest with 50% interest in kind.
® In lieu of (charging interest, the lender cultivates a plot of land belonging
to the borrower until the loan is repaid.
Due either to the interest rate being unspecified by the lender or to the 
borrower being unaware of the terms of the loan, or to incomplete responses.
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Table 4
SYNOPTIC LIST OF CREDIT SOURCES IN 1974/75
Credit Source
Friends and 
Relatives
Public
Institutions
Village Money 
Lending
Other
Typical Range 
of Interest Rates
(% per year)
0
7-13
24-50
unknown
Total Debt 
Outstanding* 
(Rs.)
1,956
115,663
32,410
3,164
Collateral
Requirements
None
None, as long 
as eligibility 
conditions are 
satisfied
None
unknown
Elibility
Conditions
Privileged bond 
with the lender
Depend on the scheme; 
may include owning land.
To the discretion of the 
lender
unknown
All debt is in cash figures expressed in 1983/84 rupees. 00
<N
SYNOPTIC LIST OF CREDIT SOURCES IN 1983/84
Credit Source
Friends and 
Relatives
Public
Institutions
Urban Money 
Lending
Village Money 
Lending
Other
Typical Range 
of Interest Rates
(% per year)
9-18
30-36 
36-60 
not available
Total Debt 
Outstanding 
(Rs. )
21,826
333,168
25,460
34,763
14,646
Collateral
Requirements
None
None, as long 
as eligibility 
conditions are 
satisfied
Gold or Silver 
Usually none 
not available
Elibility
Conditions
Privileged bond 
with the lender
Depend on the scheme; 
may include owning land.
None, as long as 
collatoral is provided
To the discretion of the 
lender
various
Table 5
DISTRIBUTION OF DEBTS OUTSTANDING BY SOURCE IN 1974/75*
Source Total debts outstanding fRs)^
Cash Kind Total
Public Institutions 99,335 16,327 115,663
(73) (95) (76)
Palanpur Money-lenders 31,642 768 32,410
(23) (4) (21)
Friends and Relatives 1,886 70 1,956
(1) (1) (1)
Other sources® 3,164 0 3,164
(2) (0) (2)
TOTAL 136,027 17,166 153,193
All debt is in cash figures expressed in 1983/84 rupees (see text, footnote 1) 
Percentage distribution in brackets.
Due to incomplete responses.
DISTRIBUTION1 OF DEBTS OUTSTANDING BY SOURCE IN 1983/84*
Source Total debts outstanding (Rs)**
Cash Kind Total
Public Institutions 323,718 9,450 333,168
(78) (62) (78)
Palanpur Money-lenders 29,068 5695 34,763
(7) (38) (8)
Friends and Relatives 21,826 0 21,826
(5) (0) (5)
Urban Moneylenders 25,460 0 25,460
(6) (0) (6)
Other Sources® 14,646 0 14,646
(4) (0) (3)
TOTAL 414,718 15,145 429,863
(100) (100) (100)
* All debt is in cash figures 
 ^ Percentage distribution in
expressed in 1983/84 
brackets.
rupees.
Due to incomplete responses.
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Table 6
VILLAGE DEBT BY RATE OF INTEREST IN 1974/75, DISTINGUISHING 
BETWEEN FOUR BROAD SOURCES*
Rate of interest
(% per year)
Amount due by Palanpur Households
(RS)
not available 
FRIENDS AND RELATIVES 
0%
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
1% to 13%
25% in kind 
unknown^*
VILLAGE MONEY-LENDERS
25% and below 
36%
50%
TOTAL
3,164
1,956
98,207
11,169
6,287
20,326
10,547
1,537
153,193
All debt is expressed in 1983/84 rupees (see text, footnote 1).
Due either to the interest rate being unspecified by the lender or to the 
borrower being unaware of the terms of the loan, or to incomplete 
responses.
Due to incomplete responses.
VILLAGE DEBT BY RATE OF INTEREST IN 1983/84, DISTINGUISHING 
BETWEEN FOUR BROAD SOURCES
Rate of interest
(% per year)
Amount due by Palanpur Households
(Rs)
not available 
FRIENDS AND RELATIVES
0%
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
9% to 18%
25% in kind
URBAN MONEY-LENDERS
30% (gold collatoral)
36% (silver collatoral) 
other
VILLAGE MONEY-LENDERS
below 37%
37% (old traditional system) 
40-42% (previous standard)
50% in kind
60% (new standard)
above 60% (only gambling loans)
usufruct mortgage
14,646
21,826
323,718
9,450
4,490
15,670
5,300
2,944
1,300
9,930
5,695
9,581
3,653
1,660
TOTAL 429,863
2 8 0
Table 7
INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT IN PALANPUR IN 1974/75 AND 1983/84
Source
Farmers' Service 
Society (FSS) and 
Seed Store
Land Development Bank 
Cane Society
Prathma Bank
TOTAL
Total Amount 
due by Palanpur 
Households (RsT
1974/75"
89,462
24,727
1,474
115,663
1983/84
244,795
24,738
0
70,070
339,607
Remarks
Government-assisted cooperative aiming to promote 
cultivation by lending to its shaure-holders (recruited 
among land-owning cultivators). Seed Store gives small loans of 
wheat at the time of sowing, mainly to small and marginal farmers.
Government-owned rural bank; gives large cash loans for agricultural 
investment.
Organization responsible for the collection and processing of 
sugarcane. Reported one outstanding cash loan to a Palanpur villager 
in 1974/75.
Government-owned rural bank; mainly oriented towards the promotion 
of agriculture and related activities ; started issuing a large number 
of IRDP loans in Palanpur in 1985.
00
CN
All 1974/75 debt is in cash figures expressed in 1983/84 rupees (see text, footnote 1).
Table 8
THE FARMERS' SERVICE SOCIETY <FSS) AND THg SCHEDULED CASTES
Name Details of FSS loanfsK as reported In 1983/84
Mangli
Naubat
Danni
Lila Dhar
Lochan
Chander
Gangu
and Sompal
Borrowed 100 kgs of wheat (approximate value Rs. 130 at current prices fd)out 
8 years ago. Repaid at least 3 installments (Rs. 600 total). Current balance 
according to FSS records: Rs. 2,143.
Borrowed one bag of fertilizer 5-6 years ago (approximate value Rs 120 at 
current prices). Repaid at least 4 installments (Rs. 850 total). Current 
balance as per FSS records: Rs. 2,943. Last year the FSS staff told him that 
his debt was Rs. 3,600; he came back with a literate Murao friend (grandson 
of a former village headman), and they were then told that the debt was only 
Rs. 2,700 after all.
Borrowed Rs 50 in 1960. Repaid many installments (including Rs. 800 during 
the last 2 years). Current balance as per FSS records: Rs. 3,523.
Borrwoed Rs. 50 around 1960. Repaid many installments (including Rs. 300 last 
year). Current balance as per FSS records: Rs. 983.
Outstanding debt of Rs. 8,000. Details not available.
Sold land to repay one RSS debt. Another debt of Rs 2,669 remains (inherited 
from father).
Borrowed Rs. 140 about 20 years ago. Rs. 1,900 were repaid about 10 years 
later, but no receipt was given. In 1983/84 they sold property and liquidated 
the loan by paying another Rs. 5,500.
Note t Between 1960 and 1983/84, the price level in Palanpur increased by a factor 
of roughly five. All the borrowers are poor labourers or marginal farmers, 
and all are illiterate.
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Table 9
DISTRIBUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL DEBT BY INCOME CLASS IN 1974/75
Quintlle of 
the 1^74/75
fer-caplta ncome scale
Number of Loans which
were outstanding to
the Seed Store in 1974/75*
Number of Loans which 
were outstanding to 
other Institutional
Poorest 8 (7) 3
2 15 (14) 44
3 15 (14) 35
4 14 (13) 36
Richest 10 (10) 28
TOTAL 62 (58) 166
* The number of households which had loans outstanding is in brackets. 
 ^ This includes loans from the FSS.
DISTRIBUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL DEBT BY INCOME CLASS IN 1983/84
Quintlle of 
the 1983/84 
per-capita 
income scale
Number of Households 
with outstanding debts to 
the Seed Store in 1983/84
Number of Households 
with outstanding debts to 
other institutional 
sources*
Poorest 7 3
2 7 2
3 6 7
4 4 9
Richest 6 9
TOTAL 29 30
* This does not include loans from the FSS (for which the relevant data are
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Table 10
OUTSTANDING LOANS OF REGULAR MONEY LENDERS IN 1974/75 BY CASTE*
Caste of Interest Rate Total
borrower Outstandinq
0% 25% 36% 50%
Thakur 0 0 0 0 0
Murao 140 5588 1397 279 7404
Dhimar 0 0 0 0 0
Gadaria 0 0 1118 0 1118
Dhobi 0 0 0 0 0
Teli 0 0 699 0 699
Passi 0 4401 908 0 5308
Jatab 0 1327 1538 978 3841
Other 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 140 11316 5658 1257 18370
" All figures are in cash terms and are expressed in 1983/84 rupees.
OUTSTANDING LOANS OF FOUR REGULAR MONEY-LENDERS IN 1983/84
Name Total value of loans outstandinq (Rs) Total Number
of loans
Interest- 
free loans
loans 
in kind
Interst- 
bearing 
cash loans*
All
loans
Gulabo 450 361 6,363 (50%) 7,024 19
Harpal 500 203 3,058 (37%) 3,261 6
Mohan 734 2,795 1,144 (27%) 4,423 19
Nisar** 366 1,053 800 (n/a)® 2,219 10
TOTAL 2,050 3,891 11,365 (44%) 18,332 54
“ In brackets, the average interest rate charged on interest-bearing cash loans (with each 
loan being given equal weight in the averaging calculation). It should be borne in mind that 
differences in these interest rates between lenders reflect partly different lending 
strategies, and partly also differences in the dates at which loans were issued (with more 
recent loans typically bearing higher rates of interest).
 ^ Although Nisar was interviewed shortly after the harvest, by which time all his loans in 
kind (except one) had be repaid, this table describes his credit position prior to the 
harvest.
Instead of charging interest on this loan, Nisar has obtained the right to cultivate a plot 
of land belonging to the borrower until the loan is repaid (this is a system referred to as 
"usufruct mortgage").
Note : This table includes interest-free loans (counted elsewhere as coming from "friends and
relatives").
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Table 11
CASTE DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS OF ANY VTT.T.4GB MONEYLENDER IN 197 A/7 S 
AT A POSITIVE RATE OF INTEREST
Caste No. of Households Number of Households with Debts Outstanding to
Thakur 25
Village Moneylenders 
24% 25% 36%
2 0
50% TOTAL"'" 
0 0 2 (8%)
Murao 27 0 4 2 1 7 (25%)
Dhimar 8 4 0 1 0 5 (63%)
Gadaria 10 1 0 1 0 2 (20%)
Dhobi 3 0 0 0 0 0 (0%)
Teli 12 0 2 2 0 4 (33%)
Passi 8 0 3 2 0 4 (50%)
Jatab 14 0 4 5 4 8 (57%)
Other 4 0 0 0 0 0 (0%)
TOTAL 111 7 13 13 5 32 (29%)
The number of households in the row totals need not correspond to the sum 
of the columns entries in that row because seme households may have more 
than one debt outstanding.
In brackets, the percentage of all households in the respective caste.
CASTE DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS OP awY VTT.T.&OB MOWKYLENPER IN 1983/84 
No. of HouseholdsCaste Number of Households with Debts Outstanding to 
Village Moneylenders
"Daur"
loans
Cash
loans
(r<5%)
Cash
loans
(r-5%)
Other
terms'
All
Terms^
Thakur 30 3 1 0 1 5(17%)
Murao 27 1 2 1 1 5(19%)
Dhimar 13 1 3 0 2 3(23%)
Gadaria 12 0 1 0 1 2(17%)
Dhobi 4 1 0 0 0 1(25%)
Teli 16 2 5 3 1 7(44%)
Passi 15 1 1 2 4 5(33%)
Jatab 19 7 0 0 0 7(37%)
Other 7 1 0 0 1 2(29%)
TOTAL 143 17 13 6 11 37(26%)
• Interest rates above 5% (gamblings-related loans), not available, or taking the from of
cultivation of land ("usufruct" mortgage).
The entries in this column are not necessarily the row total, since row totals would involve 
double-counting of households with several debts outstanding under different terms. In brackets, 
the percentage of all households in the relevant caste.
Note: r denotes the monthly rate of interest (interest-free loans are excluded from this table).
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Table 12
DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS OF ANY VILLAGE MONEYLENDER 
BY LAND OWNERSHIP
Landownership 
class (bighas)
No. of 
Households
Number of Households with debt 
outstanding to any village moneylenders
24% 25% 36% 50% TOTAL"^
0 10 0 0 1 0 1 (10%)
0-5 12 3 1 1 1 5 (41%)
5-15 24 2 6 6 1 13 (54%)
15-30 42 2 3 3 3 9 (21%)
30-50 9 0 2 1 0 2 (22%)
50+ 14 0 1 1 0 2 (14%)
ALL SIZES 111 7 13 13 5 32 (29%)
The number of households in the row totals need not correspond to the sum of the columns entries 
in that row because some households may have more than one debt outstanding.
In brackets, the percentage of all households in the respective class.
DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS OF ANY VILLAGE MONEYLENDER 
BY LAND OWNERSHIP IN 1983784
Land 
ownershii
No. of Households
snlp 
class tSighas)
Number of Households with Debts Outstanding to 
Village Moneylenders
"Daur*
loans
0 27 3
0 - 5 19 1
5 - 1 5 35 5
15 - 30 36 7
30 - 50 15 1
50+ 11 0
TOTAL 143 17
Cash
loans
(r<5%)
Cash
loans
(r-5%)
Other All 
terms* Terms^
3 2 2 6(22%)
2 2 2 7(37%)
2 0 2 8(23%)
3 1 3 11(31%)
3 1 2 5(33%)
0 0 0 0(0%)
13 6 11 37(26%)
available, or taking the from of
total, since row totals would involve
cultivation of land ("usufruct" mortgage).
^ The entries in this column are not necessarily the 
double-counting of households with several debts out 
the percentage of all households in the relevant landholding class.
Note; r denotes the monthly rate of interest (interest-free loans are excluded from this table)
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Table 13
DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS OF ANY VILLAGE MONEYLENDER
BY PER CAPITA INCOME QUINTILES
Quintlles of the No. of Number■ of households with debt
Per Capita Income Households outstanding to any' yillaae
Scale moneylender
24% 25% 36% 50% TOTAL"^
poorest 23 5 2 3 2 11 (48%)
2 22 1 5 6 2 10 (45%)
3 22 0 1 1 0 2 (9%)
4 22 1 3 2 0 6 (27%)
richest 22 0 2 1 1 3 (14%)
ALL SIZES 111 7 13 13 5 32 (29%)
The number of households in the row totals need not correspond to the sum of the columns entries 
in that row because some households may have more than one debt outstanding.
In brackets, the percentage of all households in the respective quintile.
DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS OF ANY VILLAGE MONEYLENDER 
BY PER CAPITA INCOME QUINTILES IN l983>84*^
Quintlles of 
1983/84 per 
capita income
No. of Households Number of Households with Debts Outstandinq to Village 
Moneylenders
"Daur"
loans
Cash
loans
(r<5%)
Cash
loans
(r-5%)
Other
terms*
All
Terms*
poorest 31 7 (8) 1 (3) 1 (2) 1 (1) 9 (12)
2 28 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (1) 1 (2) 6 (6)
3 28 3 (3) 5 (7) 1 (1) 2 (4) 9 (10)
4 28 4 (3) 2 (0) 2 (2) 4 (2) 7 (5)
richest 28 1 (1) 3 (1) 0 (0) 3 (2) 6 (4)
TOTAL 143 17(17) 13(13) 6 (6) 11 (11) 37 (37)
• The numbers in brackets indicate the corresponding numbers when households are ranked by 
"apparent prosperity" rather than by per capita income in 1983/84 (see text for details).
Interest rates above 5% (gamblings-related loans), not available, or taking the from of 
cultivation of land ("usufruct" mortgage).
" The entries in this column are not necessarily the row total, since row totals would involve 
double-counting of households with several debts outstanding under different terms. In brackets, 
the percentage of all households in the relevant landholding class.
Note; r denotes the monthly rate of interest (interest-free loans are excluded from this table).
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Table 14
INTEREST-FREE CREDIT FROM FRIENDS AND RELATIVES IN 1983/84
Source Total debts 
outstandinq 
(RS)
Average 
value of 
loans 
(RS)
Total amount 
borrowed in 
1983/84"
(RS)
Outsiders :
relatives 
others 
TOTAL OUTSIDERS
17,250
1,080
18,330
1,150
360
1,018
2,950 (5)
1,100 (2 ) 
4,050 (7)
Palanpur:
regular moneylenders**
same caste 
other caste
others
same caste 
other caste
TOTAL PALANPUR
400
1,675
221
1,200
3,496
133
168
74
200
159
150
950
171
400
(1)
(4)
(2)
(1)
1,671 (8)
GRAND TOTAL 21,826
" Number of loans in brackets
546 5,721 (15)
* This group consists of six individuals who regularly issue interest- 
bearing loans.
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Table 15
DEBT FROM URBAN MONEY LENDERS BY CASTE
Caste
Thakur
Murao
Dhimar
Gadaria
Dhobi
Teli
Passi
Jatab
Other
TOTAL
No. of Loans*
3 (3)
8 (8)
1 (1)
1 (1)
1 (1 )
5 (3)
3 (3)
1 (1)
1 (1)
24 (22)
Rs♦ Outstandinq 
(% of Total)
900
(4)
8,940
(35)
200
(1)
615
(2)
670
(3)
6,375
(25)
5,900
(23)
1,360
(5)
500
(2)
25,460
Purpose
marriage
marriage,
farming
medicines
bullock
land
purchase
marriage, 
she-buffalo, 
land purchase
medicines 
not available
farming
expenses
The number of households in brackets.
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Table 16
REAL AMOUNT OF DEBT OUTSTANDING BY CASTE AND SOURCE IN 1974/75*
Caste LPB Cane
Societv
FSS and 
Seed store
Private Total Per Capita Per Capita 
Indebtedness* Income
Thakur 5,867
(13%)
1,474
(3%)
32,016
(70%)
6,238
(14%)
45,595
(100%)
262 1,757
Murao 12,573
(35%)
0 11,963
(34%)
11,106
(31%)
35,642
(100%)
200 1,812
Dhimar 6,287
(43%)
0 5,786
(40%)
2,445
(17%)
14,517
(100%)
246 1,102
Gadaria 0 0 19,062
(93%)
1,537
(7%)
20,599
(100%)
303 1,247
Dhobi 0 0 636
(36%)
1,118
(64%)
1,754
(100%)
80 934
Teli 0 0 3,907
(67%)
1,886
(33%)
5,794
(100%)
82 1,064
Passi 0 0 10,250
(66%)
5,309
(34%)
15,559
(100%)
255 1,508
Jatab 0 0 5,840
(43%)
7,893
(57%)
13,733
(100%)
142 994
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,117
TOTAL 24,727
(16%)
1,474
(1%)
89,462
(58%)
37,530
(25%)
153,193
(100%)
202 1,444
* All debts are in 
debts per caste by
cash figures, and expressed in 1983/84 rupees. In brackets, the percentage of total
Per capita indebtedness is expressed as total debts held by households of a particular caste divided 
by the population within that caste. Per capita income is obtained in a similar manner.
REAL AMOUNT OF DEBT OUTSTANDING BY CASTE AND SOURCE IN 1983/84*
Caste Public Urban Village Friends Others Total Per Capita Per Capita
Sector Money-
Lenders
Money and 
Lenders Relatives
Indebtedness* Income
Thakur 96,173
(94%)
900
(1%)
2,654
(3%)
2,130
(2%)
100 101,957 
(0%) (100%)
470 1,119
Murao 35,248
(71%)
8,940
(18%)
1,478
(3%)
3,371
(7%)
955 49,992 
(0%) (100%)
230 1,265
Dhimar 54,428
(75%)
200
(0%)
12,859
(18%)
2,716
(4%)
1,975 72,178 
(3%) (100%)
975 1,026
Gadaria 48,828 
(88%)
615
(1%)
4,100
(7%)
500
(1%)
1,194 55,237 
(2%) (100%)
666 1,112
Dhobi 2,080
(58%)
670
(19%)
388
(11%)
450
(13%)
0 3,588 
(0%) (100%)
133 922
Teli 16,190
(54%)
6,375
(21%)
4,740
(16%)
2,317
(8%)
400 30,022 
(1%) (100%)
326 784
Passi 42,351
(61%)
5,900
(8%)
5,547
(8%)
9,950
(14%)
6,122 69,870 
(9%) (100%)
822 1,202
Jatab 29,978
(87%)
1,360
(4%)
2,620
(8%)
50
(0%)
345 34,353 
(1%) (100%)
291 436
Other 7,893
(62%)
500
(4%)
378
(3%)
342
(3%)
3,555 12,668 
(28%) (100%)
270 1,023
TOTAL 333,168
(79%)
25,460
(6%)
34,764
(6%)
21,826 14,646 429,863 
(5%) (4%) (100%)
447 1,025
* In brackets, the percentage of total debts per caste , by source.
» Per capita indebtedness is expressed as total debts held by households of a particular caste divided
by the population within that caste. Per capita income is obtained in a similar manner.
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Table 17
REAL AMOUNT OF DEBT OUTSTANDING BY PER CAPITA INCOME AND SOURCE IN 1974/75*
Quintile 
of Income 
per capita
LDB Cane
Societv
FSS and 
Seed Store
Private Total Per Capita 
Indebtednei
Per Capita 
■a Income
poorest 2,096
(9%)
0 12,297
(51%)
9,500
(40%)
23,892
(100%)
157 673
2nd 4,191
(11%)
1,474
(4%)
22,512
(58%)
10,338
(27%)
38,515
(100%)
247 1,097
3rd 0 0 30,532
(86%)
4,910
(14%)
35,443
(100%)
205 1,343
4th 5,588
(23%)
0 9,226
(38%)
9,220
(38%)
24,033
(100%)
162 1,651
richest 12,852
(41%)
0 14,895
(48%)
3,562
(11%)
31,310
(100%)
245 2,679
TOTAL 24,727
(16%)
1,474
(1%)
89,462
(58%)
37,530
(25%)
153,193
(100%)
202 1,444
• All debts are in cash figures, and expressed in 1983/84 rupees, 
total debts per quintile by source.
In brackets, the percentage of
REAL AMOUNT OF DEBT OUTSTANDINQ BY QUINTILE AND SOURCE IN 1983/84*
Quintile 
of Per 
Capita 
Income
» Public 
Sector
Urban
Monev-
Lenders
Villaqe
Monev
Lenders
Friends
and
Relatives
Others Total Per Capita 
Indebtedness^
Per Capita 
Income
poorest 47,400
(71%)
7,780
(12%)
4,864
(7%)
5,950
(9%)
400
(1%)
66,394
(100%)
418 308
2nd 32,828
(74%)
2,000
(5%)
1,805
(4%)
5,092
(12%)
2,345
(5%)
44,070
(100%)
262 629
3rd 74,135
(81%)
4,365
(5%)
8,531
(9%)
2,330
(3%)
1,694
(2%)
91,055
(100%)
440 882
4th 58,999
(74%)
4,700
(5%)
5,749
(7%)
4,438
(6%)
5,717
(7%)
79,603
(100%)
370 1,233
richest 119,807
(81%)
6,615
(4%)
13,812
(8%)
4,016
(3%)
4,490
(3%)
148,740
(100%)
704 1,850
TOTAL 333,168
(79%)
25,460
(6%)
34,761
(6%)
21,826
(5%)
14,646
(4%)
429,863
(100%)
448 1,025
• In brackets, the percentage of total debts per quintile, by source.
Per capita indebtedness is expressed as total debts held by households of a particular quintile 
divided by the population within that quintile. Per capita income is obtained in a similar manner.
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Table 18
REAL AMOUNT OF DEBT OUTSTANDING BY LANDHOLDING CLASS AND SOURCE IN 1974/75*
Landholding LDB Cane FSS and Private Total Per Capita Per Capita
class
(bighas)
Societv Seed Store Indebtedne s s Income
0 0 0 930
(72%)
349
(27%)
1,279
(100%)
24 1,035
0 - 5 0 0 7,023
(57%)
5,378
(43%)
12,401
(100%)
153 1,022
5 - 1 5 2,095
(6%)
0 24,139
(86%)
10,128
(14%)
36,363
(100%)
249 1,056
15 - 30 11,176
(18%)
0 39,513
(65%)
9,849
(16%)
60,538
(100%)
218 1,453
30 - 50 0 0 8,005
(68%)
3,771
(32%)
11,777
(100%)
171 1,728
50+ 11,455
(37%)
1,474
(5%)
9,853
(32%)
8,054
(26%)
30,836
(100%)
239 2,146
TOTAL 24,727
(16%)
1,474
(1%)
89,462
(58%)
37,530
(25%)
153,193
(100%)
202 1,444
• All debts are in cash figures, and expressed in 1983/84 rupees. In brackets, 
total debts per landholding class by source.
the percentage of
REAL AMOUNT OF DEBT OUTSTANDING BY QUINTILE AND SOURCE IN 1983/84*
Land-
holding
Class
(bighas)
Public
Sector
Urban
Money-
Lenders
Village
Money
Lenders
Friends
and
Relatives
Others Total Per Capita Per Capita 
Indebtedness* Income
0 37,942
(75%)
2,225
(4%)
3,911
(8%)
4,109
(8%)
2,700
(5%)
50,887 410 
(100%)
851
0-5 42,894
(83%)
1,920
(4%)
4,396
(9%)
1,400
(3%)
1,200
(2%)
51,810 489 
(100%)
1,070
5-15 65,623
(69%)
9,615
(10%)
5,587
(6%)
9,500
(10%)
4,959
(5%)
95,284 454 
(100%)
901
15-30 105,799
(77%)
6,260
(5%)
16,575
(12%)
3,037
(2%)
5,655
(4%)
137,326 509 
(100%)
1,082
30-50 72,488
(86%)
5,340
(6%)
4,294
(5%)
1,650
(2%)
132
(0%)
83,904 749 
(100%)
1,014
50+ 8,423 100 0 2,130 0 10,653 77 1,234
TOTAL 333,168
(79%)
25,460
(6%)
34,763
(6%)
21,826
(5%)
14,646
(4%)
429,863 447 
(100%)
1,025
* In brackets, the percentage of total debts per class, by source.
 ^ Per capita indebtedness is expressed as total debts held by 
divided by the population within that class. Per capita income
households of a 
is obtained in f
particular class 
a similar manner.
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Table 19
Definition of Variables for 1974/75
Variable Mean Std Dev Sum
MURAO 0.24 0.43 27.0 dummy for Murao caste
PASSI 0.07 0.25 8.0 dummy for Passi caste
FSSDUM 0.57 0.50 64.0 dummy if borrowed from FSS
CULTINC7 6278.77 5565.82 696943.23 cultivation income
REGJOB7 1493.87 2725.03 165819.71 income from regular off-farm 
employment
LNDAGLAB 0.44 0.50 50.00 dummy for landed agricultural 
labour
LNDLES 0.09 0.29 10.00 dummy for Ictndless
NOCULT 0.16 0.37 18.00 dummy for non-cultivating
JOBDUM 0.33 0.47 38.00 dummy for outside job
FSSRUP 705.34 1309.86 78292.77 outstanding rupees to FSS
MACHINES 0.35 0.69 38.00 number of agricultural 
machines
MODRNAG 0.13 0.34 15.00 dummy if using modern 
agricultural machinery
RICH 0.40 0.49 44.00 dummy if household is in top 
40%
RICHEST 0.20 0.40 22.00 dummy if household is in top 
20%
LDLSAGLB 0.07 0.26 8.00 dummy for landless labourer
DECILE 5.54 2.90 615.00 decile of per capita income
QUINTILE 3.02 1.43 335.00 quintile of per capita income
LCULT 21.96 17.56 2438.00 land cultivated
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Table 20
Definition of Variables for 1983/84
Variable Mean Std Dev Sum
THAKUR 0.21 0.41 30.0 dummy for Thakur caste
MURAO 0.19 0.39 27.0 dummy for Murao caste
PASSI 0.10 0.31 15.0 dummy for Passi caste
FSSNEW 0.05 0.22 7.0 dummy if borrowed from FSS in 
1983/84
LOWN 18.15 20.91 2596.0 land owned
LCULT 18.53 22.47 2650.0 land cultivated
CULTINC8 2060.41 4163.68 294638.4 cultivation income
REGJOB8 2325.50 3756.38 332545.8 income from regular off-farm 
employment
LNDAGLAB 0.22 0.42 32.00 dummy for landed agricultural 
labour
AP 2.95 1.43 423.00 quintile on the basis of 
apparent prosperity
FSOLDRUP 95.73 545.39 13690.0 rupees outstanding on FSS 
loans incurred before 1983/84
LENDRUP 165.96 490.18 23734.6 rupees outstanding to reguleir 
moneylenders
VALVSTK 2333.90 2420.35 333760.0 value of livestock
LNDLES 0.18 0.39 27.00 dummy for landless
NOCULT 0.32 0.47 46.00 dummy for non-cultivating
JOBDUM 0.45 0.50 65.00 dummy for outside job
FSSRUP 1645.77 3545.39 235345.11 outstanding rupees to FSS
MACHINES 0.70 1.32 100.00 number of agricultural 
machines
MODRNAG 0.24 0.43 35.00 dummy if using modern 
agricultural machinery
RICH 0.40 0.49 57.00 dummy if household is in top 
40%
RICHEST 0.20 0.40 29.00 dummy if household is in top 
20%
LDLSAGLB 0.07 0.27 11.00 dummy for landless labourer
DECILE 5.50 2.90 787.00 decile of per capita income
QUINTILE 3.00 1.43 429.00 quintile of per capita income
LCULT 18.53 22.47 2650.00 land cultivated
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Table 21
Tobit Results for Borrowing from the Seed Store
1983/84
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 115
Observations > 0 :  28
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
Model
Dependent Variable:
Variable
Constant
Rupees Borrowed From 
the FSS in 1983
Seed Store 
(Rupees)
-188.57
(90.41)
0.25
(0.08)
Seed Store 
(log Rupees)
-2.15
(1.82)
Rupees Borrowed From 
the FSS in 1983 (Log)
Non-Cultivator Dummy
Modern Agricultural 
Practices Dummy
-491.93
(166.26)
-386.80
(178.49)
1.49
(0.46)
- 11.01
(3.46)
-8.71
(3.76)
Richest Quintile Dummy -251.10
(188.23)
-7.58
(4.18)
Standard Error 461.82
Log Likelihood(0) -258.84
Log Likelihood(M) -245.02
LR Test (Model) 27.64
Degrees of Freedom 4
Critical 9.49
LM Test (homoskedasticity) 98.21
Degrees of Freedom 10
Critical y} 18.30
Preferred Model ***
9.60
-152.88
-136.96
31.84
4
9.49
118.86
10
18.30
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Table 22
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Borrowing from the Seed Store
1983/84
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 115
Observations >0: 28
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses :
Model
Tobit Probit Ratio
Dependent Variable: Seed Store Seed Store Tobit/Probit*
(Rupees) (dummy)
Constant -188.57 -0.374 1.00
(90.41) (0.172)
Rupees Borrowed From 0.25 0.002 0.25
the FSS in 1983 (0.08) (0.001)
Non-Cultivator Dummy -491.93 -1.279 0.76
(166.26) (0.367)
Modern Agricultural -386.80 -1.086 0.71
Practices Dummy (178.49) (0.422)
Richest Quintile Dummy -251.10 -0.792 0.63
(188.23) (0.484)
Log Likelihood(0) -258.84 -70.72
Log Likelihood(M) -245.02 -52.83
LR Test (Model) 27.64 35.76
Degrees of Freedom 4 4
Critical x* 9.49 9.49
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate 0 ,^ the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of Œi ( Tobit ) /(%! ( Probit ) to ( Tobit ) /a^  ( Probit ) where tto is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 23
Tobit Results for Borrowing from the Seed Store
1974/75
Total Observations : 112
Observations at 0: 54
Observations >0: 58
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parenthesesi
Model
Dependent Variable;
Variable
Constant
Rupees Outstanding to 
the FSS in 1974/75
Seed Store 
(Rupees)
7.33
(27.08)
0.05
(0.01)
Seed Store 
(log Rupees)
- 2.12
(0.78)
Rupees Outstanding to 
the FSS in 1974/75 (log)
Non-Cultivator Dummy
Modern Agricultural 
Practices Dummy
-13.93
(51.81)
-50.19
(60.45)
0.94
(0.12)
-0.89
(0.98)
-0.43
(1.12)
Richest Quintile Dummy 1.84
(49.86)
—0 .04 
(0.93)
Standard Error
Log Likelihood(O)
Log Likelihood(M)
LR Test (Model)
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical y}
LM Test (homoskedasticity) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
Preferred Model
177.28
-427.94
-420.68
14.51
4
9.49
1.79
9
16.90
3.19
-212.64
-179.87
65 .64 
4
9.49
5.96
9
16.90
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Table 24
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Borrowing from the Seed Store
1974/75
Total Observations: 112
Observations at 0: 54
Observations >0: 58
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Tobit
Dependent Variable:
Constant
Rupees Outstanding to 
the FSS in 1974/75
Non-Cultivator Dummy
Modern Agricultural 
Practices Dummy
Seed Store 
(Rupees)
7.33
(27.08)
0.05
(0.01)
-13.93
(51.81)
-50.19 
(60.45)
Probit
Seed Store 
(dummy)
-0.092
(0.227)
0.0005
(0.0002)
-0.271
(0.451)
-0.479
(0.536)
Ratio
Tobit/Probit‘
1.00
1.26
0.65
1.32
Richest Quintile Dummy 1.84
(49.86)
-0.053
(0.436)
-0.44
Log Likelihood(0) 
Log Likelihood(M)
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
427.94
■420.68
14.51
4
9.49
-70.72
-52.83
35.76
4
9.49
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate a^ , the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of tti ( Tobit )/tti( Probit ) to a* ( Tobit ) /a^  ( Probit ) where is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 25
Double Hurdle Results for Borrowing from the Seed Store
White's Robust t-statistics in parentheses:
Model
Total Observations: 143 112
Observations at 0: 115 54
Observations > 0: 28 58
Dependent Variable: Seed Store Seed Store
Rupees Rupees
(1983/84) (1974/75)
Variable 1 2
FIRST HURDLE
Constant -0.463 -0.22
(-1.5) (-0.72)
Among Most Prosperous —0.707 0.14
Two Quintiles (-1.6) (0.34)
Non-Cultivating Household -1.060 -0.213
(-2.2) (-0.39)
Rupees Outstanding to FSS 0.0006 0.0005
(1.3) (2.00)
SECOND HURDLE
Constant 242.0 164.0
(7.1) (14.0)
Among Most Prosperous 114.0 13.7
Quintile (0.73) (0.42)
Non-Cultivating Household 215.0 37.7
(2.6) (1.40)
Modern Agricultural 22.8 32.0
Practices (0.14) (0.64)
Rupees Outstanding to FSS 0.022 0.014
(1.8) (1.8)
Standard Error 130.00 78.8
Log Likelihood(O) -258.84 -427.94
Log Likelihood(M) -210.87 -350.00
LR Test (Model) 95.94 155.88
Degrees of Freedom 4 4
Critical y} 9.49 9.49
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Table 26
Tobit Results for All Borrowing from the FSS 
1983/84
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 89
Observations >0: 54
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
Model
Dependent Variable: All FSS Borrowings 
(Rupees)
Variable 1 2
Constant -4246.6
(1081.5)
-3764.1
(1075.6)
Agricultural Labour 
Household with Land
3415.9
(1409.0)
3218.5
(1384.7)
Income from Cultivation 
in 1983/84
0.3
(0.1)
0.4
(0.1)
Income from Regular 
Off-Farm Employment
0.3
(0.1)
0.3
(0.1)
Murao Dummy -2703.2
(1731.2)
Standard Error 5975.3 5870.7
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
-599.4
-592.1
-599.4
-590.8
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
14.6
3
7.81
17.3
4
9.49
LR Test (Model2-Model1) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
2.5
1
3.8
LM Test (homoskedasticity) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical yj’
9.8
6
12.6
17.4
11
19.7
Preferred Model
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Table 27
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Borrowing from the FSS
1983/84
Total Observations: 143 
Observations at 0: 89 
Observations >0: 54
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses :
Model
Tobit Probit Ratio
Dependent Variable: FSS
(Rupees)
FSS
(dummy)
Tobit/Probit‘
Constant -3764.1
(1075.6)
-0.789
(0.174)
1.00
Agricultural Labour 
Household with Land
3218.5
(1384.7)
0.897
(0.270)
0.75
Income from Cultivation 
in 1983/84
0.4
(0.1)
0.00009
(0.00004)
0.93
Income from Regular 
Off-Farm Employment
0.3
(0.1)
0.00006 
(0.00003)
1.05
Murao Dummy -2703.2
(1731.2)
-0.334
(0.326)
1.69
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
-599.4
-590.8
-94.97
-84.10
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
17.3
4
9.49
21.74
4
9.49
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of tti(Tobit)/ai(Probit) to a,,(Tobit)/a,(Probit) where a,, is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 28
Tobit Results for All Borrowing from the FSS 
1974/75
Total Observations: 112
Observations at 0: 48
Observations >0: 64
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
Model
Dependent Variable: All FSS Borrowings 
(Rupees)
Variable 1 2
Constant -454.9
(376.8)
-304.4
(378.0)
Agricultural Labour 
Household with Land
1094.7
(442.9)
962.1
(440.9)
Income from Cultivation 
in 1974/75
0.00
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
Income from Regular 
Off-Farm Employment
-0.02
(0.08)
-0.02
(0.1)
Murao Dummy -891.4
(506.5)
Standard Error 1886.2 1862.1
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
-608.3 
—604.6
—60 8.3 
-603.1
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
7.2
3
7.81
10.4
4
9.49
LR Test (Mode12-Model1) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
3.0
1
3.8
LM Test (homoskedasticity) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
1.9
7
14.1
7.2
11
19.7
Preferred Model
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Table 29
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Borrowing from the FSS
1974/75
Total Observations: 112
Observations at 0: 48
Observations >0: 64
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Tobit Probit Ratio
Dependent Variable: FSS FSS Tobit/Probit^
(Rupees) (dummy)
Constant -304.4 -0.114 1.00
(378.0) (0.238)
Agricultural Labour 962.1 0.755 0.48
Household with Land (440.9) (0.279)
Income from Cultivation 0.02 0.00002 0.37
in 1983/84 (0.03) (0.00003)
Income from Regular -0.02 -0.00002 0.37
Off-Farm Employment (0.1) (0.00003)
Murao Dummy -891.4 -0.502 0.67
(506.5) (0.309)
Log Likelihood(O) -608.3 -76.49
Log Likelihood(M) -603.1 -69.05
LR Test (Model) 10.4 14.88
Degrees of Freedom 4 4
Critical 9.49 9.49
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate a^ , the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of « 1  ( Tobit ) /a^  ( Probit ) to a@ ( Tobit ) /a,, ( Probit ) where is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 30
Double Hurdle Results for Borrowing from the FSS
White's Robust t-statistics in parentheses:
Model
Total Observations: 143 112
Observations at 0: 89 48
Observations > 0: 54 64
Dependent Variable: All FSS All FSS
Rupees Rupees
(1983/84) (1974/75)
Variable 1 2
FIRST HURDLE
Constant 1.39 6.63
(4.1) (60.0)
Agricultural Labour 2.29 -1.40
Household with Land (6.3) (-9.0)
SECOND HURDLE
Constant -5640.0 -304.0
(-4.0) (-0.88)
Agricultural Labour 1510.0 962.0
Household with Land (0.99) (2.0)
Murao Dummy -2000.0 -891.0
(-0.98) (-1.6)
Household Cultivation 0.485 0.023
Income Respective Year (3.2) (0.77)
Income from Regular Off- 0.535 —0.018
Farm Work in Respective (3.2) (-0.28)
Year
Standard Error 6270.0 1860.0
Log Likelihood(O) -599.40 -603.10
Log Likelihood(M) -545.98 -544.25
LR Test (Model) 106.84 117.70
Degrees of Freedom 4 4
Critical 9.49 9.49
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Table 31
Tobit Results for Other Formal Borrowings 
1983/84
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 115
Observations >0: 28
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Dependent Variable: Other Formal Borrowings
(Rupees)
Other Formal Borrowings 
(log Rupees)
Variable 1 2 3 4
Constant -5543.4 -4889.9 -11.4 -11.7
(1332.4) (1335.2) (3.0) (3.1)
Murao Dummy -9474.9 -9813.1 -17.1 -16.8
(3558.3) (3707.9) (6.9) (6.8)
Machines 2161.3 2831.5 3.8 3.6
(737.9) (945.3) (1.5) (1.6)
Regular Job Income 0.2 0.2
(0.2) (0.2)
Regular Job Income 0.5 0.5
(log) (0.3) (0.3)
Land Owned -61.7
(48.4)
Land Owned (log) 0.3
(0.7)
Standard Error 5280.8 5229.1 10.6 10.5
Log Likelihood(O) -325.4 -325.4 -152.4 -152.4
Log Likelihood(M) -317.0 -316.1 -144.6 -144.5
LR Test (Model) 16.8 18.5 15.5 15.7
Degrees of Freedom 3 4 3 4
Critical yj 7.81 9.49 7.81 9.49
LM Test 33.8 94.4 41.3 40.3
(homoskedasticity)
Degrees of Freedom 7 11 7 11
Critical 14.1 19.7 14.1 19.7
Preferred Model
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Table 32
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Other Formal Borrowings
1983/84
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 115
Observations >0: 28
Estimated coefficients with asynqptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Tobit Probit Ratio
Dependent Variable: Other Formal Other Formal Tobit/Probit*
(Rupees) (dummy)
Constant -5543.4 -1.055 1.00
(1332.4) (0.174)
Murao Dummy -9474.9 -1.660 1.09
(3558.3) (0.661)
Machines 2161.3 0.364 1.13
(737.9) (0.142)
Income from Regular 0.2 0.00005 0.76
Off-Farm Employment (0.2) (0.00003)
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
-325.4
■317.0
16.8
3
7.81
-70.72
-63.55
14.35
3
7.81
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate cx^, the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of « 1  ( Tobit ) /a^  ( Probit ) to a* ( Tobit ) /«„ ( Probit ) where a„ is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 33
Tobit Results for Other Formal Borrowings 
1974/75
Total Observations: 112
Observations at 0: 104
Observations >0: 7
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Dependent Variable: Other Formal Borrowings
(Rupees)
Other Formal Borrowings 
(log Rupees)
Variable 1 2 3 4
Constant -11389.6 -12945.5 -22.9 -36.7
(4502.4) (5067.9) (9.5) (18.9)
Murao Dummy 37.2 -1509.8 -1.4 -4.2
(3351.8) (3524.4) (7.0) (7.1)
Machines 2103.1 -541.2 4.2 0.4
(1958.6) (2472.5) (4.0) (4.6)
Regular Job Income -1.5 -1.4
(1.4) (1.4)
Regular Job Income -1.1 -1.0
(log) (1.0) (1.0)
Land Owned 129.5
(93.7)
Land Owned (log) 5.7
(5.1)
Standard Error 7578.2 7226.1 15.5 14.9
Log Likelihood(O) -90.3 -90.3 -47.1 -47.1
Log Likelihood(M) -88.5 -87.4 -45.7 -44.5
LR Test (Model) 3.7 5.9 2.8 5.2
Degrees of Freedom 3 4 3 4
Critical 7.81 9.49 7.81 9.49
LM Test 83.9 83.7 92.9 102.4
(homoskedasticity)
Degrees of Freedom 7 12 7 12
Critical 14.1 21.0 14.1 19.7
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Table 34
Probit Results for Borrowing from Other Formal Sector Sources
1974/75
Dependent Variable: Othdum 
Total Observations: 112
Observations at 0: 105
Observations at 1: 7
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
Model
Variable 1 2 3 4
Constant -1.867 -1.829 -1.649 -1.614
(0.252) (0.264) (0.286) (0.350)
Dummy for Modern 1.244 1.289 1.409 1.481
Agriculture (0.429) (0.448) (0.479) (0.649)
Murao -0.205 -0.363 -0.327
(0.505) (0.541) (0.583)
Job dummy -0.807 -0.816
(0.602) (0.602 )
Land Owned -0.002
(0.013)
Log Likelihood(O) -26.185 -26.185 -26.185 -26.185
Log Likelihood(M) -22.080 -21.963 -20.826 -20.812
LR Test (Model) 8.209 8.444 10.718 10.745
Degrees of Freedom 1 2 3 4
Critical 3.840 5.990 7.810 9.490
LR Test (Modell) 0.234 2.508 2.536
Degrees of Freedom 1 2 3
Critical 3.840 5.990 7.810
Preferred Model
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Table 35
Tobit Results for Borrowing from Urban Moneylenders
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 121
Observations > 0 :  22
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Dependent Variable: Urban Moneylender
(Rupees)
Variable 1 2 3
Constant -2632.7 -2417.4 -2214.4
(673.6) (651.4) (662.3)
Murao Dummy 1277.5 1959.7 2170.1
(735.6) (880.4) (928.5
Agricultural Labour -1521.3 -1825.3 -1866.4
Household with Land (986.3) (1027.8) (1028.1)
Machines Owned -455.3 -287.6
(302.0) (350.0)
Land Owned -19.3
(23.1)
Standard Error 2492.7 2472.9 2454.3
Log Likelihood(O) -241.3 -241.3 -241.3
Log Likelihood(M) -238.0 -236.7 -236.3
LR Test (Model) 6.5 9.1 9.8
Degrees of Freedom 2 3 4
Critical 5.99 7.81 9.49
LR Test (Against Model 1) 2.6 3.4
Degrees of Freedom 1 2
Critical y} 3.84 5.99
LM Test (homoskedasticity) 85.8 75.4 71.8
Degrees of Freedom 2 6 11
Critical yj 5.99 12.6 19.7
Preferred Model
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Table 36
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Urban Moneylenders
1983/84
Total Observations : 143
Observations at 0: 121
Observations > 0 :  22
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses :
Model
Tobit Probit Ratio
Dependent Variable: Urban Urban Tobit/Probit*
(Rupees) (dummy)
Constant -2632.7 -1.073 1.00
(673.6) (0.162)
Murao Dummy 1277.5 0.596 0.87
(735.6) (0.297)
Agricultural Labour -1521.3 -0.551 1.13
Household with Land (986.3) (0.388)
Log Likelihood(0) 
Log Likelihood(M)
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical y}
-241.3
■238.0
6.5
2
5.99
-61.39
-57.99
6.78
2
5.99
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate 0 ,^ the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of tti ( Tobit )/a^ ( Probit ) to a, ( Tobit ) /a@ ( Probit ) where is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 37
Tobit Results for Borrowing from Village Moneylenders
Total Observations :
Observations at 0:
Observations > 0:
143
106
37
1983/84
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Variable
Constant
1
-1908.7
(501.7)
2
-1574.9
(447.6)
3
-1052.1
(252.8)
4
-905.0
(332.0)
5
-858.7
(330.8)
Decile in Apparent 
Prosperity Ranking
-84.7
(54.5)
-56.3
(53.0)
Quintile in Apparent 
Prosperity Ranking
-96.4
(106.0)
-115.7
(105.0)
Dummy for Richest 
Two Quintiles
-479.7
(305.9)
Land Cultivated 
(Bighas)
15.5
(6.4)
13.1
(6.4)
13.2
(5.9)
19.5
(7.7)
26.5
(8.1)
Land Owned 
(Bighas)
Outside Job 
Dummy
417.4
(257.8)
Agricultural Labour 
Household with Land
778.2
(287.8)
877.0
(297.8)
818.4
(293.2)
703.0
(278.0)
Landless Agricultural 
Labour Household
439.0
(440.6)
Rupees from the FSS 0.1
(0.04)
0.1
(0.04)
Value of Livestock -0.13
(0.08)
Number of Machines 
(for Agriculture)
-425.9
(161.3)
Standard Error 1084.7 1131.4 1115.8 1070.0 1066.9
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
-361.7
-353.1
-361.7
-354.4
-361.7
-353.6
-361.7
-349.8
-361.7
-350.4
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical y}
17.3
4
9.49
14.8
3
7.81
16.1
3
7.81
23.8
5
11.1
22.7
5
11.1
LR Test (Model 1-2) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical y}
2.5
1
3.8
LM Test
(homoskedasticity) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
19.5
11
19.7
8.6
7
14.1
8.7
6
12.6
31.8
18
28.9
13.6
17
21.0
Preferred Model * * *
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Table 38
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Village Moneylenders
1983/84
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 106
Observations >0: 37
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Tobit Probit Ratio
Dependent Variable: Moneylender Moneylender Tobit/Probit^
(Rupees) (dummy)
Constant -858.7 -0.520 1.00
(330.8) (0.312)
Quintile in Apparent -115.7 -0.161 0.44
Prosperity Ranking (105.0) (0.105)
Land Cultivated 26.5 -0.014 1.15
(8.1) (0.009)
Landless Agricultural 439.0 0.276 0.96
Labour Household (440.6) (0.442)
Rupees from the FSS 0.1 0.0001 0.61
(0.04) (0.00004)
Number of Machines -425.9 -0.261 0.99
(for Agriculture) (161.3) (0.161)
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
-361.7
-350.4
22.7
5
11.1
-81.76
-72.66
18.18
5
11.1
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of tti ( Tobit )/a^ ( Probit ) to a„ ( Tobit ) /a^ ( Probit ) where is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 39
Tobit Results for Borrowing from Village Moneylenders
1974/75
Total Observations : 112
Observations at 0: 79
Observations > 0 :  32
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Dependent Variable: Moneylender Borrowings (Rupees)
Variable
Constant
1
-661.9
(534.8)
2
-666.1
(531.2)
3
-1277.7
(469.9)
4
-494.7
(557.9)
5
-217.8
(527.6)
Decile in Income 
Ranking
-150.1
(87.7)
-161.9
(84.6)
Quintile in Income 
Ranking
-389.4
(177.4)
-352.9
(166.1)
Dummy for Richest 
Two Quintiles
-324.4
(473.7)
Land Cultivated 
(Bighas)
14.2
(13.9)
16.5
(13.1)
7.9
(12.6)
14.6
(13.3)
22.9
(14.8)
Outside Job 
Dummy
-256.8
(526.8)
Agricultural Labour 
Household with Land
591.6
(500.0)
456.1
(410.7)
574.6
(420.8)
391.7
(418.1)
Landless Agricultural 
Labour Household
-1254.0
(1008.8)
Rupees from the FSS 0.03
(0.16)
0.1
(0.2)
Value of Livestock 0.19
(0.33)
Number of Machines 
(for Agriculture)
-590.1
(412.9)
Standard Error 1640.2 1635.4 1659.4 1615.7 1710.0
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
-320.2
-316.7
-320.2
-316.8
-320.2
-318.6
-320.2
-316.2
-320.2
-314.5
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
7.0
4
9.49
6.7
3
7.81
3.2
3
7.81
8.0
5
11.1
11.4
5
11.1
LR Test (Model 1-2) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
0.2
1
3.8
LM Test
(homoskedasticity) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical y}
58.9
11
19.7
64.6
7
14.1
59.2
6
12.6
62.7
18
28.9
98.7
17
28.9
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Table 40
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Village Moneylenders
1974/75
Total Observations: 112
Observations at 0: 79
Observations >0: 33
Estimated coefficients with asyn^totic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Tobit Probit Ratio
Dependent Variable: Moneylender Moneylender Tobit/Probit^
(Rupees) (dummy)
Constant -217.8 0.182 — 1.00
(527.6) (0.352)
Quintile in Income -352.9 -0.277 1.06
Ranking (166.1) (0.110)
Land Cultivated 22.9 0.011 1.74
(14.8) (0.010)
Landless Agricultural -1254.0 -0.928 1.13
Labour Household (1008.8) (0.634)
Rupees from the FSS 0.1 0.00002 4.18
(0.2) (0.0001)
Number of Machines -590.1 -0.484 1.02
(for Agriculture) (412.9) (0.282)
Log Likelihood(O) -320.2 -67.01
Log Likelihood(M) -314.5 -58.82
LR Test (Model) 11.4 16.03
Degrees of Freedom 5 5
Critical x* 11.1 11.1
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of ( Tobit )/tti ( Probit ) to Qq (Tobit )/tto( Probit ) where is the coefficient
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 41
Double Hurdle Results for Borrowing from Village Moneylenders; 1
White's Robust t-statistics in parentheses:
Total Observations: 
Observations at 0: 
Observations > 0:
Dependent Variable:
Model
143
106
37
Moneylender
Rupees
(1983/84)
112
80
32
Moneylender
Rupees
(1974/75)
Variable 1 2
FIRST HURDLE
Constant 2.39 1.09
(0.029) (1.5)
Prosperity Ranking 
(Quintile)^
-0.67 -0.43
(-0.057) (-1.9)
SECOND HURDLE
Constant -1010.0 —860.0
(-0.11) (-1.70)
Landless Agricultural 465.0 58.8
Labour Household (0.09) (0.1)
Prosperity Ranking 
(Quintile)^
138.0 23.6
(0.029) (0.19)
Land Cultivated in 39.7 54.8
Respective Year (0.50) (3.0)
Rupees Outstanding to 0.034 0.67
the FSS (0.02) (5.0)
Number of Agricultural -296.0 -301.0
Machines Owned (-0.21) (-0.64)
Standard Error 772.0 811.0
Log Likelihood(O) -361.70 -320.20
Log Likelihood(M) -313.39 -277.81
LR Test (Model) 96.62 84.78
Degrees of Freedom 7 7
Critical yj 14.10 14.10
1. Prosperity in 1983/84 is defined using the apparent prosperity criterion. 
For 1974/75, current income is the criterion used to define prosperity.
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Table 42
Double Hurdle Results for Borrowing from Village Moneylenders; 2
White's Robust t-statistics in parentheses:
Total Observations: 
Observations at 0: 
Observations > 0:
Model
143
106
37
112
80
32
Dependent Variable: 
Variable
Moneylender
Rupees
(1983/84)
1
Moneylender
Rupees
(1974/75)
2
FIRST HURDLE
Constant 1.67 1.05
(0.50) (1.4)
Prosperity Ranking 
(Quintile)^
-0.54 -0.43
(0.80) (-1.8)
SECOND HURDLE
Constant -803.0 -673.0
(-1.1) (-1.20)
Agricultural Labour 367.0 -126.0
Household with Land (1.8) (-0.4)
Prosperity Ranking 
(Quintile)^
206.0 11.2
(2.8) (0.09)
Land Cultivated in 48.1 48.3
Respective Year (5.7) (4.7)
Rupees Outstanding to 0.011 0.66
the FSS (0.23) (6.7)
Value of Livestock -0.225
(-2.6)
Number of Livestock^ 66.0
(0.70)
Standard Error 608.0 787.0
Log Likelihood(O) -361.70 -320.20
Log Likelihood(M) -308.42 -277.77
LR Test (Model) 106.56 84.86
Degrees of Freedom 7 7
Critical 14.10 14.10
Prosperity in 1983/84 is defined using the apparent prosperity 
criterion.For 1974/75, current income is the criterion used to define 
prosperity.
The double hurdle model for 1974/75 with the value of livestock as an 
explanatory variable failed to converge so the number of livestock was 
included instead.
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Table 43
Tobit Results for Interest-Free Borrowings
Total Observations : 143
Observations at 0: 121
Observations >0: 22
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Dependent Variable: Interest Free Borrowings 
(Rupees)
Interest Free Borrowings 
(log Rupees)
Variable 1 2 3 4
Constant -1683.9 -1902.4 -13.2 -12.2
(397.9) (439.5) (3.3) (3.0)
Outside Job Dummy 689.7 807.7 5.6 4.9
(326.9) (343.3) (2.4) (2.2)
Thakur Dummy -113.6
(386.2)
Poorest Quintile 552.7 2.9
in Apparent (369.0) (2.5)
Prosperity Ranking
Borrowings From 0.4 0.4
Village Moneylenders (0.2) (0.2)
Borrowings From Village 0.8 0.8
Moneylenders (in logs) (0.4) (0.4)
Standard Error 1185.6 1170.1 8.1 8.2
Log Likelihood(O) -225.2 -225.2 -118.2 -118.2
Log Likelihood(M) -220.0 -218.9 -111.9 -112.6
LR Test (Model) 10.4 12.6 12.7 11.3
Degrees of Freedom 3 3 3 2
Critical 7.81 7.81 7.81 5.99
LM Test 31.0 52.9 54.8 64.2
(homoskedasticity)
Degrees of Freedom 6 5 6 4
Critical y} 12.6 11.1 12.6 9.49
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Table 44
Comparison of Tobit and Probit Models for Interest-Free Borrowings
1983/84
Total Observations: 143
Observations at 0: 121
Observations >0: 22
Estimated coefficients with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses:
Model
Tobit
Dependent Variable:
Constant
Outside Job Dummy
Poorest Quintile in 
Apparent Prosperity 
Ranking
Borrowings from Village 
Moneylenders
Interest-free
(Rupees)
-1902.4
(439.5)
807.7 
(343.3)
552.7 
(369.0)
0.4
(0.2)
Probit
Interest-free
(dummy)
-1.566
(0.245)
0.573
(0.286)
0.453
(0.317)
0.0006
(0.0003)
Ratio
Tobit/Probit^
1.00
1.16
1.00
0.55
Log Likelihood(O) 
Log Likelihood(M)
LR Test (Model) 
Degrees of Freedom 
Critical
-225.2
■220.0
10.4
3
7.81
-61.39
-54.86
19.06
3
7.81
Note:
1. For variable i, coefficient estimate 0 ,^ the ratio is defined as the ratio 
of tti ( Tobit )/tti ( Probit ) to a,, (Tobit ) /«„ ( Probit ) where a* is the coefficient 
estimate for the constant term.
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Table 45
Double Hurdle Results for Interest Free Borrowing in 1983/84
White's Robust t-statistics in parentheses:
Total Observations: 
Observations at 0: 
Observations > 0:
Model
143
121
22
Dependent Variable: 
Variable
Interest Free 
Rupees 
(1983/84)
1
FIRST HURDLE
Constant 5.47
(42.0)
Dummy for Regular -0.42
Off-Farm Employment (-0.9)
SECOND HURDLE
Constant 1900.0
(-3.3)
Dummy for Regular 808.0
Off-Farm Employment (1.9)
Among the Least 553.0
Prosperous Quintile (1.3)
Rupees Outstanding to 0.445
Village Moneylenders (2.6)
Standard Error 1170.0
Log Likelihood(O) -225.20
Log Likelihood(M) -198.67
LR Test (Model) 53.06
Degrees of Freedom 5
Critical y} 11.10
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions
The individual chapters in this thesis have concluded with a summary 
of the main points. We shall be brief here, highlighting some of the 
principal findings from the study and attempting to relate the conclusions 
in different chapters to each other.
The impact of change on an economy can be complex and profound, no 
less for the economy of a small village in rural India than for the large 
economies of developed countries. The process of change in the economy of 
Palanpur has been associated with many different (though related) factors, 
but we have suggested that three have been of major importance. These are 
population growth in the face of limited opportunities to extend land 
access; agricultural intensification associated with technological change; 
and the expansion of employment opportunities outside agriculture. We have 
seen that the influence of these factors has been such that, over time, the 
distribution of incomes from economic activity has been neither constant 
nor moving in a uniform direction.
We saw in Chapter 2 that in Palanpur, the process of agricultural 
intensification often referred to as the "Green Revolution" has not been 
to the unambiguous advantage of large landowners. Influential factors on 
the distribution of agricultural incomes include the quality of harvest in 
combination with the distribution of operational holdings. There is some 
suggestion that during the earlier stages of agricultural intensification 
the correlation between operational and ownership holdings was less marked 
than later, but that this strengthened as skilled farmers resisted 
partitioning land in the face of demographic pressure (therefore emerging 
as the largest land owners) and also increasingly took land under tenancy 
to expand their operational holdings.
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The influence of agricultural income inequality on total income 
inequality declined sharply between the earlier surveys and 1983/84. This 
was largely replaced by the rising influence of outside job incomes. In 
the later survey year inequality in outside job income accounted for nearly 
half of total income inequality. Outside jobs increased significantly in 
number over the whole survey period, with the largest rise observed between 
the 1974/75 and 1983/84. The sharp influence of outside job incomes on 
total income inequality was not due solely to the increase in the number 
of jobs. In Palanpur it appears that outside job incomes only recently 
became attractive to the rich in the village. For example, the correlation 
between outside job incomes and total incomes in 1974/75 was nearly zero, 
but by 1983/84 had become very strong and positive.
What has been the impact of the changing economic environment on the 
position of the poor in Palanpur? To be able to address such a question, 
one must have an idea of the meaning of poverty as well as the identity of 
the poor. Such issues are not always straightforward. We have
scrutinized in some detail the implications of using income to proxy living 
standards and therefore lack of income as an indicator of poverty. We 
demonstrated that conclusions which one reaches about the nature and extent 
of poverty in Palanpur, as well as the identity of the poor, may be very 
sensitive to one or a combination of the many assumptions, conventions and 
definitions we make when we use income. These include decisions relating 
to the period over which incomes are measured, the components of income we 
include, the choice of unit of analysis, and so on. Even where we are 
prepared to accept income as a proxy for the standard of living, we have 
stressed that the measurement of income inequality, poverty or welfare 
involves an additional body of assumptions and conventions, related to the 
choice of which particular measure we use. In standard approaches to 
measurement, assumptions included in this "second-tier" often remain 
implicit.
We have indicated that there exist approaches to the measurement of 
poverty, inequality and welfare which seek to rank distributions on the
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basis of any of these three criteria. This ranking is ordinal, and may in 
some cases only be partial. However, where a ranking does obtain, 
following this approach, it holds over a wide range of the specific 
measures which are available, and therefore is not sensitive to the 
particular assumptions embodied in those measures. This approach can be 
seen to address many of the issues raised by the presence of “second-tier" 
assumptions.
In our examination of poverty in Palanpur in Chapter 3 we compared 
identification of the poor using in turn current income, income averaged 
over the four survey years and "apparent prosperity" as indicators. This 
last indicator is a much broader measure of living standard which 
implicitly embodies components such as wealth, health, life-style, 
consumption, etc. The "apparent-prosperity" indicator is an ordinal 
measure available only for the 1983/84 survey year and was constructed by 
the investigators in the village during that year. While some broad 
agreement is found between incomes and apparent prosperity, there is clear 
divergence in some cases, for example where omitted income components are 
important, or where the apparent prosperity indicator makes implicit 
adjustments for household size. In addition, where we use current income 
to calculate the incidence of poverty among households with different 
characteristics, our comparisons with apparent prosperity reveal the 
possibility of systematic biases in the use of income. Income is a "noisy" 
measure of living standard in any particular survey year and calculating 
the incidence of poverty among different groups can result in systematic 
overestimation of the poverty incidence among those who are not poor, and 
underestimation among those who are.
In terms of current income, average income and apparent prosperity we 
have found that the incidence of poverty among agricultural labour 
households and among households of the Jatab caste to be consistently high. 
The incidence of poverty among landless households is not as high as one 
might expect, but this finding is associated with the phenomena of 
household partitioning, the increased availability of outside employment,
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and the persistence of some traditional non-agricultural occupations within 
the village. Another household characteristic which is well correlated 
with poverty is the absence of a fit adult male, in particular in 
combination with landlesness or with the household head being a widow.
When we implement, in Chapter 4, the approach which permits us to 
address the question of different underlying assumptions in specific 
measures of living standards, we restrict our attention to income as our 
indicator. We suggested that the stochastic dominance approach, or the 
'primal', (as opposed to the widely used Lorenz dominance approach - the 
'dual') is best suited to the purpose of examining inequality, poverty and 
welfare within a unified framework. In our attempts to rank the data for 
Palanpur on the basis of poverty and welfare, although not inequality, we 
found that the 1974/75 survey year clearly ranks higher than the other 
survey years. In terms of inequality and poverty (but not welfare), we can 
also rank the 1957/58 survey above the 19 62/63 survey. Further rankings 
cannot be obtained unless we make some restrictions on the class of living- 
standards functions accepted. In an intermediate approach which we call 
the 'e-dominance' approach we restricted the extent to which we accomodated 
widely divergent distributional views (and the specific measures which 
embody those views). As a result of making what most commentators might 
accept as being mild restrictions, we saw that in terms of welfare we are 
now able to rank all distributions; 1974/75 followed by 1983/84, then 
1957/58 and finally 1962/63.
In Chapter 5 we examined economic mobility in Palanpur, in particular 
the economic mobility of agricultural labour households. We suggested that 
income mobility in the village as a whole as well as among agricultural 
labour households is quite high. However, agricultural labour households 
also tend to be highly represented among the poor in any given year and 
experience little occupational mobility over time. The divergence between 
high income mobility of these households and their incidence of poverty can 
be reconciled by pointing to the largely transitory movements which occur 
in the income space and which do not reflect long-term changes in living
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standards. We suggest that against the backdrop of economic change in 
Palanpur, the position of a sizeable group in the population experiencing 
a high incidence of poverty, does not appear to have altered markedly.
Finally we investigated the role of one particular market in Palanpur 
which has been influential on the outcomes in terms of income levels, 
income distribution, and poverty which we have observed. The credit market 
in Palanpur is highly segmented, not only in terms of a formal/informal 
dichotomy, but also within the informal segment. Debts outstanding to 
formal sources are much greater than to informal sources but care must be 
taken in the interpretation of these figures. Fraudulent accounting 
practices in some formal sources may suggest that more lending takes place 
in this segment than actually occurs. In addition, the turnover of loans 
may be higher in the informal segments. There is strong evidence of 
rationing in the Palanpur credit market, and poor households appear to have 
restricted access to sources offering credit at low-cost. Over time 
interest rates from village moneylenders have been rising. New informal 
sources of credit have appeared in the village. Urban moneylenders in 
nearby towns lend to villagers, but demand jewelry as collateral. Interest 
free lending between friends and relatives has also shown an increase and 
is greatest among those with outside jobs and access to village moneylender 
loans. Neither of these two emerging segments are likely to have 
benefitted the poor in a significant way. There is little in the operation 
of the Palanpur credit market which suggests that it is well placed to help 
the poor in Palanpur raise their living standards and reduce their 
vulnerability.
The study of income inequality, poverty and mobility in Palanpur has 
provided a number of insights into the way in which a changing economic 
environment can affect living standards. This type of enquiry for rural 
India is still relatively rare as it is crucially dependent on the 
availability of appropriate longitudinal data. Moreover, an understanding 
of the processes which can play an important role often involves examining 
several markets and institutions simultaneously as well their various
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interlinkages. In both these respects the detailed study of a village is 
a useful vehicle with which to proceed. We cannot assert that what is 
observed in Palanpur also holds for villages elsewhere in India, but the 
analysis and ideas here may be compared with economic theories and with 
findings from studies elsewhere. If propositions and theories are 
expounded which do not find support in Palanpur's experience the we may 
learn something of them by trying to understand where and how they fail. 
If ideas from elsewhere find confirmation in a very detailed study like 
Palanpur, then such support would, we hope, be worth having. In addition, 
it is hoped that ideas generated from the Palanpur study may prove fruitful 
in understanding problems and circumstances elsewhere.
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